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The study is undertaken on the premise that the technological 
advancement of blogs has not only accorded a novel platform for 
communication, but has also democratised the right to exercise 
political expression in Malaysia. Blogs have on numerous occasions 
outpaced restrictive laws that were enacted to curtail the exercise of 
this fundamental right and have caused great challenges in applying 
the existing specific media laws to online content in the blogosphere. 
The main purpose of the study is to resolve the legal uncertainties 
faced by bloggers in disseminating political speech under the existing 
laws of the country and to analyse the legal position in the United 
Kingdom as a comparative model or reference to the issue. In so 
doing, the study examines the general principles and restrictive laws 
to freedom of expression and the application of these rules to political 
blogs, scrutinises the statutory rules and regulations that are currently 
being employed to govern the traditional media and the Internet as 
well as other relevant general legislation, in particular the law of 
defamation, that has been commonly employed to regulate blog 
entries and comments by readers in both countries. The study 
concludes that although offline and online content should not be 
treated differently and certain regulatory controls are undoubtedly 
necessary to prevent misuse of political blogs by unscrupulous 
persons, any legal measures to be adopted by the Malaysian 
government to govern political blogs should take into account the 
rapid development of various forms of Internet based communications 
and be proportionate in light of current needs and the local 
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1.1 Overview and Rationale of the Study 
Malaysia is a democratic country with a written constitution that 
guarantees the fundamental rights of its citizens including freedom of 
speech and expression. The existence of the right is central to the 
democratic process in Malaysia as it enables the people to acquire a 
reasonable understanding of political issues and to make informed 
judgments in elections. Nonetheless, the exercise of the right has been 
severely constrained by a long list of restrictive laws passed by the 
Parliament. To intensify the issue, the traditional print and broadcast 
media have been strictly controlled by the government via the 
imposition of prior restraints in the form of licences and permits, and 
the adoption of ownership mechanisms.
1
 As a result, news and 
information disseminated by the mainstream media are often biased 
and partial towards the ruling party. This has indirectly affected the 
democratic status of the country and as a result, various labels have 





 and ‘flawed democracy’.
4
 
The evolution of the World Wide Web (the Web),
5
 from its first form 
Web 1.0 (the read only web) into the new version of Web 2.0 (the read 
– write web),
6
 appears to offer a novel platform for freedom of 
                                                 
1
 Wang Lay Kim, ‘Malaysia: Ownership as Control’ (1998) 2 Dev Dialogue 61, 65 – 
74. 
2
 Larry Diamond, ‘Thinking about Hybrid Regimes’ (2002) 13(2) JOD 21, 33. 
3
 William Case, ‘Semi-Democracy in Malaysia: Pressures and Prospects for Change’ 
(1993) 66(2) Pac Aff 183, 183. 
4
 Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘The Democracy Index 2012: Democracy at a 
Standstill’, 2012 at 
<www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy-Index-
2012.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=DemocracyIndex12> [accessed 7 May 2013]. 
5
 The Web is to be distinguished from the Internet. See Przemysław Paul Polański, 
Customary Law of the Internet: In the Search for a Supranational Cyberspace Law 
(T.M.C. Asser Press 2007) 17. 
6
 The term ‘Web 2.0’ was initially coined by Darcy DiNucci in 1999 but it was 
closely associated with O’Reilly Media Inc and was popularly used by Dale 
Dougherty in 2004. See Paul Anderson, ‘What is Web 2.0? Ideas, Technologies and 
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expression. The development of Web 2.0 has enabled Internet users 
not only to read critical views of the government, but also to 
contribute and provide information
7
 through various applications that 
are largely based on user-generated content (UGC)
8
 like blogs, wikis, 
social networking sites and other user generated media sites.
9
 Out of 
these platforms, it was argued that blogs with a political slant or 
political blogs have not only revitalised the people’s right to exercise 
freedom of expression, but they have also reshaped and redefined the 
landscape of the media in Malaysia.
10
 
Political blogs in Malaysia were reported to have garnered the highest 
interest and attention of the blogosphere among seven Asian 
countries.
11
 This is arguably due to the widespread perception that 
Internet based publications are free of government controls.
12
 
Consequently, political blogs have been resorted to publish and 
express personal opinions and dissenting views against the 
government’s policies and decisions.
13
 Political blogs also play a 
significant role as ‘watchdog to watchdog’ (mainstream media)
14
 or 
                                                                                                                   
Implications for Education’, 2007, JISC 
<http://www.jisc.ac.uk/media/documents/techwatch/tsw0701b.pdf> [accessed 14 
February 2011]. 
7
 Peggy Valcke and Marieke Lenaerts, ‘Who’s Author, Editor and Publisher in User-
generated Content? Applying Traditional Media Concepts to UGC - Providers’ 
(2010) 24(1) IRLCT, 120. 
8
 There is no specific definition of UGC but it is generally understood to cover all 
content that is put online by users, regardless of whether it is created by them or not. 
9
 P. A. Bernal, ‘Web 2.5: The Symbiotic Web’ (2010) 24 (1) IRLCT 25, 26 – 28. 
10
 Tang Hang Wu, ‘Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom: A Malaysian Case Study on 
Blogging towards a Democratic Culture’ (presented at the 20th BILETA Conference 
BILETA 23 June 2005). 
11
 PR Newswire, ‘Blogging Phenomenon Sweeps Asia’28 November 2006) 
<http://prnwire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/11-28-
2006/0004480819&EDATE=> [accessed 2 August 2010]. 
12
 Stuart Biegel, Beyond Our Control? Confronting the Limits of Our Legal System 
in the Age of Cyberspace (MIT Press 2001) 53. 
13
 Brian Ulicny, ‘Modeling Malaysian Public Opinion by Mining the Malaysian 
Blogosphere’ in Huan Liu and others (eds), Social Computing, Behavioral 
Modeling, and Prediction (Springer US 2008) 211. 
14
 Laura McKenna and Antoinette Pole, ‘What Do Bloggers Do: An Average Day on 
an Average Political Blog’ (2008) 134(1) PC 97, 102. 
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the ‘fifth estate’
15
 to the traditional media by providing information 
from many sources, revealing media bias and influencing opinion on a 
wide scale vision called ‘participatory media’.
16
 Sometimes, they 
disseminate first-hand reports and details that the mainstream media 
ignore or have too little preference or time to investigate.
17
 Thus, they 
posed serious challenges to the traditional media and have resulted in 
the public being less dependent on the latter. Their most celebrated 





 It was the first time in history that 
the ruling coalition (the National Front) suffered heavy losses and 
failed to secure a two-thirds majority of the seats in Parliament.
19
 It 
has been claimed by some analysts that political blogs are the driving 
force for the success of the opposition parties (People’s Alliance) as 
they appeared to have accorded ‘greater’ opportunity to the people to 




                                                 
15
 The four estates consist of the political nobility (government), the knowledge 
clergy (academia and research institutes), the popular citizenry and the press. See M. 
Cornfield, J. Carson, and A. Kalis, ‘Buzz, Blogs and Beyond: the Internet and the 
National Discourse in the Fall of 2004’ (Pew Internet & American Life Project and 
BuzzMetrics 2005) 16. 
16
 Rebecca Blood, ‘Hammer, Nail: How Blogging Software Reshaped the Online 
Community’, December 2004 
<http://www.rebeccablood.net/essays/blog_software.html> [accessed 14 March 
2010]. 
17
 Eric Barendt, ‘Bad News for Bloggers’ (2009) 1(2) JML 141, 145 
18
 The country’s 12
th
 general election was held on 8 March 2008. 
19
 Rachel Gong, ‘Internet Politics and State Media Control: Candidate Weblogs in 
Malaysia’, in SSRN eLibrary (presented at the 4th Communication Policy Research: 
South Conference, Negombo, Sri Lanka: SSRN, 2009), pp. 3 - 4 .. 
20
 Susan Leong, ‘The Hindraf Saga: Media and Citizenship in Malaysia’ (Australia 
and New Zealand Communication Association Conference 2009, Brisbane, July 
2009) 
<http://www.academia.edu/192821/The_Hindraf_Saga_Media_and_Citizenship_in_
Malaysia> [accessed 12 September 2010]. 
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Nonetheless, political blogs or other web-based publications have 
neither been left unregulated nor treated as a legal vacuum.
21
 Bloggers 
and their readers have never been accorded absolute or uninhibited 
freedom in the blogosphere, and they are expected to be bound by the 
same rules and regulations as the mainstream media and the general 
public.
22
 Preventive efforts and legal actions, including the blocking 
of access to certain blogs
23
 and the filing of defamation suits against 
bloggers,
24
 have been employed by the authority to curb unwelcome 
critiques of the government’s programmes and policies.
25
 
Unfortunately, political blogs managed to evade most of these 
autocratic measures. This posed a great challenge to the existing laws 
and resulted in uncertainties as to the legal position of bloggers in 
expressing political speech in the online world.  
1.2 Research Objectives 
Prior to the development of blogs and other online publications, 
ordinary citizens in Malaysia in general had difficulties to advance or 
publish their views and thoughts to the public. Political blogs then 
appear to offer a novel platform for communication and seem to have 
democratised freedom of expression as they have enabled the people 
to directly share and publish their opinions and ideas to the outside 
world without the need to pass any traditional media outlets. 
Nonetheless, uncertainty arises as to whether political blogs are bound 
                                                 
21
 Section 3.5 of the Malaysian Content Code explicitly provides that ‘The online 
environment is not a legal vacuum. In general, if something is illegal off-line, it will 
also be illegal on-line’. See also Sonia Ramachandran, ‘Cyber Crimes: The Net is 
Not in a Legal Vacuum’ New Sunday Times (Kuala Lumpur, 31 August 2008). 
22
 Anis Ibrahim, ‘Bloggers Subject to Same Rules’ New Straits Times (25 January 
2007). 
23
 Nurbaiti Hamdan and Cheok Li Peng, ‘ISPs Ordered to Cut Access to Malaysia 
Today Website’ The Star (28 August 2008). 
24
 Ahiruddin Attan, ‘Bloggers Sued in Malaysia’, 18 January 2007 
<http://rockybru.com.my/2007/01/injunction.html> [accessed 14 March 2010]. 
25
 Sabrina Mohamed Hashim, ‘Blogging - Are You Exposing Yourself to Legal 
Liabilities?’ (2007) 2 CLJ i, 1 – 4. 
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by existing rules and regulations that predated their existence. Further, 
the no censorship promise on the Internet by the government seems to 
suggest that the new media are beyond legal rules and controls. Thus, 
the main objective of the study is to analyse and possibly suggest 
potential solutions to the uncertainties faced by bloggers in expressing 
political expression under the existing laws. An in-depth analysis of 
all types of Internet communications such as social networking 
services, online news portals, twitter and many others is not possible 
within the limited period of the PhD programme and I have therefore 
focussed on this key issue of political communication and blogs. 
Further, the use of political blogs has been admitted to have had a 




In order to fully comprehend this critical predicament, the research 
will: 
1. Highlight the importance and role played by political blogs in 
democratising the media freedom in Malaysia; 
2. Examine the general principles relating to and restrictions on 
the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, as well as 
the special position of political speech (if any) in Malaysia and 
the UK; 
3. Analyse specific media laws and regulations that could 
potentially be extended and applied to political blogs in 
Malaysia and the UK; 
                                                 
26
 Koh Lay Chin, ‘Was This Election Made on the Internet?’ New Straits Times 
(Kuala Lumpur, 12 March 2008), 25; ‘Internet Served a Painful Lesson’ New Straits 
Times (Kuala Lumpur, 26 March 2008), 2. 
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4. Scrutinise the efficacy of general laws, in particular the law of 
defamation which has been widely used to restrict political 
blogs; and  
5. Recommend potential solutions to the uncertainties faced by 
authors of political blogs or other user-generated content 
media in Malaysia. 
1.3 Methodology and Sources 
The study is largely based on doctrinal research as it is primarily 
concerned with the review of the existing rules and regulations that 
are likely to be applicable to political blogs in Malaysia and the UK, 
and the formulation of possible solutions to address the uncertainties 
posed by political blogs. As such, the study will conduct critical 
analyses of the primary sources of law that are to be found in statutes 
and cases, as well as the secondary sources including text books, 
scholarly articles from refereed journals and seminar papers presented 
at relevant conferences. Further, reference will also be made to 
newspaper articles, periodicals and information gathered from reliable 
websites that reflect the latest development on the subject matter. 
The study has also adopted a comparative analysis with the position in 
the UK. This method is preferred because it can be a useful tool in 
exploring a range of alternative approaches that can be used as a basis 
for law reform in the country.
27
 Moreover, a comparative analysis can 
help to avoid ‘mistakes’ as the experience and approaches in other 
jurisdictions can be useful in determining how best to protect freedom 
of expression in the online environment.
28
 It is thus submitted that a 
                                                 
27
 O. Kahn-Freund, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37(1) MLR 
1, 1 – 2. 
28
 Morris Manning, Rights, Freedoms and the Courts: A Practical Analysis of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 (Emond-Montgomery 1983) 12. 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 1: The Framework of Study 7 
comparative method is appropriate as it allows knowledge of other 
legal systems to be built up and then used to inform development of 
the law.
29
 In particular, it should facilitate the development of 
principles consistent with recognised international standards. It is 
submitted that for a comparative study, the author needs to ‘first lay 
out the essentials of the relevant foreign law and then uses this 
material as a basis for critical comparison, ending up with a 
conclusion about the proper policy for the law to adopt, which may 
involve a reinterpretation of his own system’.
30
  
A comparative analysis will be made with the position in the UK, 
since Malaysia is a Commonwealth nation whose laws are based to a 
large extent on English legislation and precedent.
31
 Further, the 
English common law also has a special position in the country’s legal 
system. By virtue of Article 160(2) of the Malaysian Federal 
Constitution, the word ‘law’ is defined to include ‘written law, the 
common law in so far as it is in operation in the Federation or any part 
thereof, and any custom or usage having the force of law in the 
Federation or any part thereof’. Thus, the English common law has 
been regarded as one of Malaysia’s unwritten sources.
32
  
Apart from that, the reception and application of the English law has 
been clearly enunciated in the Civil Law Act 1956. Section 3(1) states 
that: 
Save so far as other provision has been made or may hereafter be 
made by any written law in force in Malaysia, the Court shall –   
                                                 
29
 Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law’ 
(1991) 39 Am J Comp L 1, 5. 
30
 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (2nd rev. ed. 
Clarendon Press 1987) 6 
31
 Cirami Drahaman, ‘Computers and Internet’ (2006) 27 BLR 2, 11. 
32
 Tan Sri Ahmad Ibrahim and Ahilemah Joned, The Malaysian Legal System (2nd 
ed. Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka 1995) 12 – 15; Min Aun Wu, The Malaysian Legal 
System (2nd ed. Longman 2004) 20 – 21. 
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(a) in West Malaysia or any part thereof, apply the common law 
of England and the rules of equity as administered in England on 
the 7th day of April 1956; 
(b) in Sabah, apply the common law of England and the rules of 
equity, together with statutes of general application, as 
administered or in force in England on the 1st day of December 
1951; 
(c) in Sarawak, apply the common law of England and the rules 
of equity, together with statutes of general application, as 
administered or in force in England on the 12th day of December 
1949, subject however to subsection (3)(ii): 
Provided always that the said common law, rules of equity and 
statutes of general application shall be applied so far only as the 
circumstances of the States of Malaysia and their respective 
inhabitants permit and subject to such qualifications as local 
circumstances render necessary. 
The significance of the provision is that the English law as of the 
aforesaid cut-off dates shall continue to apply in the country provided 
that local circumstances permit and no overriding provisions have 
been made by any statutes. With regard to the application of the 
English law after the cut-off dates, it is within the discretionary power 
of the courts on the basis of persuasive authority. Comparison with 
subsequent English law will clearly be of interest with the coming into 
operation of the Human Rights Act 1998 and recent cases on blogs 
and other Internet-based communications.  
With regard to the application of international law in Malaysia, 
historically prior to the country’s independence in 1957, local courts 
had adopted a similar approach to that practised by the UK; namely 
the doctrine of transformation for treaties and the doctrine of 
incorporation with certain limitations for customary international 
law.
33
 The situation changed after the independence as the operation 
of any law (municipal or international) will be subjected to the express 
                                                 
33
 Abdul Ghafur Hamid, ‘Judicial Application of International Law in Malaysia: A 
Critical Analysis’ (2005) 1 Asian Yrbk Int L 196, 197. 
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provisions of the Malaysian Federal Constitution. Unfortunately, there 
are no specific provisions in the constitution on the operation of 
international law into the country. Hence, reference must be made to 
general provisions and decided cases that may lend some assistance on 
this matter. 
Article 39 of the Malaysian Federal Constitution provides that ‘The 
executive authority of the Federation shall be vested in the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong
34
 and exercisable … by him or by the Cabinet or any 
Minister authorized by the Cabinet’. Further, Article 80(1) states that 
‘the executive authority of the Federation extends to all matters with 
respect to which Parliament may make laws’. The power of the 
Parliament to enact laws is stated in Article 74(1) whereby it explicitly 
provides that ‘Parliament may make laws with respect to any of the 
matters enumerated in the Federal List
35
 or the Concurrent List’.
36
 The 
Federal List among others covers ‘external affairs, including (a) 
treaties, agreements and conventions with other countries and all 
matters which bring the Federation into relations with other countries; 
(b) implementation of treaties, agreements and conventions with other 
countries’. Thus, the aforesaid provisions prove that the Executive or 
the Cabinet is vested with the exclusive power to enter into treaties, 
agreement and conventions with other countries whilst the Parliament 
is empowered to enact municipal laws in order to implement the 
treaties, agreements and conventions so that they can be enforced in 
the domestic courts. 
                                                 
34
 The Yang di-Pertuan Agong can be literally interpreted as the King and His 
Majesty is to be appointed among the Royal Rulers or Head of each state in the 
country. Article 32 of the Malaysian Federal Constitution stipulates that the Yang di-
Pertuang Agong shall be considered as the supreme head of Malaysia. 
35
 Article 160(2) of the Malaysian Federal Constitution defines Federal List as to 
mean the First List of the Ninth Schedule. 
36
 Article 160(2) of the Malaysian Federal Constitution refers Concurrent List as the 
Third List of the Ninth Schedule. 
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The position is further reiterated by the judgment of Thomson CJ in 
The Government of the State of Kelantan v The Government of the 
Federation Malaya and Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj.
37
 In this 
case, Kelantan
 
 (one of the states in the Federation of Malaya) 
commenced proceedings against the Federal Government and Tunku 
Abdul Rahman (the first Prime Minister). It was argued that the 
Malaysia Agreement, an international treaty which was signed on 9
th
 
July 1965 by the Federation of Malaya, the UK, Singapore, Sarawak 
and North Borneo (now known as Sabah) was null and void on the 
ground that the consent of individual states in the Federation of 
Malaya had not been obtained prior to the conclusion of the 
agreement. It was held that by virtue of Articles 39 and 80(1) of the 
Malaysian Federal Constitution, the Malaysia Agreement was not a 
nullity as the power to conclude the agreement was lawfully exercised 
by the body that was conferred express authority by all of the states in 
the Federation. It was observed by Thomson CJ that: 
The Malaysia Agreement is signed ‘for the Federation of Malaya’ 
by the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and four other 
members of the Cabinet. There is nothing whatsoever in the 
Constitution requiring consultation with any State Government or 
the Ruler of any State.
38
 
The decision espoused an important principle that the treaty-making 
capacity is exclusively entrusted by the Malaysian Federal 
Constitution to the Executive or the Cabinet.
39
 Nonetheless, for the 
treaties to be implemented domestically, Parliament must pass 
necessary laws to give effect to these treaties. A good illustration 
would be the Malaysia Act 1963 that was passed by the Parliament 
subsequent to the signing of the Malaysia Agreement. However, there 
are treaties that can be implemented without the necessity of enacting 
                                                 
37
 [1963] 1 MLJ 355. 
38
 ibid 359. 
39
 Abdul Ghafur Hamid, ‘Treaty-Making Power in Federal States with Special 
Reference to the Malaysian Position’ (2003) 30 JMCL 65, 80 – 82. 
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any legislation
40
 such as the Treaty of Friendship between the 
Federation of Malaysia and the Republic of Indonesia that was signed 
on 10 April 1959 and has resulted in several cultural exchanges being 




Pertaining to international treaties on human rights, currently 
Malaysia has only ratified two conventions namely the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
42
 
Both of these treaties were acceded to in 1995 with certain 
reservations on the basis of religious and national or cultural 
relativism.
43
 The country has also signed, but not ratified,
44
 the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).
45
 
Unfortunately, Malaysia still has not signed the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that safeguards 
fundamental human rights including the right to freedom of 
expression. The government has been urged by the Human Rights 
Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM)
46
 to ratify certain core treaties 
including the ICCPR, but so far the situation remains the same. It is 
submitted that perhaps special protection accorded to the 
                                                 
40
 Heliliah Haji Yusof, ‘Internal Application of International Law in Malaysia and 




 CRC was acceded on 17
th
 February 1995 whilst CEDAW was on 5
th
 July 1995. 
See Malaysia’s status at 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet> [accessed 16 March 
2010]. 
43
 Jaclyn Ling-Chien Neo, ‘Malaysia’s First Report to the CEDAW Committee: A 
Landmark Event for Women’s Rights in Malaysia’ (2007) 13 Asian Yrbk Int L 303. 
44
 CRPD was signed on 8
th
 April 2008. 
45
 Elizabeth Looi and Shanon Shah, ‘Human Rights: What’s Stopping Malaysia?’, 
10 December 2008 < http://www.thenutgraph.com/print/1226> [accessed 17 March 
2010]. 
46
 SUHAKAM is the only independent national human rights institution in Malaysia 
which was established by the Malaysian government under the Human Rights 
Commission of Malaysia Act 1999. For details see <http://www.suhakam.org.my> 
[accessed 23 March 2010]. 
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Bumiputera
47
 as well as the persistent use of several legislative 
provisions which contravene fundamental liberties are among the key 
factors for such resistance.
48
 
1.4 The Structure of Study 
The study is organised into eight chapters as follows: 
Chapter 1 –  The Framework of Study 
The chapter offers a general background to the thesis, 
its research objectives, methodology and sources of the 
study. 
Chapter 2 –  Overview of Blogs  
This chapter provides a brief history of blogs, analysis 
of various interpretations of the word ‘blogs’, their 
nature and the important role played by political blogs 
in democratising freedom of speech and expression in 
Malaysia. 
Chapter 3 –  Freedom of Expression in Malaysia 
This chapter analyses the right to freedom of 
expression under the Malaysian Federal Constitution, 
statutory limitations on such a right, the legality of the 
restrictive laws that have been passed by the Parliament 
and the possibility of applying the principles to 
political blogs in the country. 
 
                                                 
47
 The word ‘Bumiputera’ means the son of the soil and it refers to the Malays and 
natives of Sabah and Sarawak. 
48
 Looi and Shah, ‘Human Rights: What’s Stopping Malaysia?’ (n 45). 
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Chapter 4 –  Freedom of Expression in the UK 
This part of the study examines the right to freedom of 
expression in the UK under the common law and the 
Human Rights Act 1998, the status of political speech 
in the offline and online environment, permitted 
restrictions to the right and the potential application of 
these principles to political blogs. 
 
Chapter 5 –  Specific Regulation of the Media in Malaysia 
This chapter examines in detail the statutory rules and 
regulations that are currently being used to govern the 
traditional print and broadcast media as well as the 
Internet industry in Malaysia, and to evaluate the 
possibility of applying any of these legal regimes to the 
blogosphere. 
 
Chapter 6 –  Specific Regulation of the Media in the UK 
This chapter analyses specific media laws and the 
regulatory bodies which govern the traditional print 
and broadcast media as well as the new on-demand and 
the Internet industries in the UK, and to evaluate the 
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Chapter 7 –  Blogs and Online Defamation in Malaysia and the UK 
The chapter discusses a brief overview of defamatory 
statement and the status of defamatory posts by 
bloggers and comments by readers, the application of 
single publication rule to Internet publication under the 
Defamation Act 2013, liability of blogs for third party 
content and hyperlinks, and available defences in 
Malaysia and the UK. 
 
Chapter 8 –  Conclusion  
The chapter concludes the issues that have been 
discussed in the previous chapters. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The Internet has had an enormous impact on our daily lives. It has 
empowered any persons to share and publish their views or thoughts, 
either one-to-one, one-to-many or many-to-many, without restrictions 
or limitations. This is in stark contrast with the traditional print and 
broadcasting media that are only one-to-many media. For that reason, 
it has been claimed that the Internet has completed the transformation 
of communication by enabling the emergence of various types of 
online channels such as e-mail, instant messaging, chat group, 
newsgroup, blog, forum, wiki, social networking site and many 
others.
1
 Out of these platforms, blogs have been regarded as a global 
phenomenon that brings about a ‘blogging revolution’
2
 and is 
currently changing journalism, politics, business, academia and other 
aspects of everyday life.
3
  
Since the first website which coined the word ‘weblog’ went online 
more than twelve years ago,
4
 blogs have surpassed other types of 
Internet communications previously used by the digital communities 
including bulletin board system (BBS), Usenet and e-mail listings.
5
 
Blogs continue to have a steady increase in numbers and influence 
though they faced strong competition from social networking sites like 
Facebook and Twitter. By the end of 2011, NM Incite (a 
                                                 
1
 Dan Gillmor, We the Media: Grassroots Journalism by the People, for the People 
(O’Reilly 2006) 13. 
2
 Andrew Sullivan, ‘The Blogging Revolution. Weblogs Are to Words What Napster 
was to Music’ (WIRED, May 2002) 
<http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/10.05/mustread.html?pg=2> [accessed 13 
February 2010]. 
3
 Anthony Ciolli, ‘Bloggers as Public Figures’ (2006) 16 BU Pub Int LJ 255, 255. 
4
 Jenna Wortham, ‘After 10 Years of Blogs, the Future’s Brighter Than Ever’ 
(WIRED, 17 December 2007) 
<http://www.wired.com/entertainment/theweb/news/2007/12/blog_anniversary> 
[accessed 13 February 2010]. 
5
 Sunny Woan, ‘The Blogosphere: Past, Present, and Future - Preserving the 
Unfettered Development of Alternative Journalism, The’ (2007) 44 Cal W L Rev 
477, 481. 
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Nielsen/McKinsey company) tracked 173 million blogs around the 
world,
6
 up from 133 million in August 2009 as per reported by 
Econsultancy,
7
 which quoted a statistic from Technorati.
8
 The 
growing number of blogs proves the earlier perception that the rise of 
Facebook and Twitter will bring the demise of blogs was unjustifiable. 
Indeed, social media networking platforms have saved blogging from 




Blogs have been praised by the mainstream media analysts for 
providing a new channel for online self-expression.
10
 They are 
primarily used by hobbyists as a source to speak their mind and share 
experience and expertise with others.
11
 On the contrary, corporate and 
entrepreneur bloggers use blogs to attract new clients to their 
businesses, whilst professional bloggers earn income from blogging.
12
 
As to the blogosphere’s composition, it was observed that majority of 
bloggers are young (25 – 44 years old), well educated with a 
minimum of either college or graduate degrees and more affluent than 
                                                 
6
 NM Incite, ‘State of the Media: U.S. Digital Consumer Report’ (NM Incite 2011) 
10. 
7
 Jake Hird, ‘20+ More Mind-Blowing Social Media Statistics’ (Econsultancy 17 
August 2009) <http://econsultancy.com/blog/4402-20+-more-mind-blowing-social-
media-statistics> [accessed 3 November 2009]. 
8
 Technorati is the leading blog search engine and directory. For details, see 
<http://technorati.com> [accessed 6 June 2013]. 
9
 Technorati ‘State of the Blogosphere 2011 – Social Media’ (4 November 2011) 
<http://technorati.com/social-media/article/state-of-the-blogosphere-2011-
part2/page-2/#social> [accessed 5 June 2013]. 
10
 Bob Tedeschi, ‘E-Commerce Report; Internet Experts Wonder If Weblog 
Technology Is a Powerful New Media Species, or Just Another Fad.’ The New York 
Times (25 February 2002) <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/25/business/e-
commerce-report-internet-experts-wonder-if-weblog-technology-powerful-
new.html> [accessed 13 February 2010]. 
11
 Technorati ‘State of the Blogosphere 2011 – Introduction and Methodology’ (4 
November 2011) <http://technorati.com/social-media/article/state-of-the-
blogosphere-2011-introduction> [accessed 5 June 2013]. 
12
 ibid.  
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 2: Overview of Blogs 17 
the general population.
13
 Further, it was found that bloggers are more 
likely to have broadband access and to be urban dwellers.
14
 Thus, 
blogs have a great ability to shape the judgment and opinion of the 
people especially the young generation and the educated group as well 
as those who live in the urban area. As such, this chapter examines 
brief history of blogs, analyses various interpretation of the term 
‘blog’, explains the nature and importance of blogs and highlights the 
important role played by political blogs in Malaysia. 
2.2 Brief History of Blogs 
The origin of blogs can be traced back to the year 1989 when an 
English physicist at Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire 
(CERN)
15
 in Switzerland, Tim-Berners Lee wrote a proposal for 
information management showing how information could be 
transferred easily over the Internet by using hypertext.
16
 Later, Tim-
Berners Lee together with Robert Cailliau, a Belgian computer 
scientist, developed a Hypertext project called the World Wide Web 
(the Web) and built the very first website at the address of 
http://info.cern.ch in 1990.
17
 At this point, it is worthwhile to highlight 
that the Internet and the Web are two different things although these 
terms are frequently being used interchangeably. The Internet refers to 
a network of networks whilst the Web is an abstract space of 
                                                 
13
 Technorati ‘State of the Blogosphere 2011 – Who Are the Bloggers?’ (4 
November 2011) <http://technorati.com/social-media/article/state-of-the-
blogosphere-2011-part1> [accessed 5 June 2013]. 
14
 David C Wyld, ‘The Blogging Revolution: Government in the Age of Web 2.0’ 
<http://www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/WyldReportBlog.pdf> [accessed 26 
August 2009]. 
15
 CERN originally refers to European Council for Nuclear Research, but it was later 
changed to European Organization for Nuclear Research. 
16
 Tim Berners-Lee, ‘Information Management: A Proposal’ (CERN March 1989, 
May 1990) <http://www.w3.org/History/1989/proposal.html> [accessed 4 
November 2009]. 
17
 Tim Berners-Lee and Robert Cailliau, ‘WorldWideWeb: Proposal for a HyperText 
Project’ (WorldWideWeb 12 November 1990) <http://www.w3.org/Proposal.html> 
[accessed 4 November 2009]. 
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information that would link together the vast collection of resources 
and information scattered all over the Internet.
18
  
At the early stage, only a handful of pioneering programmers made 
use of the Web.
19
 Later, Marc Andersen and a few students at the 
National Centre for Supercomputing Applications, University of 
Illinois wrote Mosaic (Netscape Navigator), a graphical browser that 
let users browse web pages containing both text and images.
20
 The 
creation of the Web (previously named as ‘Mesh’) coupled with the 
invention of the Mosaic has greatly facilitated the transformation of 
the Internet from a world of largely text-based, hard to find resources 
to an inviting multimedia tapestry of full-colour information.
21
 Over 
the years, the Web has evolved from a non-interactive web (Web 1.0) 
that merely displays static content into Web 2.0, a truly participatory 
medium that allows users to interact with each other. Web 2.0 (known 
as user generated media) enables users to easily create web content by 




The evolution of the Web and the explosion of its popularity in the 
1990s
23
 have facilitated Internet users to express their opinion via 
personal websites. This is possibly the starting point of blogs, when 
                                                 
18
 Richard T. Griffiths, ‘From ARPANET to the World Wide Web’ (Leiden 
University 11 October 2002) <http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/history/ivh/chap2.htm> 
[accessed 2 November 2009]. 
19
 Scott Rosenberg, Say Everything: How Blogging Began, What It’s Becoming, and 




 Ohio University Multimedia Group, ‘A Brief History of the Internet’ (Ohio 
University Multimedia Group 1997) 
<http://oak.cats.ohiou.edu/~tk347090/history.html> [accessed 4 November 2009]. 
22
 Further details on Web 2.0, see Nick Holmes and Delia Venables, ‘Law 2.0 Is Not 
Just a Name’ (2007) 1 LS Gaz; Paul Anderson, ‘What Is Web 2.0? Ideas, 
Technologies and Implications for Education’ (2007) 
<www.jisc.ac.uk/media/documents/techwatch/tsw0701b.pdf> [accessed 20 January 
2011]. 
23
 Przemysław Paul Polański, Customary Law of the Internet: In the Search for a 
Supranational Cyberspace Law (TMC Asser Press 2007) 17. 
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Justin Hall, a student at Swarthmore College, created Links.net
24
 and 
started to record chronicles of his life on his personal homepage from 
January 1994.
25
 Though the word ‘blog’ was still unknown at that 
time, Links.net is generally recognised as one of the earliest blogs 
ever created in the history and Justin Hall himself has been labelled as 
‘the founding father of personal blogging’ by the New York Times 
Magazine in 2003.
26
 Some may argue that the first website created by 
Tim Berners-Lee in 1990 at http://info.cern.ch deserved to be 
recognised as the first blog,
27
 but such argument appears to be 




The word ‘weblog’ only came into the picture on 17 December 1997 
when Jorn Barger described the list of links on his Robot Wisdom 
website that ‘logged’ his Internet wanderings.
29
 Later, the short form 
‘blog’ was coined by Peter Merholz
30
 when he playfully pronounced 
the word ‘weblog’ into ‘wee blog’ or ‘blog’ in his blog 
Peterme.com.
31
 Though Merholz was unsure as to the exact date he 
coined the word, Brad L. Graham has confirmed in his blog (the 
                                                 
24
 Justin Hall’s blog of the Links.net <http://links.net> [accessed 5 November 2009]. 
25
 Clive Thompson, ‘The Early Years’ New York Magazine (New York 12 February 
2006) <http://nymag.com/news/media/15971> [accessed 5 November 2009]. 
26
 Reyhan Harmanci, ‘Time to Get A Life – Pioneer Blogger Justin Hall Bows Out 
at 31’ San Francisco Chronicle (San Francisco 20 February 2005) 
<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/02/20/MNGBKBEJO01.DTL> [accessed 5 November 
2009]. 
27
 Dave Winer, ‘The History of Weblogs’ (Weblogs.Com News 17 May 2002) 
<http://oldweblogscomblog.scripting.com/historyOfWeblogs> [accessed 5 
November 2009]. 
28
 Rosenberg, Say Everything (n 19) 81. 
29
 Wortham, ‘After 10 Years of Blogs, the Future’s Brighter Than Ever’ (n 4). 
30
‘It’s the Links, Stupid’ The Economist, 20 April 2006, 
<http://www.economist.com/surveys/displaystory.cfm?story_id=6794172> 
[accessed 5 November 2009]. 
31
 Peter Merholz, ‘Play with Your Words’ (Peterme.com 17 May 2002) 
<http://www.peterme.com/archives/00000205.html> [accessed 5 November 2009]. 
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BranLands) that Merholz did so on 23 May 1999.
32
 The coinage did 
not exactly spread like wildfire but the circle of veteran bloggers 
picked up Merholz’s joke and repeated it to one another in the 
blogosphere.
33
 As a result, the word ‘blog’ then grew in acceptance as 
a shorter form of the noun ‘weblog’ and the weblog editor is known as 
a ‘blogger’. 
At the beginning of 1999, it was reported that there were only 23 
blogs known to be in existence.
34
 The slow take-up is generally due to 
the fact that the first-generation blogs required considerable technical 
knowledge to establish and maintain. For that reason, early bloggers 
were normally those who were acquainted with computer codes and 
hypertext mark-up language (HTML) such as computer programmers, 
web designers or those who already knew how to make a website.
35
 
Later, when user-friendly software and tools for creating blogs were 
made available to the public, the numbers rose steeply as more 
Internet users, including non-technical authors, started to publish their 
personal thoughts and essays through their own blogs.
36
 
Pitas.com was recognised as the first free build-your-own-weblog tool 
and it was launched by Andrew Smales, a programmer in Toronto in 
July 1999.
37
 One month later, Blogger.com, which was invented by 
Evan Williams and Meg Hourihan at Pyra Labs in San Francisco, was 
                                                 
32
 Brad L. Graham, ‘PeterMe Decides the Proper Way to Say “weblog” is “wee’-
blog”’ (The BradLands 23 May 1999) <http://www.bradlands.com/weblog/1999-
05.shtml/P1925>  [accessed 5 November 2009]. 
33
 Rosenberg, Say Everything (n 19) 101. 
34
 Rebecca Blood, ‘Weblogs: A History and Perspective’ (Rebecca’s Pocket 7 
September 2000) <http://www.rebeccablood.net/essays/weblog_history.html> 






 Jensen Mallory, ‘A Brief History of Weblogs (Emerging Alternatives)’ [2003] 
Columbia Journalism Review <http://www.higbeam.com> [accessed 22 December 
2009]. 
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introduced to the market.
38
 Blogger.com has later become the most 
popular tools among the bloggers as it allows them to have 
personalised addresses by storing their blogs on their servers rather 
than on a remote base as offered by other blogging tools.
39
 By the end 
of 1999, a lot of other blogging software such as Diaryland,
40
 Edit 
This Page and Velocinews were launched.
41
 The innovation and 
adoption of free and user-friendly blogging software is arguably the 
main catalyst for the blogging revolution. These programmes have 
enabled those who have little or no training and knowledge about 
computer code or programming language a new opportunity to create 
blogs easily and almost with no trouble at all.  
The occurrence of unfortunate events and natural disasters has also 
ignited the appetite of the public towards the blogosphere. This could 
be seen in the catastrophic demolition of the World Trade Centre on 
11 September 2001, the tsunami incident that hit Asia on 26 
December 2004, the London bombings on 7 July 2005, and many 
other incidents such as the Japanese tsunami, London riots, nuclear 
crisis in Japan and Arab Spring.
42
 The incidents have caused people 
across the world to search for alternative news and information from 
blogs as the mainstream media failed to accommodate the pressing 
demand for the latest coverage and updates. Over time, the interest 
towards the blogs and the numbers of the bloggers has intensified 




                                                 
38
 Rosenberg, Say Everything (n 19) 102. 
39




 Blood, ‘Weblogs: A History and Perspective’ (n 34). 
42
 This is clearly illustrated by the Technorati Report in 2011 which shows that these 
incidents received the greatest hits in the blogosphere. See 
<http://technorati.com/social-media/article/state-of-the-blogosphere-2011-
part2/page-2/#topics> [accessed 5 June 2013]. 
43
 Blood, ‘Weblogs: A History and Perspective’ (n 34). 
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2.3 Definition of Weblogs or Blogs 
There is little consensus as to the agreed definition of the word 
‘weblog’ or ‘blog’ even though the term had been used and known 
since late 1990’s.
44
 The word is elusive and varied according to the 
understanding and interpretation of scholars, bloggers, blog readers, 
Internet users and the public members. There were in fact heated 
debates among the community of the early bloggers as to what was 
and what was not a blog.
45
 In early 1999, any sites that consisted of 
dated entries was regarded as a blog and listed in the Eatonweb 
Portal.
46
 Although some bloggers disputed the simple criterion 
adopted by Brigitte Eaton (the creator of the Eatonweb Portal), the 
definition did prevail since the portal was the only most complete 
listing of the weblogs available at that point of time.
47
 
In general, some would hold the view that websites that are made with 
blogging software are blogs. Whilst others would simply say that 
blogs are akin to online diaries that record their personal chronicles 
and they are publicly shared online in order to be viewed and read by 
closed relatives, friends and other interested communities. 
Nonetheless, it is submitted that the first classification is quite 
inaccurate since there are a number of commercial blogs published by 
corporations and commercial entities that are not personal in nature. 
Further, the use of blogging software is also not a precondition since 
blogs can be built and maintained even without resorting to any 
blogging tools. This can be seen in the early generation blogs that 
                                                 
44
 Garry Thompson, ‘Weblogs, Warblogs, the Public Sphere, and Bubbles’, 
(Transformation September 2003) 
<http://www.transformationsjournal.org/journal/issue_07/article_02.shtml> 
[accessed 6 June 2013]. 
45
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were set up from scratch by the blogging pioneers long before the 
coming into picture of the blogging software.  
As to the second description, it appears to be rather simplistic and 
sketchy because modern blogs are much more than online journals or 
personal diaries of bloggers. Blogs are distinct in both form and 
content from web journals that preceded them in the sense that blog 
entries are short, usually contain links to other sites and appear all 
together on one long page, whilst web journals appear one entry per 
page and one page per day as per the paper diary.
48
 Further, blogs are 
currently being used for a variety of purposes, including journalism, 
activism, politics, businesses, academia and many others. Despite the 
fact that the majority of bloggers are diarists (hobbyists)
49
 who blog 
about their personal activities and daily minutiae rather than news 
articles, opinion columns or scholarship, blogs should not be merely 
portrayed as personal diaries as they are also widely used by 




The word ‘weblog’ or ‘blog’ has also been given a classic definition 
as just a web site organized by time. Every website that is updated at 
least once (this applies to 99.9% of all websites) could be considered a 
weblog because it contains two entries.
51
 It is argued that the 
application of this interpretation does not lend any assistance in 
                                                 
48
 Rebecca Blood, ‘Hammer, Nail: How Blogging Software Reshaped the Online 
Community’ (Rebecca’s Pocket December 2004) 
<http://www.rebeccablood.net/essays/blog_software.html> [accessed 6 November 
2009]. 
49
 60% of the total numbers of bloggers tracked by Technorati in 2011 are hobbyists. 
See Technorati ‘State of the Blogosphere 2011 – Introduction and Methodology’ (n 
11). 
50
 For details, see Technorati ‘State of the Blogosphere 2011 – Who Are the 
Bloggers?’ (n 13). 
51
 Russ Lipton, ‘What is a Weblog’ (RadioDocs 11 June 2002) 
<http://radio.weblogs.com/0107019/stories/2002/02/12/whatIsAWeblog.html> 
[accessed 7 December 2009]. 
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conceptualising the notion of blogs since such a description would 
render all websites synonymous with blogs. It is further submitted that 
blogs should not be treated like typical websites that are composed of 
static collections of documents and information-rich but often written 
by anonymous authors in an impersonal and public relations style.
52
 
From a historical point of view, when the term ‘weblog’ was first 
mentioned in 1997, it was originally intended to refer to a webpage 
where bloggers ‘log’ all other webpages that they find interesting.
53
 
Blogs were not only about any updated websites, but they were links 
to other interesting web pages that mixed with bloggers’ 
commentaries, personal thoughts and essays.
54
 On the same note, it is 
submitted that weblogs are often updated sites that point to articles 
elsewhere on the web, often with comments and to on-site articles.
55
 
Since bloggers played an active role in filtering through vast 
collections of information on web pages and presented the most 
interesting and important posts to the readers in their own versions, 
this type of weblogs is known as ‘filter-style’ weblogs.  
Over times, blogs have evolved beyond the lists of links that 
characterised the early efforts. The introduction of Blogger.com and 
other similar blogging software has resulted in the shift from the filter-
style blogs to the new breed of journal-style blogs.
56
 The main 
difference between the two is that the former includes a mix of links 
and commentaries whilst the latter merely consists of a record of 
bloggers’ thoughts that are often updated several times a day.
57
 It is 
obvious that the traditional blogs perform a valuable filtering service 
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and provide tools for more critical evaluation of the information 
available on the Internet whereas the free-style blogs are nothing less 
than an outbreak of personal self-expression. Even though both styles 
still exist, it is observed that modern bloggers preferred to adopt the 
journal-style blog since they are free to express their personal opinions 
and ideas on any subjects without the hassle of searching a link and 
writing some text around it.
58
 
The popularity of the word ‘blog’ has resulted in the inclusion of its 
definition into the Oxford English Dictionary in 2003.
59
 The word is 
defined as ‘a frequently updated web site consisting of personal 
observations, excerpts from other sources, etc., typically run by a 
single person, and usually with hyperlinks to other sites; an online 
journal or diary’.
60
 Later, the US dictionary of Merriam-Webster 
declared that the term ‘blog’ has been chosen as the top word of 2004 
as it was the most looked up word for that particular year.
61
 Merriam-
Webster Dictionary defines a blog as ‘a web site that contains an 
online personal journal with reflections, comments, and often 
hyperlinks provided by the writer’.
62
 
Apart from the definitional perspectives, a more comprehensive 
discussion states that ‘a blog is a type of website, usually maintained 
by an individual with regular entries of commentary, descriptions of 
events, or other material such as graphics or video. Entries are 
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commonly displayed in reverse-chronological order’.
63
 Likewise, 
another technical clarification describes a blog as ‘a web-based 
writing space, like an on-line journal, a website an individual uses to 
write every day, where all the writing and editing, and the whole look 
and feel of the site, is managed through a web browser from wherever 
the writer happens to be. A weblog is designed so that, just like a 
journal, the page can be turned each day, and the website itself keeps 
track of the date and archiving of all the writing’.
64
  
Many scholarly articles attempted to provide some useful input into 
the meaning of the word. Blogs have been defined as a series of web 
posts from a single web address with a common author or set of 
authors, often integrated with commentary on the post itself or on 
other blogs.
65
 Others claimed that the word may be best explained in 
three definitions; namely chronological definition, diary definition and 
amateur journalist definition.
66
 The chronological definition adopts the 
view proposed by the classic definition which states that every website 
that is updated at least once can be considered a weblog because it 
contains two entries.
67
 In the meantime, the diary definition assumes a 
narrower approach whereby blogs are regarded as online diaries 
because they are distinct from regular websites in the sense that the 
personalities or voice of the bloggers are communicated via their 
posts.
68
 As to the amateur journalist definition, blogs are given a 
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significantly narrower meaning and being characterised as a new form 
of journalism (citizen journalist).  Bloggers are referred to as those 
who are either not employed at all in the media industry, or write as a 
side-line to some other business.
69
 
For the ease of understanding, blogs may be summarised as a kind of 
website that can be created from scratch or by using blogging 
software. Blogs provide web-based writing space that is free from 
editorial control. They can be used for various purposes and their 
entries may contain personal records of the bloggers without referring 
to any links or the bloggers’ comment on other stories in external 
websites. Blog posts are usually displayed in reverse chronological 
order, expressed in an informal style and they reflect the personal 
voice and personalities of their authors. 
2.4 Nature and Importance of Blogs 
The dawn of the 21
st
 century has witnessed the influx of blogs as the 
newfound technology that is revolutionising the mode of 
communication and the exchange of information in the new era. The 
explosion of this phenomenon, which is referred to as the ‘blogging 
revolution’,
70
 has resulted in enormous popularity of blogs and their 
widespread acceptance among the online communities. Being a new 
pedigree to the Internet communications, blogs possess the distinctive 
features of borderlessness, geographical independence, one-to-many 
communication, low threshold information distribution, widely used, 
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portability, lack of reliable geographical identifiers, reactive nature, 
lack of central control and convergence.
71
 
Apart from those common traits, the nature of blogs is however to be 
distinguished from other online media, in particular web magazines 
and online news. This is because more often than not those online 
channels are simply the Internet footprint of traditional media entities 
like newspapers, radio, and television stations.
72
 Blogs on the other 
hand are highly personal in nature and their postings are often written 
in an informal style.
73
 This is the striking difference between blogs 
and other online media as the former lets the voice of the bloggers 
comes through and consequently reflects the interest, view and 
personality of their authors.
74
 Hence, personality or voice of the 
bloggers is the distinctive persona of a blog even though some blogs 
may lack other common technical features such as permalinks,
75
 
calendar, bio page and many others,
76
 or even if certain blog entries in 
a webpage cannot be linked to separately via permalinks rather than 
just linking to the whole site.
77
 
Blogs are also interactive in nature as they are equipped with technical 
features that enable bloggers to interact with readers through 
trackback and comment sections. The trackback enables bloggers to 
keep track of who is linking and referring to their blog posts.
78
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Bloggers can then track and respond to others who cite their postings, 
and readers of the linked blog can refer to the record of the trackbacks 
under each blog post.
79
 In addition, comment feature empowers blog 
readers to post comments or leave questions to any blog posts. The 
design of blogs can be easily customised to either turn-on or turn-off 
the comment feature altogether. Alternatively, bloggers can manage 
incoming comments by turning away anonymous comments, 
screening or freezing such comments temporarily or even deleting 
them to keep the interactions smooth.
80
 However, setting the blog into 
comment-free may lead the blog to be an inferior form of the 
broadcast media.
81
 Thus, these features should be fully utilised so that 
they do not only become places for self-expression, but also as 
platforms for dialogue and debate.  
From the economics point of view, blogs differ greatly from the 
mainstream media in the sense that a majority of their authors does not 
have a profit motive from blogging. This is based on the findings of 
the Internet survey conducted from 13 September to 4 October 2011 
among 4,114 bloggers around the world, which reveal that personal 
satisfaction and number of unique visitors are the prime motivations 
of the surveyed bloggers.
82
 Unsurprisingly, only 14% of the 
respondents generated revenue from blogging activities although they 
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may earn modest income through advertising, per-post fees and 
salaries for maintaining blogs for companies.
83
 
In terms of capital investment, the setting up and maintaining of blogs 
require no significant investments in physical equipment, technology, 
office space, personnel and goodwill.
84
 The cost is very minimal as it 
only necessitates a computer, Internet connection and any cheap or 
free blogging software. Beside the basic investments, blogs require 
additional investments in the form of the bloggers’ time and 
credibility necessary to build readership in the blogosphere.
85
 The 
readership, which is a kind of goodwill asset analogous to the 
audience of the conventional media, can only be built by establishing 
the credibility and encouraging links by other blogs.
86
 
As for the importance of blogs, it was obvious that blogs have been 
widely used as a novel channel for expression.
87
 Blogs have enabled 
Internet users to express and publish their personal opinions on 
various topics directly to the public at large. They have empowered 
their authors to have total control over the content of their blogs as 
they are not subjected to any control by editors or intermediaries. As 
such, blogs have democratised publishing
88
 and seized the means of 
production.
89
 In relation to this, it is argued that blogs will continue to 
become one of the preferred media for authentic or uncensored 
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expression of Internet users. Since blogs or other online publications 
do not operate by prescribed standards or codes, they could facilitate 
the sharing of news or critical comments that are most unlikely to be 
featured in any mainstream media. This is particularly significant for 
countries with limited media freedom like Malaysia where almost all 
of the traditional media are heavily controlled and regulated by the 
government through licensing and restrictive laws. 
Another significant contribution of blogs is in the field of journalism. 
Blogs enable ordinary Internet users, who were former readers or 
audience of the mainstream media, to engage in journalistic activities 
of collecting and circulating news to the public. Further, the 
interactive feature of blogs allows their authors to engage in online 
debates or discussion with blog readers on any issues or viewpoints. 
Thus, blogs appear to possess great potential to change the nature of 
journalism and democratic function of the traditional media.
90
 
Although some bloggers, particularly online diarists, do not regard 
blogging as a form of journalism and are hesitant to be labelled as 
journalists,
91
 blogs have over the last few years become increasingly 
mainstream.
92
 In the first place, many traditional media journalists 
have established their own blogs as it is believed that their presence in 
the blogosphere can help to democratise news production processes 
and bring audiences closer.
93
 Further, there is also an ever-increasing 
overlap between the professional journalists and bloggers since a large 
number of bloggers are still working with the media establishments or 
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used to be employed either as a journalist, columnist, reporter, news 
presenter or even producer.
94
 
Secondly, many amateur bloggers attempt to operate as journalists. 
This can be seen in the occurrence of natural disasters that have turned 
many passers-by and eye witnesses, who have no journalism 
background and professional training, into amateur journalists and 
reporters via their blogs. Blogs offer first-hand reports that are more 
often than not accompanied with raw pictures and unedited video 
shoots taken from their digital cameras, camcorders or even mobile 
phones. This reflects the personal experience of bloggers who 
happened to be on the scene during the happening of such events. 
Undoubtedly, blogs have emerged as a citizen-based form of 
journalism
95
 and this is by far more appealing and preferable over the 
mainstream media, which perform ‘helicopter journalism’, as their 
news coverage is normally mediated by editors and limited in scope.
96
 
Further, the ‘bottom up coverage’ in blogs provides in depth reporting 
and coverage with frequently updated news and interactive features, 
and they sometimes provide details that the mainstream media ignore 
or have too little inclination or time to investigate.
97
 
Unfortunately, their status as journalists is yet to be resolved
98
 
although reports suggested that bloggers tend to define their role as an 
extension of the traditional media and believe that they have an impact 
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on politics and news.
99
 Reporters Without Borders claimed that 
blogging is a form of independent journalism and bloggers are 
regarded as the real journalists particularly in countries where the 
traditional media are heavily censored or placed under government 
pressure.
100
 It has been argued that by writing blogs, bloggers are 
neither qualified nor disqualified from the ‘journalist’ label, and so 
long as they perform similar journalistic tasks such as recording and 
reacting to newsworthy events, they should be considered as 
journalists.
101
 It has been further argued that though many bloggers 
are keen to concentrate on analysis rather than reporting of facts,
102
 
they should still be regarded within the general term of journalists and 
be rightly treated as amateur journalists.
103
 In relation thereof, it was 
alleged that the argument seems to be more sensible than the crude 
approach of treating bloggers in general as amateur journalist.
104
  
2.5 Political Blogs & Democratisation in Malaysia 
Initially, blogs were primarily used for personal self-expression, 
sharing expertise
105
 and maintaining social networks with family and 
friends.
106
 However, as the influence and size of the blogosphere 
continues to grow, blogs have started to establish their eminence in 
                                                 
99
 Michael Tomaszeski, Jennifer M Proffitt and Steven McClung, ‘Exploring the 
Political Blogosphere: Perceptions of Political Bloggers about Their Sphere’ (2009) 
17(2) Atlantic Journal of Communication 72, 83. 
100
 J Pain, ‘Bloggers, the New Heralds of Free Expression’ in Reporters Without 
Borders (ed), Handbook for Bloggers and Cyber Dissidents (2005) 5. 
101
 Rosenberg, Say Everything (n 19) 273. 
102
 JD Lasica, ‘Blogging as a Form of Journalism’ (Online Journalism Review, 24 
May 2001) <http://www.ojr.org/ojr/workplace/1017958873.php> [accessed 1 
September 2010]. 
103
 Ribstein, ‘From Bricks to Pajamas’ (n 65) 189. 
104
 Ciolli, ‘Bloggers as Public Figures’ (n 3) 259 – 260. 
105
 Technorati ‘State of the Blogosphere 2011 – Introduction and Methodology’ (n 
11). 
106
 Kim Hart, ‘Portrait of a Blogger: Under 30 and Sociable’ The Washington Post 
(20 July 2006) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/07/19/AR2006071901900.html> [accessed 19 February 
2010]. 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 2: Overview of Blogs 34 
other fields including politics. In parallel to this, a survey by the Pew 
Internet and American Life Project reveals that political blogs appear 
to have grown faster than other kinds of blogs including technology, 
business, music and sports blogs,
107
 and consequently they have been 
hailed as a new force in politics.
108
 
Political blogs are generally referred to as blogs that focus on issues, 
events and policy in a constituency, national, international or party 
political context.
109
 They can be individualised (e.g. personal blogs by 
MPs, citizens or journalists) or multiple author groups (e.g. 
Greenpeace).
110
 It has been argued that political blogs are primarily 
used as technological ‘soapboxes’ from which bloggers can convey 
their ideas, observations, experiences and opinion to the public at 
large.
111
 On the other hand, they have to a lesser extent been utilised 
as ‘link filters’ or ‘transmission belts’ that provide links to other 
websites or quote sources with no commentary.
112
 Apart from that, 
political blogs offer information not covered by the traditional media 
such as party platform, dates of political rallies or events, upcoming 
votes and the release of data.
113
 Political blogs also act as ‘fifth 
estate’
114
 or ‘watchdog’ to the mainstream media
115
 by highlighting 
and writing posts about bias or omissions in the media.  
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Political blogs have taken off in the US and they have been 
extensively used for various aspects of political activities.
116
 They 
have started to gain attention and respect from the mainstream media 
after making several important exposures. The most remarkable 
success is the highlighting of racist remarks by Senator Trent Lott in 
2002, which later on resulted in his resignation as the Senate Majority 
Leader.
117
 Another celebrated incident is the exposure of forged 
documents used by Dan Rather to publish a story on President Bush’s 
service in the National Guard. Upon the revelation of the truth, Dan 
Rather resigned from his post as CBS Evening News anchor in 
2004.
118
 In the US presidential campaign of 2004, political blogs were 
perceived to have reached almost the status of mainstream media with 
political consultants, news services and candidates beginning to use 
blogs as tools for outreach and opinion formation.
119
 Similarly in the 
2008 US Presidential election campaign, where Barack Obama’s 
ability to fully utilise social networking including blogs is claimed to 
have given him an advantage over other candidates.
120
 
As to the position in the UK, political blogs have only come into the 
picture in 2003 even though UK-authored blogs have been around 
from the late 1990s. They have initially been resorted to by 
individuals and groups on the margins of political institutions,
121
 but 
following a series of incidents including record low turnout at the 
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2001 General Election and a vigorous debate on military action in 




In Malaysia, political blogs were initially not regarded as a threat at all 
by the government. This is perhaps due to the reason that the 
overwhelming majority of the Malaysian bloggers (94 per cent) is 
highly individualistic and apolitical in nature.
123
 As such, it is not 
surprising that early political bloggers have been likened as ‘bad 
karaoke singers’ by the Information Minister.
124
 Nonetheless, the 
misjudgement of the role of political blogs seemed to be fatal when 
the ruling party (National Front or Barisan Nasional) lost five out of 
eleven states in the Peninsular Malaysia to the opposition parties, 
which only formalised their coalition (People’s Alliance) after the 
general election.
125
 The crucial role played by political blogs is also 
reflected by the fact that six well-followed bloggers won their 
parliamentary seats on the opposition tickets.
126
 Consequently, many 
political analysts believed that the driving force for the success of the 
opposition parties was the effective use of political blogs by the 
candidates and supporters. Indeed, the former Malaysian Prime 
Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, admitted that the biggest mistake 
of the ruling party was ignoring the impact of the online debate that 
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was fully exploited by the opposition.
127
 Therefore, it is submitted that 
the proliferation of political blogs has a great impact on the 
liberalisation of freedom of expression and democracy in Malaysia. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Until the emergence of the Internet, the traditional media were the 
only sources of information and news for the people in Malaysia. 
Realising the powerful influences of the media, the government had 
imposed permit and license requirements as well as ownership 
mechanism on the media players.
128
 The adoption of such policy that 
has gravely impaired the media freedom was justified on the ground 
of unity and nation building, though it was alleged that the ultimate 
goal was to confine the role of the media as the mouthpiece of the 
ruling party and to contain political dissent and eliminate open 
criticisms against the government.
129
 As a result, the ruling party 
managed to control the public sphere, gain enormous political support 
and eventually hold to its power for more than 50 years since the 
country’s independence in 1957. 
The scenario has started to change with the evolution of numerous 
forms of web-based communications, including blogs in the late 
1990s. Despite the fact that blogs are primarily used by Internet users 
as online diaries that record personal interests and experience, they 
have more importantly become a novel platform for public dialogue 
and debate on political issues and matters of public interests. Blogs 
have given a new hope to the people to access independent and 
alternative information. They have also empowered the public to 
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express authentic and unprejudiced critics against the establishment as 
blogs or other web-based communications are currently insusceptible 
to prior constraints such as printing licence or publication permit. 
Consequently, blogs have flourished and become an effective platform 
for bloggers and their readers to share information, circulate news and 
critically discuss issues and events more broadly.
130
 Thus, it is argued 
that not only blogs have gradually changed the media landscape in 
Malaysia, they have also been considered as the most ideal platform to 
democratise public participation and political debates. To sum up, it is 
submitted that blogs have and will continue to enhance the people’s 
right to exercise freedom of expression as well as the democracy in 
the country.  
                                                 
130
 Sandra C Smeltzer, ‘Blogging in Malaysia: Hope for a New Democratic 
Technology?’ (2008) 14(1) J Int’l Comm 28, 5. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Malaysia is a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarch, 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King), as the supreme head of the 
country
1
 and a prime minster as the head of the government. The 
prime minister is appointed from among the members of the House of 
Representatives
2
 according to which political party wins the most 
seats in a general election.
3
 Since the fate of the country is decided by 
the votes of the electorate, the right to exercise freedom of speech and 
expression is crucial to enable the people to participate and make an 
informed judgment in the political process. Therefore, the people 
should be allowed to enjoy this right at their will and any interference 
with its exercise could only be imposed by the government in certain 
prescribed circumstances for Malaysia to be regarded as a democratic 
nation in the true sense. 
In relation thereof, this part of the thesis attempts to analyse the right 
to freedom of speech and expression in Malaysia and the application 
of these principles to political blogs. The study will begin the 
discussion with historical origin of the right, its meaning, scope and 
categories of expression, in particular political speech. Thereafter, it 
will discuss permitted grounds of restrictions under the Malaysian 
Federal Constitution (Malaysian Constitution), legality of restrictive 
laws passed by Parliament and reasonableness of such derogation on 
                                                 
1
 Article 32(1) of the Malaysian Constitution provides ‘There shall be a Supreme 
Head of the Federation, to be called the Yang di-Pertuan Agong…’.The Yang di-
Pertuan Agong shall be selected among the nine Malay Rulers and elected by the 
Conference of Rules for a term of five years. 
2
 House of Representatives is one of the three components of the Malaysian 
Parliament and the members are elected by the people in general election. See 
Articles 44 and 46 of the Malaysian Constitution.  
3
 Article 43(2)(a) of the Malaysian Constitution states ‘… the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong shall first appoint as Perdana Menteri (Prime Minister) to preside over the 
Cabinet a member of the House of Representatives who in his judgment is likely to 
command the confidence of the majority of the members of that House; …’. 
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freedom of expression. Finally, the application of these principles to 
political blogs will be highlighted at the end of this chapter.  
3.2 Origin of Freedom of Expression 
The historical origin of the right to freedom of expression in Malaysia 
is deep rooted in the Report of the Constitutional Commission of 1957 
(Constitutional Commission Report).
4
 The Constitutional Commission 
Report was prepared by a group of independent constitutional experts 
who were jointly appointed by the British sovereign and the Malay 
Rulers subsequent to the London Constitutional Conference of 1956
5
 
and was headed by Lord Reid (Reid Commission).
6
 The Reid 
Commission was composed of eminent jurists
7
 from the 
Commonwealth countries, as it was believed that a commission of 
locals would not be qualified for the task and ‘it would be desirable, 
therefore, to invite persons with specialised knowledge of 
constitutions of federal government’.
8
 
The Reid Commission was entrusted ‘to make recommendations for a 
federal form of constitution for the whole country as a single 
independent, self-governing unit within the Commonwealth’.
9
 The 
Reid Commission then adopted the Indian model with a written and 
                                                 
4
 Andrew Harding, Law, Government and the Constitution in Malaysia (Kluwer 
Law International 1996) 28. 
5
 The conference was primarily held to discuss the independence of Malaya from the 
British and was attended by the British government, the Alliance government and 
representatives of the nine Malay Rulers (Kings). 
6
 Since the commission was led by Lord Reid, it was commonly referred to as the 
Reid Commission. 
7
 The Reid Commission was made up of Lord Reid (Scottish lawyer and judicial 
member of the House of Lords), Sir Ivor Jennings (British constitutional lawyer), 
Justice B. Malik (chief justice of the Allahabad High Court in India) Justice Abdul 
Hamid (member of West Pakistan High Court) and Sir William McKell (former 
governor-general of Australia and cabinet member). 
8
 Memorandum by Tunku Abdul Rahman, 1 March 1955, Malayan Chinese 
Association Files, MCA Headquarters, Kuala Lumpur, PH/A/0084. 
9
 Para 3 of the Constitutional Commission Report. For details on the terms of 
references for the Reid Commission, see Mohd. Hishamudin Mohd. Yunus, ‘An 
Essay on the Constitutional History of Malaysia (Part 2)’ (1995) 3 CLJ xxxi, 3 – 5. 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 3: Freedom of Expression in Malaysia 41 
supreme constitution and a chapter on fundamental rights, but 
Parliament is conferred with legislative power to restrict the 
application of those rights.
10
 Thus, that the draft constitution was 
largely based on the Constitution of India of 1949 (Indian 
Constitution), with a specific chapter on fundamental rights including 
freedom of expression.
11
 Paragraph 161 of the Constitutional 
Commission Report states: 
The rights which we recommend should be defined and guaranteed 
are all firmly established throughout Malaya and it may seem 
unnecessary to give them special protection in the Constitution. But 
we have found in certain quarters vague apprehensions about the 
future. We believe such apprehensions to be unfounded, but there 
can be no objection to guaranteeing these rights subject to limited 
exceptions in conditions of emergency and we recommend that this 
should be done.  
The paragraph points out the Reid Commission’s perception that 
fundamental rights were already recognised in Malaysia and therefore 
warranted no special attention. As the Reid Commission appeared to 
be over optimistic about these rights,
12
 it was not unexpected that their 
importance was not sufficiently emphasised. This is evidenced with 
only two
13
 out of 194 paragraphs of the Constitutional Commission 
Report were devoted to recommending protection for these rights. 
However, there exist uncertain apprehensions among the minority 
communities,
14
 and since the country was still vulnerable to racial and 
religious tension, political and economic instability and threat of 
                                                 
10
 Apart from the Indian model, the drafters of the Malaysian Constitution also did 
consider the British model of an unwritten constitution with a supreme Parliament 
vested with unlimited legislative competence and the US model of a written 
constitution with a limited legislature and an entrenched chapter on fundamental 
liberties. See Shad Saleem Faruqi, Document of Destiny: The Constitution of the 
Federation of Malaysia (Star Pub Bhd 2008) 62. 
11
 Tan Sri Ahmad Ibrahim and Ahilemah Joned, The Malaysian Legal System (2nd 
ed, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka 1995) 54 – 55. 
12
 Harding, Law, Government and the Constitution in Malaysia (n 4) 35 – 36. 
13
 Paras 161 – 162 of the Constitutional Commission Report. 
14
 A number of non-Malay communities such as the Malayan Tamils Association, 
Eurasian Union and the Straits Chinese British Association had raised the issue of 
fundamental rights in their memoranda submitted to the Reid Commission. 
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communist subversion, the Reid Commission felt that the fundamental 
rights should be included into the draft constitution.
15
 Article 10 of the 
draft states: 
Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and 
expression, subject to any reasonable restriction imposed by federal 
law in the interest of the security of the Federation, friendly 
relations with other countries, public order, or morality or in 
relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to any 
offence. 
It is imperative to note that Article 10 of the draft constitution 
contained the word ‘reasonable’ in relation to the power of Parliament 
in restricting the right to freedom of expression. This setting was 
similar to Article 19 of the Indian Constitution
16
 and was purposely 
designed to empower the judiciary to review the reasonableness of any 
restrictive laws passed by Parliament.
17
 However, the inclusion of the 
word ‘reasonable’ was strongly opposed by Justice Abdul Hamid. In 
his Note of Dissent, he opined: 
If the word reasonable is allowed to stand, every legislation on this 
subject will be challenged in court on the ground that the 
restrictions imposed by the legislature are not reasonable. This will 
in many cases give rise to conflict between the views of the 
legislature and the views of the court on the reasonableness of the 
restrictions. To avoid this situation it is better to make the 
legislature be the judge of the reasonableness of the restrictions… 
There will always be a fear that the court may hold the restrictions 
                                                 
15
 Kevin Tan and Li-Ann Thio, Constitutional Law in Malaysia and Singapore (3rd 
ed, LexisNexis 2010) 719. 
16
 Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India provides ‘All citizens shall have the right 
to (a) freedom of speech and expression…’. And clause 2 to the same article 
stipulates that ‘Nothing in sub clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of 
any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law 
imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said 
sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of 
the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or 
in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence’. 
17
 Michael Hor and Collin Seah, ‘Selected Issues in the Freedom of Speech and 
Expression in Singapore’ (1991) 12 Sing L Rev 296, 299. 
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It was alleged that Justice Abdul Hamid’s insistence on the omission 
of the word ‘reasonable’ was based on three grounds namely that it 
would derogate from the sovereignty of Parliament, create 
uncertainties as all laws will be exposed to judicial review, and 
ultimately could lead to tension and conflict between the legislature 
and the judiciary.
19
 Although some contended that the dissent was 
flawed as Article 19 of the Indian Constitution (in pari materia with 
Article 10 of the draft constitution) had served India very well,
20
 it 
was really surprising that other members of the Reid Commission did 
not stage any argument to counter the dissent. Even Lord Reid himself 
felt that the proposed changes to the provision on freedom of 
expression were not significant and said: 
[A] greater part of the changes have been in the direction of giving 
more freedom to the executive and Parliament of Malaya and 
correspondingly less extensive guarantees of individual rights that 
we had recommended. I cannot speak for my colleagues but 
speaking for myself I am not dismayed at the changes which have 
been made. The other changes which do not come into this 
category I have described are mostly of minor importance.
21
 
The Constitutional Commission Report together with the draft 
constitution were reviewed by a Working Party, which was made up 
of the High Commissioner, four representatives of the Malay Rulers, 
four Alliance Government representatives, the Chief Secretary and the 
Attorney-General.
22
 Unfortunately, the Working Party, in its White 
                                                 
18
 Para 11 of Justice Abdul Hamid’s Dissent Note. 
19
 Khoo Boo Teong, ‘Rule of Law in the Merdeka Constitution’ (2000) 27 JMCL 59, 




 Quoted at clmn. 3139 of the Federal Legislative Council Proceedings, 11 July, 1957. 
22
 Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, ‘Rediscovering the Constitution’ (1995) 16 Sing L Rev 157, 
171. 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 3: Freedom of Expression in Malaysia 44 
Paper,
23
 concurred with Justice Abdul Hamid’s argument and insisted 
for the deletion of the word ‘reasonable’ from the draft constitution.
24
 
Based on the recommendations in the White Paper, several 
amendments were made and later, a final draft was passed by the 
Federal Legislative Council and came into force with the 
independence of the nation on 31 August 1957.
25
 
Despite the fact that the Reid Commission proposed the right to 
freedom of expression ‘… should be guaranteed in the Constitution 
and the courts should have the power of enforcing the right,’
26
 the 
word ‘guaranteed’ appeared to be without much substance. This is 
because the right could be restricted by numerous laws passed by 
Parliament.
27
 For this reason, it was argued that the Reid Commission 




Nonetheless, it would be erroneous to hold the Reid Commission 
responsible in entirety for the lack of an effective constitutional 
safeguard. Although the Malaysian Constitution was alleged to be less 
indigenous
29
 for it was a product of constitutional advisers from the 
Commonwealth,
30
 the final draft was indeed debated and reviewed by 
                                                 
23
The White Paper prepared by the Working Party entitled ‘Constitutional Proposals 
for the Federation of Malaya’ sets out the changes made to the Constitutional 
Commission Report and the draft constitution. 
24
 Rais Yatim, Freedom under Executive Power in Malaysia: A Study of Executive 
Supremacy (Endowment Sdn Bhd 1995) 78 – 79. 
25
 Harry E Groves, ‘Fundamental Liberties in the Constitution of the Federation of 
Malaya - A Comparative Study’ (1959) 5 Howard LJ 190, 199 – 200. 
26
 Para 161 of the Constitutional Commission Report. 
27
 Yatim, Freedom under Executive Power in Malaysia: A Study of Executive 
Supremacy (n 24). 
28
 Abdul Aziz Bari, ‘Freedom of Speech and Expression in Malaysia After Forty 
Years’ (1998) 27(3) INSAF 149, 159. 
29
 Tun Suffian LP observed that the Malaysian Constitution is less indigenous 
compared to the Indian Constitution as it was not drawn up by a constituent 
assembly and was not ‘given by the people’. See Phang Chin Hock v. Public 
Prosecutor [1980] 1 MLJ 70 at 73. 
30
 Joseph M Fernando, ‘Sir Ivor Jennings and the Malayan Constitution’ (2006) 
34(4) J Imp & Commonw Hist 577, 578. 
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local leaders from the Alliance party
31
 and their response was 
considered by the Federal Legislative Assembly.
32
 This can be seen 
with the inclusion of provisions on the monarchy institution, the 
Islamic religion, the Malay language and the Malay special privileges 
(commonly known as ‘traditional elements’
33
 or ‘indigenous 
elements’),
34
 which were incorporated into the final draft on 
recommendations by local leaders. Since there was sufficient local 
input inserted into the final draft, it would be more appropriate to 
regard the Malaysian Constitution as a product born of the local 
people.
35
 Further, the final draft was scrutinised and approved by 




3.3 The Meaning of Freedom of Expression 
Freedom of speech and expression has been grouped together with 
freedom of assembly and association in Article 10. It is specifically 
placed in Part II (Articles 5 – 13)
37
 of the Malaysian Constitution 
                                                 
31
 The Alliance (Perikatan) party was the ruling government at that time and it was a 
coalition of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), Malayan Chinese 
Association (MCA) and Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). The Alliance party is now 
superseded by the National Front (Barisan Nasional). 
32
 Abdul Aziz Bari, ‘The Indigenous Roots of the Malaysian Constitution : The 
Provisions and the Implications’ (2008) 6 CLJ xxxiii, 6. 
33
 Mohd Salleh Abas, ‘Traditional Elements of the Malaysian Constitution’ in FA 
Trindade and Hoong Phun Lee (eds), The Constitution of Malaysia: Further 
Perspectives and Developments: Essays in Honour of Tun Mohamed Suffian 
(Oxford University Press 1986) 1 – 12. 
34
 Bari, ‘The Indigenous Roots of the Malaysian Constitution : The Provisions and 
the Implications’ (n 32) 43 – 50. 
35
 Sharon K Chahil, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Constitutional Protection of 
Fundamental Liberties: The Basic Structure Doctrine and Constitutional 
Amendment in Malaysia’ (2002) 3 MLJ xii, 6. 
36
 It was claimed that the Malaysian legal system was greatly influenced by a 
mixture of the British law, the Commonwealth jurisprudence, Shariah law and local 
customs. See Shamrahayu A. Aziz, ‘The Malaysian Legal System: The Roots, the 
Influence and the Future’ (2009) 3 MLJ xcii, 92. 
37
 Part II of the Malaysian Constitution contains nine provisions on fundamental 
liberties namely (i) personal liberty, (ii) prohibition from slavery and forced labour, 
(iii) prohibition on double jeopardy and retrospective criminal laws, (iv) right to 
equality, (v) freedom of movement, (vi) freedom of expression, assembly and 
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under the heading of ‘Fundamental Liberties’,
38
 and is distinctively 
arranged after the supremacy clause.
39
 Since the legislative framework 
of the country is based on the doctrine of constitutional supremacy,
40
 
this setting gives the impression that the right is very well guarded. In 
addition, any alteration to the constitutional provisions that house this 
right requires a two-third majority of the total number of members of 
Parliament.
41
 Unfortunately, such a presumption is simply flawed as 




Article 10(1) of the Malaysian Constitution provides that: 
Subject to Clauses (2), (3) and (4)
43
 –  
(a) Every citizen has the right to freedom of speech and expression. 
The provision demonstrates express recognition of freedom of 
expression, but elaboration on its meaning is nowhere provided. Plain 
reading of the provision indicates that the right is conferred on 
Malaysian citizens only. The right is also applicable to artificial 
                                                                                                                   
association, (vii) religious freedom, (viii) educational rights and (ix) proprietary 
rights.  
38
 The terms ‘fundamental liberties’, or ‘civil rights’ or ‘civil liberties’ refer to rights 
that are basic and essential for the development of human personalities and 
capabilities. They can also be referred to as human rights. See Tunku Sofiah Jewa, 
Public International Law: A Malaysian Perspective (Pacifica Publications 1996) 
465. 
39
 The supremacy clause refers to Article 4(1) of the Malaysian Constitution that 
provides ‘This Constitution is the supreme law of the Federation and any law passed 
after Merdeka (Independence) Day which is inconsistent with this Constitution, 
shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void’. 
40
 Mohamed Suffian, An Introduction to the Legal System of Malaysia (2nd ed, 
Penerbit Fajar Bakti 1989) 12. 
41
 Article 159(3) of the Malaysian Constitution provides ‘A Bill for making any 
amendment to the Constitution (other than an amendment excepted from the 
provisions of this Clause) and a Bill for making any amendment to a law passed 
under Clause (4) of Article 10 shall not be passed in either House of Parliament 
unless it has been supported on Second and Third Readings by the votes of not less 
than two-thirds of the total number of members of that House’. 
42
 Bari, ‘Freedom of Speech and Expression in Malaysia After Forty Years’ (n 28) 
150. 
43
 Clauses 2 – 4 of the Malaysian Constitution that restrict freedom of expression are 
discussed below at Part 3.6. 
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persons such as companies and statutory bodies that are incorporated 
under Malaysian law, although they are unable to be regarded as 
citizens since citizenship is only conferred on natural persons.
44
 
With regard to foreigners or non-citizens, they are not entitled to claim 
this right although they are constitutionally guaranteed other 
fundamental liberties including freedom of religion and right to 
property.
45
 However, this does not render foreigners to be totally 
unprotected as common law principles can be invoked to protect their 
interests. This can be seen in the case of John Peter Berthelsen v 
Director-General of Immigration, Malaysia & Ors,
46
 when it was 
ruled that the summary withdrawal of the work permit of an American 
journalist, who was legally permitted to enter the country, without a 
prior hearing was declared to be null and void as it violated the 
principles of natural justice. As to the disqualification of the right to 
foreigners, this has been expounded in Dow Jones Publishing v 
Attorney General,
47
 whereby it was ruled that foreigners and foreign 
publications lack the constitutional protection of freedom of speech 
and expression under Article 10 of the Malaysian Constitution. 
The lack of statutory interpretation on freedom of expression has 
nevertheless been remedied in Public Prosecutor v Ooi Kee Saik & 
Ors
48
 that ‘The right to freedom of speech is simply the right which 
everyone has to say, write or publish what he pleases so long as he 
does not commit a breach of the law’.
49
 By virtue of this ruling, 
freedom of expression refers to communication of information and 
                                                 
44
 Under Part III of the Malaysian Constitution, citizenship can only be conferred on 
natural person either by birth, descent, registration or naturalisation. 
45
 Shad Saleem Faruqi, ‘Human Rights and the Constitution’ in S. Sothi Rachagan 
and Ramdas Tikamdas (eds), Human Rights and the National Commission 
(HAKAM 1999) 140. 
46
 [1986] CLJ (Rep) 160 
47
 [1989] 2 MLJ 385. 
48
 [1971] 2 MLJ 108. 
49
 ibid 112. 
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ideas that are not prohibited by law and it can be in verbal or written 
form. Nonetheless, this judicial interpretation still appears to be 
wanting and incomplete compared to definitions by other institutions. 
A good illustration would be the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), which provides a clear interpretation on the right to 
freedom of expression. Article 10(1) of the ECHR says: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right 
includes the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by a public authority 
and regardless of frontiers… (emphasis added). 
The right to freedom of expression in the ECHR has been defined to 
include freedom of information since these two rights are so closely 
connected or intertwined.
50
 The close relationship between freedom of 
expression and freedom of information has also been recognised in 
other international instruments including the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). The UDHR is a non-binding declaration and 
was adopted by the United Nations in 1948 as part of the International 
Bill of Human Rights along with the ICCPR and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
51
 
Whilst the ICCPR is an international legal treaty which was approved 
by the Third Committee of the General Assembly of the United 
Nation in December 1966 and came into force in 1976.  
 
 
                                                 
50
 The Hon Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Relationship between Freedom of Expression 
and Freedom of Information’ in J Beatson and Yvonne Cripps (eds), Freedom of 
Expression and Freedom of Information: Essays in Honour of Sir David Williams 
(Oxford University Press 2000) 225. 
51
 Henry J Steiner, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals: 
Text and Materials (3rd ed, Oxford University Press 2008); Arthur Henry Robertson 
and John Graham Merrills, Human Rights in the World: An Introduction to the Study 
of the International Protection of Human Rights (4th ed, Manchester University 
Press 1996). 
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Article 19 of the UDHR provides: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this 
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media 
and regardless of frontiers (emphasis added). 
 
In a similar vein, Article 19(2) of the ICCPR states: 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right 
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or 
in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice 
(emphasis added). 
These provisions clearly show that though the ECHR slightly differs 
from the UDHR and ICCPR, in the sense that the former merely 
guarantees the right ‘to receive and impart’ and not the right ‘to seek’ 
information and ideas, they all treat freedom of expression to cover 
freedom of information. The absence of freedom of information from 
the judicial interpretation of freedom of expression in Malaysia seems 
to suggest that the scope of the right is deficient compared to the 
international jurisprudence. Attempts were made to invoke the 
provisions of UDHR in Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis 
Negara & Other Appeals,
52
 but it was held that UDHR was not legally 
binding on the Malaysian courts.
53
 The case followed the earlier 




The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed and 
adopted on December 10, 1948 by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations. It is not a legally binding instrument as such and 
some of its provisions depart from existing and generally accepted 
                                                 
52
 [2002] 4 MLJ 449 
53
 ibid 453. 
54
 [1981] 2 MLJ 356. 
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rules. It is merely a statement of principles devoid of any obligatory 
character and is not part of our municipal law.
55
 
Since UDHR is not applicable in Malaysia, the government has been 
urged by the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM)
56
 
to ratify certain core treaties particularly the ICCPR that guarantees 
the right to freedom of expression. But so far, the situation remains the 
same and the ICCPR has yet to be signed and ratified by the country.
57
 
It was claimed that special protection accorded to the Bumiputera
58
 
and the use of certain laws that contravene the fundamental rights are 
among the key factors for the government’s resistance.
59
  
The non-accession of the ICCPR is further intensified with the 
absence of Asian regional human rights regime, comparable to the 
ECHR in Europe, Pact of San José in America or Banjul Charter in 
                                                 
55
 ibid 366. 
56
 The Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) was established under 
the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999. See Kevin Kam Soon Aun, 
‘The Role of Fundamental Liberties in the Evolution of Malaysia as a Democratic 
Society’ (2003) xxxii (2) INSAF 50, 60. For details on SUHAKAM, see 
<www.suhakam.org.my/home> [accessed 1 March 2012]. 
57
 Malaysia is a dualist state that has currently ratified only two international treaties 
on human rights; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 
These treaties were acceded to in 1995 with certain reservations on the basis of 
religious and national or cultural relativism. Malaysia has also signed, though not 
ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). See 
Jaclyn Ling-Chien Neo, ‘Malaysia’s First Report to the CEDAW Committee: A 
Landmark Event for Women’s Rights in Malaysia’ (2007) 13 Asian Yrbk Int L 303. 
58
 The word ‘Bumiputera’ or ‘Bumiputra’ literally means the ‘son of soil’ and it is 
used to refer to ethnic Malay and other indigenous ethnic groups such as the 
aboriginal people (Orang Asli) in Peninsular Malaysia and the tribal people in Sabah 
and Sarawak. See Sharon Siddique and Leo Suryadinata, ‘Bumiputra and Pribumi: 
Economic Nationalism (Indiginism) in Malaysia and Indonesia’ (1981) 54(4) Pac 
Aff 662, 662 – 663; Maran Marimuthu, ‘Bumiputera-Controlled Companies: 
Performance Evaluation Using A Non-Parametric Approach’ (2010) 2(2) IJEF 178. 
<http://journal.ccsenet.org/index.php/ijef/article/view/5905/4684> [accessed 29 
March 2012]. 
59
 Elizabeth Looi and Shanon Shah, ‘Human Rights: What’s Stopping Malaysia?’, 
10 December 2008 <http://www.thenutgraph.com/print/1226> [accessed 17 March 
2010]. 
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Africa,
60
 which ought to safeguard the fundamental rights of the 
people in Asia or Asia-Pacific.
61
 Fortunately, all leaders of 
Association for South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) states have taken 
a positive step to promote human rights among its members with the 
adoption of the Charter of ASEAN in 2007.
62
 Thereafter, an ASEAN 
human rights body, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights (AICHR), was founded in 2009.
63
 Though AICHR is 
still considered in its infancy stage, it has already been heavily 
criticised as a toothless council that failed to promote and protect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the region.
64
 
Despite those undesirable developments, the ruling in Sivarasa Rasiah 
v Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor
65
 appears to have relieved the lack 
of interpretation in the Malaysian Constitution. It was ruled by Gopal 
Sri Ram FCJ: 
Article 10 contains certain express and, by interpretive implication, 
other specific freedoms. For example, the freedom of speech and 
expression are expressly guaranteed by art. 10(1)(a). The right to be 
derived from the express protection is the right to receive 
information, which is equally guaranteed.
66
 
By virtue of this judgment, it is a settled law now that the right to 
freedom of speech and expression in Malaysia should be interpreted to 
include the right to receive information as well. 
                                                 
60
 Further discussion on human rights regimes, see Burns H Weston, Robin Ann 
Lukes and Kelly M Hnatt, ‘Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and 
Appraisal’ (1987) 20 Vand J Transnat’l L 585, 592 – 614. 
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 Ralph Wilde, ‘NGO Proposals for an Asia-Pacific Human Rights System’ (1998) 
1 Yale Hum Rts & Dev LJ 137, 137. 
62
 Li-Ann Thio, ‘Human Rights and the Charter of ASEAN’ (2006) 13 Asian Yrbk 
Int L 285. 
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 For details on ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
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Of late, many scholars and legal experts, including His Royal 
Highness Raja Azlan Shah, the former Lord President of the Supreme 
Court
67
 who was later elected as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King) of 
Malaysia,
68
 have openly recommended the adoption of the right of 
access to information. In a public lecture delivered on 19 December 
1986, His Royal Highness was reported to have said: 
The right to access to information has assumed increasing 
importance in recent years as one of the steps in achieving the 
concept of open government. I believe that we need a Freedom of 
Information, under which members of the public have a right to 
access specifically requested records, and that these should be 
made available, as a right, within reasonable time.
69
 
It is an undisputed fact that apart from freedom of expression, the 
right of access to information is also crucial in a democratic country.
70
 
Unfortunately, the importance of such a right and the public outcry for 
a law on freedom of information was rejected by the government as it 
viewed such law as unnecessary at the present time.
71
 This position is 
certainly undesirable as the rejection for the proposals of formulating 
freedom of information law indirectly indicates the government’s 
intention of holding on to the culture of secrecy in its operations. 
                                                 
67
 The title of Lord President of the Supreme Court previously referred to the highest 
position in the Malaysian judicial system. But the judiciary reforms in 1994, which 
rendered final appeals to the Privy Council in London were abolished in 1985, had 
resulted in the title to be replaced by that of Chief Justice of the Federal Court (also 
known as Chief Justice of Malaysia). Accordingly, the Supreme Court was replaced 
by the Federal Court as the apex court in the country. 
68
 Raja Azlan Shah was promoted to the office of Lord President on 12 November 
1982, and later was installed as Raja Muda (Crown Prince) by his uncle, Sultan 
Idris, the King of Perak. When Sultan Idris passed away, he succeeded to the throne 
of Perak. Later in April 1989, Raja Azlan Shah was appointed as the ninth Yang di-
Pertuan Agong (King) of Malaysia. 
69
 Sultan Azlan Shah, ‘The Right to Know’ (1986) 1 JMCL 22. 
70
 Abu Bakar Munir and Siti Hajar Mohd Yasin, Information and Communication 
Technology Law : State, Internet and Information: Legal and Regulatory Challenges 
(Sweet & Maxwell Asia 2010) 34 – 37. 
71
 Beh Li Yi, ‘Minister: No Need for Freedom of Information’ (Malaysiakini.com, 
26 September 2005) <http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/40903> [accessed 10 
February 2012]. 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 3: Freedom of Expression in Malaysia 53 
3.4 The Scope of Freedom of Expression 
The Malaysian Constitution also does not elaborate the exact scope of 
the right to freedom of speech and expression in Article 10(1). In the 
traditional sense, the right refers to typical forms of expression such as 
making speeches, writing books, articles or broadcasting.
72
 
Nonetheless, a well-established principle in constitutional law 
provides that freedom of expression would cover communication by 
word of mouth, signs, symbols and gestures and through works of art, 




As to freedom of the press, its inter-connection with freedom of 
expression has been highlighted by Abdul Hamid LP in The New 
Straits Times Press (M) Bhd v Airasia Bhd
74
 when it was observed 
that ‘…freedom of speech which is related to the freedom of the 
press’.
75
 Nonetheless, freedom of the press has not been explicitly 
mentioned in the Malaysian Constitution. Such absence has prompted 




[T]he Constitution of Malaysia says nothing about the freedom of 
the press. The relevant portion of art 19(1) of the Indian 
Constitution says this: ‘All citizens shall have the right: (a) to 
freedom of speech and expression; ...’.  Nevertheless, a consistent 
current of judicial opinion in India has established the proposition 
that art 19(1)(a) includes within its ambit the freedom of the 
press…With this proposition we agree and indeed before us no 
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The judgment indicates that since Article 10(1) of the Malaysian 
Constitution is substantially similar with Article 19(1) of the Indian 
Constitution, the right to freedom of expression should technically 
include freedom of the press. The decision was followed in Mkini 
Dotcom Sdn Bhd v Ketua Setiausaha Kementerian Dalam Negeri & 
Ors
78
 whereby it was ruled: 
It is beyond doubt that the freedom of speech and expression, in 
Malaysia has its roots in article 10 of our Federal Constitution and 
further, to my mind that includes the freedom of press to print and 
publish. Clearly therefore, it is a right founded upon strong 




Thus, it is a settled law that freedom of the press has been judicially 
considered to be within the scope of freedom of speech and 
expression. Despite the close relation between these two rights, 
Kamalanathan Ratnam J in J Heng Consulting Services (M) Sdn Bhd 
& Anor v The New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd
80
 observed: 
A distinction must be drawn between the right to ‘freedom of 
speech’ and the ‘freedom of the press’. Whilst the courts would 
endeavour to see that the right to freedom of speech is protected, 
there is no special privilege accorded to the press.
81
 
The position of the press has been further underlined by Edgar Joseph 
Jr SCJ in Pung Chen Choon’s
82
 case: 
The position of the press under our Constitution is not as free as the 
position of the press under the Indian Constitution and more so 
when compared to the position of the press in England or the 
United States of America.
83
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These cases have clearly established that although press freedom has 
been given due judicial recognition, no special constitutional 
protection is conferred on such a right. Thus, the press merely enjoys 
the same right to freedom of expression under Article 10(1) like any 
other ordinary citizens,
84
 even though the press may have a great 
impact on the public mind, particularly in the area of politics and 
public interest,
85




3.5 Political Expression 
Freedom of expression together with freedom of assembly and 
association are commonly regarded as important political rights.
87
 
Nonetheless, the right to freedom of expression, which is explicitly 
stipulated in article 10(1) of the Malaysian Constitution, is not limited 
to political speech per se. Other types of expression, which are non-
political such as commercial and artistic, are also protected to certain 
degree by the laws of the country. Nonetheless, the study will limit its 
focus on political speech because of its substantial impact on the 
democracy in the country. 
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The term ‘political speech’ has been generally defined to include ‘all 
speech relevant to the development of public opinion on the whole 
range of issues which an intelligent citizen should think about’, and 
should not be narrowly confined to ‘communications which directly 
concern the conduct of government or which seek to influence 
electoral choices’.
88
 It has been accorded a privileged legal status in 
most common law countries including the UK.
89
 It is however 
uncertain whether political speech would enjoy similar status under 
the Malaysian Constitution. 
Article 10(1) provides that freedom of expression is not confined to 
merely speech concerning public affairs, let alone political matters in 
a narrow sense. Though it was argued that special protection for 
political speech might be impliedly established in the said provision, 
this contention was difficult to sustain because the alleged implied 
protection for political speech, which should be stronger in its effects 
than the express provisions, is very hard to prove.
90
  
The only case that examines the relationship between political 
discussion and freedom of expression is Ooi Kee Saik.
91
 In this case, 
the first accused (an opposition politician) was charged under section 
4(1)(b) of the Sedition Act 1948 for uttering seditious words at a 
dinner held by his party when he alleged the government of practising 
partiality in favour of one ethnic group. In his defence, he argued that 
freedom of expression should be given greatest latitude and that such 
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a charge against him stroked at the very heart of free political 
comment. It was ruled: 
[A]s a general statement, free and frank political discussion and 
criticism of government policies cannot be developed in an 
atmosphere of surveillance and constraint … The question arises: 
where is the line to be drawn; when does free political criticism end 
and sedition begin? In my view, the right to free speech ceases at 
the point where it comes within the mischief of section 3 of the 
Sedition Act. The dividing line between lawful criticism of 
Government and sedition is this – if upon reading the impugned 
speech as a whole the court finds that it was intended to be a 
criticism of Government policy or administration with a view to 
obtain its change or reform, the speech is safe. But if the court 
comes to the conclusion that the speech used naturally, clearly and 
indubitably, has the tendency of stirring up hatred, contempt or 
disaffection against the Government, then it is caught within the 
ban of paragraph (a) of section 3(1) of the Act.
92
 
The judgment has drawn the line between political criticism and 
sedition, but the special status of political speech has never been 
underlined. In the absence of any constitutional provision and express 
judicial recognition, it is submitted that political speech in Malaysia 
will not be given a privileged legal status like the position in the UK. 
Thus, political speech ought to be treated in the same manner like 
other types of expression such as commercial or artistic and shall be 
subjected to the same restrictive laws that have been passed by 
Parliament. 
Unfortunately, the position of political speech has been further 
aggravated with the presence of the Sedition Act 1948, which has on 
numerous occasions been used to deter dissent and criticism towards 
the government. This could be seen in a number of cases including 
Ooi Kee Saik,
93
 Public Prosecutor v Fan Yew Teng,
94
 Public 
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Prosecutor v Oh Keng Seng
95
 and Lim Guan Eng v Public 
Prosecutor.
96
 The use of such laws in the past has effectively curtailed 
opposition politicians and civic groups from making critical comments 
on matters of public interest.
97
 
Protection of national stability and racial harmony of the country has 
relentlessly been invoked to justify limitations on speech that 
challenges the government.
98
 This line of reasoning has been 
underlined in Fan Yew Teng v Public Prosecutor
99
 that: 
It is important to bear in mind that Malaysia has a plural 
society. Therefore, it is the primary and fundamental duty of 
every Government to preserve law and order. It is in 
connection with this function of the Government that the 
offence of sedition must be looked at.
100
 
Notwithstanding the aforesaid judgment, it was claimed that these 
reasons have been exploited to contain the influence of the opposition 
and to control public opinion.
101
 The vague definition of the phrases 




 of the 
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Sedition Act 1948 renders the statute to be very wide in scope and this 
had empowered the government to prosecute opposition politicians 
and critics under vague grounds of sedition. As a result, most of the 
sedition cases in Malaysia are not cases where politicians in the 
opposition parties call for armed rebellion against the government, but 
merely speech criticising the government.
104
 Thus, it is not surprising 
when political speech in the country has been unfairly dominated by 
government leaders and ruling parties, whilst opposition parties and 
civil right groups have constantly been denied the opportunity to 
deliver political expression arguably as a means by the authority to 
control public opinion and hold to power.
105
 
To sum up, political speech in Malaysia does not enjoy a privileged 
legal status like the position in the UK or other common law 
countries. It is theoretically permitted like commercial and artistic 
speech under article 10(1) of the Malaysian Constitution. Nonetheless, 
a close scrutiny of sedition cases reveals that political speech has been 
severely limited in practice by the government to strengthen its 
position and political control. Since it was observed that open public 
dialogue and criticism is hardly permissible,
106
 it is submitted that so 
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long as the Sedition Act 1948 continues to be in force and employed 
by the government, it is very much unlikely that political speech will 
be freely exercised by the people in the country. Thus, it is pertinent to 
scrutinise permitted grounds for restricting freedom of expression 
under the Malaysian laws. 
3.6 Restrictions on Freedom of Expression 
The right to freedom of speech and expression as constitutionally 
guaranteed to all citizens is not absolute or limitless. There is no doubt 
that freedom of expression is the citizens’ fundamental liberty, but it is 
equally not disputed that the right should be subjected to certain 
restrictions. Several judicial decisions have clearly established that 
there is no unrestricted freedom of expression and restrictions are a 
necessary part of the right.
107
 The rationale for imposing such 
restrictions has been described by Raja Azlan Shah J who quoted with 
approval a passage from the judgment of the Indian Supreme Court in 
the case of AK Gopalan v State of Madras:
108
 
There cannot be any such thing as absolute or uncontrolled liberty 
wholly free from restraint; for that would lead to anarchy and 
disorder. The possession and enjoyment of all rights ... are subject 
to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed to be, to the 
governing authority of the country, essential to the safety, health, 
peace and general order and moral of the community.
109 
It was further observed by Eusoff Chin CJ in Ling Wah Press (M) Sdn 
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Freedom of speech is not an absolute right. Freedom of speech is 
not a licence to defame people. It is subject to legal restrictions. An 
absolute or unrestricted right to free speech would result in persons 
recklessly maligning others with impunity, and the exercise of such 
right would do the public more harm than good.
111
 
It is obvious that there is a grave danger for an unbridled freedom of 
expression and qualifications on this right are undeniably necessary to 
secure the broader interest of the public. For this reason, the opening 
sentence to Article 10(1)
112
 that stipulates that ‘Subject to Clauses (2), 
(3) and (4) – (a) every citizen has the right to freedom of speech and 
expression’ has from the beginning qualified this freedom to a number 
of restrictions.
113
 Nonetheless, this arrangement has invited an acute 
criticism that Article 10(1) is ‘remarkable for what it takes away 
rather than what it gives’
114
 as it failed to place real restrictions on the 
restrictions
115
 and has effectively rendered the exercise of the right to 
be residual in nature.
116
 The impact of this provision was discussed in 
Lau Dak Kee v Public Prosecutor
117
 that:  
Article 10(1) of the Federal Constitution guarantees the rights of 
every citizen to freedom of speech, assembly and association. 




                                                 
111
 ibid 85. 
112
 Article 10(1) contains three fundamental rights namely freedom of speech and 
expression in sub-clause (a), freedom of peaceful assembly in sub-clause (b) and 
freedom of association in sub-clause (c). 
113
 Clause 3 to Article 10 will not be discussed in this study because it is mainly on 
restrictions to the right to form associations under Article 10(1)(c). 
114
 Harding, Law, Government and the Constitution in Malaysia (n 4) 169. 
115
 Ahmad Masum, ‘Freedom of Speech and the Internet - A Case Study of 
Malaysia’ (2009) 3 MLJ 4. 
116
 Abdul Aziz Bari and Farid Sufian Shuaib, Constitution of Malaysia: Text and 
Commentary (2nd ed, Prentice Hall 2006) 33. 
117
 [1976] 2 MLJ 229. 
118
 ibid 230. 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 3: Freedom of Expression in Malaysia 62 
3.6.1 Permitted Grounds of Restrictions 
Article 10 can be regarded as the most repressive provision as it 
contains two clauses that provide the basis for Parliament to pass 
restrictive laws on freedom of speech. Clause 2 of Article 10 states:  
Parliament may by law impose – 
(a) on the rights conferred by paragraph (a) of Clause (1), such 
restrictions as it deems necessary or expedient in the interest of the 
security of the Federation or any part thereof, friendly relations 
with other countries, public order or morality and restrictions 
designed to protect the privileges of Parliament or of any 
Legislative Assembly or to provide against contempt of court, 
defamation, or incitement to any offence. 
Clause 2 empowers Parliament to enact laws restricting freedom of 
expression on eight specified grounds. The first ground relates to 
security of the Federation or any part thereof. It was alleged that the 
words ‘any part thereof’
119
 have increased Parliamentary control over 
freedom of expression.
120
 Several restrictive laws have been passed 
including the Official Secrets Act 1972, Printing Presses and 
Publications Act 1984, Protected Areas and Protected Places Act 
1959, Public Order (Preservation) Act 1958 and Sedition Act 1948. 
Secondly, freedom of expression can be limited to preserve friendly 
relations with other countries. At present, no specific law has been 
passed for preserving good relations with foreign countries as these 
matters are specifically dealt with by the government in accordance to 
its administrative guidelines and foreign policies.
121
 
Thirdly, limitation on the right can be justified on the ground of public 
order. This basis has been invoked to pass the Sedition Act 1948, 
Police Act 1967 and Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984. 
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Fourthly, Article 10(2) recognises morality as a justifiable limitation 
and a number of laws such as Films (Censorship) Act 1952, Indecent 
Advertisements Act 1953, Lotteries Act 1952, Medicines 
(Advertisement and Sale) Act 1956, Printing Presses and Publications 
Act 1984 and Perbadanan Kemajuan Filem Nasional Malaysia Act 
1981 have been passed to this effect. 
Further, Parliament may enact laws to safeguard the privileges of its 
members or Legislative Assembly. In relation to this, the Houses of 
Parliament (Privileges and Powers) Act 1952 and the standing orders 
of each House of Parliament have been enacted to enable Members of 
Parliament and State Legislative Assemblies to perform their duties as 
effectively as possible. The next constitutional ground is contempt of 
court and accordingly, two laws have been passed to restrict comment 
on judges and judicial proceedings namely the Judicial Proceedings 
(Regulation of Reports) Act 1962 and the Courts of Judicature Act 
1964.  
Freedom of expression can also be limited on the ground of 
defamation via the Defamation Act 1957 and the Penal Code.
122
 
Lastly, the Parliament is also permitted to enact laws on the ground of 
incitement to commit any offence. Offences like obscenity,
123
 or 
causing disharmony, disunity on grounds of religion
124
 and many 
other Penal Code offences that are restricting the right to freedom of 
expression are derived from clause 2 of Article 10. 
Apart from clause 2, clause 4 of Article 10 also confers Parliament 
with additional legislative power to restrain the exercise of this 
fundamental right. The article reads: 
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In imposing restrictions in the interest of the security of the 
Federation or any part thereof or public order under Clause (2)(a), 
Parliament may pass law prohibiting the questioning of any matter, 
right, status, position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative 
established or protected by the provisions of Part III, Article 152, 
153 or 181 otherwise than in relation to the implementation thereof 
as may be specified in such law. 
The restrictions in Article 10(4) were introduced subsequent to the 
Constitution (Amendment) Act 1971.
125
 The amendment, which was 
passed following the racial riots on 13
th
 May 1969, prohibits anyone 
from questioning matters classified as politically sensitive in 
Malaysia. They are the right to citizenship under Part III
126
 of the 
Malaysian Constitution, the status of the Malay language,
127
 the 
position and privileges of the Malays and the natives of Sabah and 
Sarawak,
128
 and the prerogatives of the Malay Sultans and the Ruling 
Chiefs of Negeri Sembilan.
129
 
Freedom of expression is further constrained by Articles 149 and 150. 
The former permits Parliament to pass legislative action to fight 
subversion whilst the latter permits Parliament to enact laws to combat 
an emergency. Altogether, there are fourteen broad grounds available 
for Parliament to confine freedom of expression. To date, 35 statutes 
have been passed including the highly repressive laws namely the 
Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984, the Sedition Act 1948 and 
the Official Secrets Act 1972.
130
 Surprisingly, these limitations are not 
exhaustive as there is a distinct possibility of other indirect restrictions 
derivable from other than these provisions.
131
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The existence of this incredible list of constraints has placed freedom 
expression at the mercy of Parliament. To make matter worse, these 
legislative powers are open to manipulation by the government to 
maintain its political power.
132
 This can be illustrated by a number of 
cases whereby members of opposition parties and non-government 
organisations were dubiously charged with violating restrictive laws on 
freedom of expression.
133
 Undoubtedly, unduly restrictive exploitation 
of these statutes will have a dire impact on the democratic status of 
Malaysia, which has already been labelled alongside a ‘democratic 




 or ‘syncretic 
state’.
136
 These terms signify the hybrid character of the country that is 
situated between democracy and ‘full’ authoritarianism.
137
 
The latest democracy index issued by the Economist Intelligence Unit 
in 2012 also categorised Malaysia as a ‘flawed democracy’ and not 
‘full democracy’ at the position of 64
th
 out of 167 countries 
worldwide.
138
 This is because protection of basic human rights, 
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including freedom of expression, is among the essential criteria in 
evaluating the regime types and the country was given a very low 
mark in this particular area by the report.
139
 Hence, there is a pressing 
need to evaluate the restrictive laws passed by Parliament as any 
misuse of the permitted constitutional grounds is most likely to 
undermine the constitutional right of the people.  
3.7 Legality of Restrictive Laws on Freedom of 
Expression 
In theory, the legality of any statutes, which have the effect of 
restricting constitutional rights including freedom of speech and 
expression, can be challenged in courts. This is by virtue of the 
doctrine of constitutional supremacy contained in Article 4(1).
140
 The 
supreme status of the Malaysian Constitution was highlighted by the 
Federal Court in Loh Kooi Choon v Government of Malaysia
141
 that: 
The Constitution is not a mere collection of pious platitudes. It is 
the supreme law of the land embodying 3 basic concepts … The 
third is that no single man or body shall exercise complete 
sovereign power, but that it shall be distributed among the 
Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches of government, 
compendiously expressed in modem terms that we are a 
government of laws, not of men.
142
 
Thus, courts are empowered to review and invalidate any laws that 
have violated the Malaysian Constitution. However, constitutional 
review of legislation that restricts freedom of expression is hardly to 
be effected as the supremacy of the constitution is made subject to a 
number of exceptions. For instance, Article 10(2) permits Parliament 
                                                 
139
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to pass any restrictive laws on freedom of expression that it deems 
‘necessary and expedient’ for the specified purposes. In addition, 
other grounds of derogation are also provided in Articles 10(4), 149 
and 150. In relation to this, it was alleged that these constitutional 
provisions have been so promulgated as to give the ruling government 
in Parliament virtually unfettered powers in controlling the right to 
freedom of speech and expression in the country.
143
 
This state of affairs is worsened by Article 4(2)(b) that explicitly 
provides that Parliament’s assessment of the necessity or expediency of 
any of these statutes is not open for challenge. Article 4(2)(b) reads: 
The validity of any law shall not be questioned on the ground that 
… it imposes such restrictions as are mentioned in Article 10(2) but 
those restrictions were not deemed necessary or expedient by 
Parliament for the purposes mentioned in that Article. 
This position has been affirmed by Chan J in Public Prosecutor v 
Param Cumaraswamy
144
 which provides: 
By virtue of Article 4(2)(b) the validity of any law which 
Parliament under Article 10(2)(a) has deemed necessary to pass to 
impose restrictions on freedom of speech shall not be questioned.
145
 
The decision rendered the questioning of the legality of any law that 
imposes restrictions pursuant to Article 10(2) is prohibited by Article 
4(2). As a result, the possibility of any challenge of such laws has 
almost disappeared.
146
 The article had effectively made Parliament 
‘supreme in the business of law making’ and accordingly, the 
fundamental liberties (including freedom of expression) appeared 
secondary importance in the Malaysian Constitution.
147
 On the 
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contrary, it was argued that Article 4(2) only prevents questioning on 
the ground that Parliament did not deem the restriction necessary and 
does not anticipate arguments based on the reasonableness.
148
 It was 
also alleged that a law purporting to be passed under Article 10(2) 
could be challenged on the ground that it is not in any of the interests 
mentioned in the clause.
149
  
Nonetheless, the alternative view on the implication of Article 4(2) on 
freedom of expression has not been favoured. Consequently, the only 
possible recourse is through an application to declare that such laws are 
unconstitutional for falling outside the scope permitted by the Malaysian 
Constitution. This has been highlighted by Chang Min Tat J in Madhavan 
Nair & Anor v Public Prosecutor
150
 that ‘Any condition limiting the 
exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of speech not falling 
within the four corners of Article 10 clauses (2), (3) and (4) of the 
Federal Constitution cannot be valid’.
151
 The principle has been 
followed in Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Anor v Nordin bin 
Salleh
152
 that ‘…such restrictions as only Parliament may impose and 
that too on specified grounds, and on no other grounds’.
153
 
Unfortunately, after more than 55 years since the Independence Day, 
out of ten cases challenging the legality of restrictive laws, nine cases 
were rejected by courts.
154
 Only in the landmark case of Muhammad 
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Hilman bin Idham & Ors v Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors
155
 which 
disputed the constitutionality of section 15(5)(a) of the Universities 
and University College Act 1971 (UUCA) that prohibits involvement 
of university students in politics has been declared unconstitutional. 
The provision was held to fall outside the scope of permitted grounds 
in the Malaysian Constitution and was declared illegal by the Court of 
Appeal. This decision is very commendable and could be regarded as 
a positive development for the future of free speech in the country. 
Later, the Federal Court has on 22 November 2012 affirmed the 
decision of the Court of Appeal when the appeal by the government 
was rejected as the dispute no longer existed following the repeal of 
the impugned section three months after the government was granted 
the permission to lodge a final appeal.
156
 
3.7.1 The Phrases ‘Necessary or Expedient’  
Apart from ascertaining whether the impugned provisions come 
within the scope of permissible exceptions, courts in the past appeared 
to be unwilling to interfere with the legality of such laws arguably 
because the phrase ‘necessary or expedient’ in Article 10(2) of the 
Malaysian Constitution confers superfluous legislative power on 
Parliament. As a result, there are likely to be very few possible 
restrictions that would not be covered by the permissible grounds. The 
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Where such entirely subjective words have been used, it is not 
within the competency of the courts to question the necessity or 
expediency of the legislative provision.
158
 
The judgment has caused Parliament to become the ultimate decision 
making body in determining the necessity or expediency of any laws 
and not the judiciary. It was claimed that so long as the passage of 
laws limiting freedom of expression by Parliament fulfilled all the 
procedural requirements, there would be no substantive challenge to 
these laws even if they were overly harsh or unreasonable.
159
 This was 
highlighted by Raja Azlan Shah FJ in Loh Kooi Choon
160
 that: 
The question whether the impugned Act is ‘harsh and unjust’ is a 
question of policy to be debated and decided by Parliament, and 
therefore not meant for judicial determination. To sustain it would 
cut very deeply into the very being of Parliament.
161
 
Consequently, courts were powerless to annul laws and they appeared 
to be assertive on restrictions laid down by Parliament rather than 
being inquisitive on the aims and functions of the right.
162
 This is 
partly due to the omission of the word ‘reasonable’ from Article 10(2), 
which indicates the framers’ intention of holding Parliament 
(ultimately the Executive) as the sole deciding body on the extent, 
nature or scope of restrictions.
163
 This undesirable setup has 
effectively exempted Parliament from proving the necessity and 
expediency of laws it passed and simultaneously precluded courts 
from inquiring the reasonableness of such statutes. 
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The approach taken by the Malaysia courts was in stark contrast with 
its counterpart in India. This is due to the express provision in the 
Indian Constitution that specifically mandates any derogation on 
freedom of expression to be reasonable. Article 19(2) of the Indian 
Constitution provides that:  
Nothing in sub clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of 
any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so 
far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of 
the right … (emphasis added) 
In relation to this, any laws purported to restrict the right to freedom 
of expression in India should be reasonable and the duty of 
determining the reasonableness of such restrictions is vested in 
courts.
164
 The different judicial approach between courts in Malaysia 
and India has been discussed in Pung Chen Choon that:
165
  
In Malaysia, the position of the court when considering an 
infringement of this Right is different from that of the position of 
the court in India... the Indian Constitution requires that the 
restrictions, even if within the limits prescribed, must be 
‘reasonable’ – and so that court would be under a duty to decide on 
its reasonableness. But, with regard to Malaysia, when 
infringement of the Right of freedom of speech and expression is 
alleged, the scope of the court’s inquiry is limited to the question 
whether the impugned law comes within the orbit of the permitted 
restrictions. So, for example, if the impugned law, in pith and 
substance, is a law relating to the subjects enumerated under the 
permitted restrictions found in cl 10(2)(a), the question whether it 
is reasonable does not arise; the law would be valid.
166
 
3.7.2 Constitutional Interpretation 
Constitutional interpretation poses enormous challenges to local 
judges. In general, courts are mandated to adopt the ‘four walls’ 
approach that was established in The Government of the State of 
                                                 
164
 M. P. Jain, Samaraditya Pal and Ruma Pal, Indian Constitutional Law (6th ed, 
Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur 2010) 982. 
165
 Public Prosecutor v Pung Chen Choon (n 76). 
166
 ibid 575. 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 3: Freedom of Expression in Malaysia 72 
Kelantan v The Government of the Federation of Malaya and Tunku 
Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj.
167
 It was ruled by Thomson CJ that ‘The 
Constitution is primarily to be interpreted within its own four walls 
and not in the light of analogies drawn from other countries such as 
Great Britain, the United States of America or Australia’.
168
 
The ‘four walls’ approach towards constitutional interpretation was 
followed by Raja Azlan Shah FJ in Loh Kooi Choon:
169
  
Whatever may be said of other Constitutions, they are ultimately of 
little assistance because our Constitution now stands in its own 
right and it is in the end the wording of our Constitution itself that 
is to be interpreted and applied, and this wording ‘can never be 
overridden by the extraneous principles of other Constitutions’.
170
 
These cases indicate that the Malaysian Constitution should be ideally 
interpreted in the local context. Though there were times when local 
courts resorted to comparative analysis with foreign countries, 
particularly the English and Indian cases, they are not binding but 
merely persuasive. This can be seen in a number of cases including 
Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri Malaysia.
171
 In this 
case, the Federal Court was referred to a long list of English and 
Indian authorities on constitutional interpretation. In choosing the 
laws between the two countries, it was observed by Suffian LP that 
‘Judgments of the Indian Supreme Court are of great persuasive value 
here, particularly on the Constitution because to a great extent the 
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The relevance and authoritative value of the Indian cases have been 
discussed in details in Yeap Hock Seng @ Ah Seng v Minister For 
Home Affairs, Malaysia & Ors.
173
 It was submitted by Abdoolcader J 
that: 
Our Constitution and the laws providing for preventive detention 
have been primarily drawn from Indian sources, and accordingly 
decisions of the highest tribunal in India, the Supreme Court of 
India, and indeed also of the High Courts of her several States, are 
of great persuasive authority here upon the borrowed provisions 
and will be entitled to great weight in interpreting and considering 
the relevant local statutory counterparts, subject of course to such 




As such, it is obvious that reference to the Indian cases would prove 
beneficial in interpreting the Malaysian Constitution whenever there is 
a lack of local authority. In addition, Article 10(1) of the Malaysian 
Constitution is to a large extent similar to Article 19(1) of the Indian 
Constitution. This has been acknowledged by Tuan Abang Iskandar J 
in the unreported case of Mkini Dotcom Sdn Bhd.
175
   
Apart from the ‘four walls’ approach and the adoption of the Indian 
cases on constitutional issues, local courts appeared to have preferred 
the literal approach in interpreting the Malaysian Constitution.
176
 By 
applying the literal interpretation, a greater emphasis would be placed 
on the ‘plain language’ of the provision so that its grammatical and 
ordinary sense would be applied. This approach was discussed in 
Public Prosecutor v Datuk Harun Bin Haji Idris & Ors:
 177
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The Constitution is not to be construed in any narrow and pedantic 
sense… but it is equally true that this does not mean that the court 
is at liberty to stretch or pervert the language of the Constitution in 




On a similar note, it was highlighted in Ooi Kee Saik:
179
 
[I]n interpreting a written constitution such as the Federation of 
Malaya Constitution the court must look at the expressed wording 
of the written constitution itself rather than be guided by extraneous 
principles of other constitutions.
180
 
Consequently, judges were of the opinion that they have no other 
options but to apply these laws. This is reflected in the ruling of Raja 
Azlan Shah J: 
Once the court has determined that such law lies within the 
province of a competent authority, the court is not authorised to 
reweigh what a competent authority has weighed. The court will 
not assume the role of a third legislative chamber.
181 
These cases indicate the preference of the judiciary in Malaysia to 
focus on the language of the provisions than on the philosophical basis 
of the rights. It was alleged that the restrictive interpretation of the 
provisions on freedom of expression has resulted in the right looked 
illusory.
182
 It was also contended that the superior court judges’ 
immersion in the British legal philosophy of positivism and their 
familiarity with the British tradition of parliamentary supremacy have 
contributed to the judges’ reluctance to invalidate restrictive laws on 
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the ground of human rights violation.
183
 Further, it was argued that the 
escalating power of the executive has also weakened courts’ powers in 
safeguarding freedom of expression.
184
 The power is derived from 
consistent success of the ruling party in securing a two-third majority 
of Parliament seats in general elections.
185
 Another critical factor is 
the eastern cultures and traditions of the people that do not encourage 
challenges against the ruling authority.
186
 Consequently, the executive 
is not only able to dominate legislative functions and pass laws as it 
desires, but also to behave like feudal lords.
187
 
Nonetheless, there have been positive developments in the 
interpretation of the Malaysian Constitution by local courts. This was 
highlighted by the Federal Court in Dato Menteri Othman bin 
Baginda v Dato Ombi Syed Alwi:
188
  
In interpreting a constitution two points must be borne in mind. 
First, judicial precedent plays a lesser part than is normal in matters 
of ordinary statutory interpretation. Secondly, a constitution, being 
a living piece of legislation, its provisions must be construed 
broadly and not in a pedantic way – with less rigidity and more 
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The same approach was later followed in Merdeka University Berhad 
v Government of Malaysia
190
 and Palm Oil Research and 
Development Board Malaysia & Anor v Premium Vegetable Oils Sdn 
Bhd & Another Appeal.
191
 In the latter case, Gopal Sri Ram JCA ruled 
that: 
It is the solemn duty of the judicial arm of Government – the courts 
who are the guardians of constitutional rights – to interpret the 
fundamental rights provisions in Part II of the Constitution 
prismatically, so that our citizens obtain the full benefit and value 
of those rights. And it is in this simple way, through the exercise of 
the court's interpretive jurisdiction that our public law gains 
momentum. Accordingly, it cannot be over-emphasised that on no 




The paradigm shift of the local courts from literal interpretation was 
reaffirmed in Badan Peguam Malaysia v Kerajaan Malaysia.
193
 In this 
case, it was held that interpreting a constitution, which is the supreme 
law of the country, is not the same as interpreting a statute as it 
involves the application of sui generis principles. It was further ruled 
by the Federal Court that a constitution should be construed with less 
rigidity and more generosity than other ordinary statutes.
194
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The attitude of local courts in interpreting fundamental rights was 
tested in Dr Mohd Nasir bin Hashim v Menteri Dalam Negeri 
Malaysia.
195
 The case concerned a refusal by the Registrar of 
Societies (ROS) to register a new political party, Parti Sosialis 
Malaysia (PSM), at national level on the ground that PSM’s 
committee did not comprise of members from at least seven states in 
Malaysia. The appellant sought a judicial review claiming that his 
right to form association under Article 10(1)(c) had been infringed by 
ROS and the decision not to register the party is a restriction not 
authorised by the Malaysian Constitution. In delivering the judgment, 
the Court of Appeal had discussed the implication of the words ‘such 
restrictions as it deems necessary or expedient’ in Article 10(2)(c) and 
ruled that the words should not be given a literal meaning. It was 
observed by Gopal Sri Ram JCA that: 
Against the background of these principles it is my judgment that 
the restrictions which art 10(2) empower Parliament to impose 
must be reasonable restrictions. In other words, the word 
‘reasonable’ must be read into the sub-clauses of art 10(1)… the 
court must not permit restrictions upon the rights conferred by art 
10 that render those rights illusory. In other words, Parliament may 
only impose such restrictions as are reasonably necessary. To 




The non-literal approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in the case 
has departed from the earlier ruling of Eusoff Chin J in Nordin bin 
Salleh v Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan
197
 which ruled that 
‘reasonableness is not material in art 10(2)(c) of the Federal 
Constitution’.
198
 Apparently, this judgment has a great impact on the 
fundamental rights as the word ‘reasonable’ must now be read before 
the word ‘restrictions’ in Article 10. Consequently, Parliament is no 
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longer at liberty to pass restrictive laws at will since any limitations on 
such rights must be reasonable, for any non-compliance will render 
such laws to be declared unconstitutional by courts. 
3.7.3 Reasonableness of Restrictions on Freedom of 
Expression 
The landmark ruling that requires the word ‘reasonable’ to be read 
before restrictions in Article 10 has been conceded by the unanimous 
decision of the Federal Court in Sivarasa Rasiah.
199
 In delivering the 
judgment, Gopal Sri Ram FCJ said: 
Provisos or restrictions that limit or derogate from a guaranteed 
right must be read restrictively… although the article says 
‘restrictions’, the word ‘reasonable’ should be read into the 
provision to qualify the width of the proviso... when reliance is 
placed by the state to justify a statute under one or more of the 
provisions of art 10(2), the question for determination is whether 
the restriction that the particular statute imposes is reasonably 




The question of reasonableness of restrictive laws on the freedom of 
expression has been invoked in the subsequent case of Muhammad 
Hilman.
201
 The appellants were political science undergraduates of the 
third respondent (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia). They were 
present at a parliamentary by-election in Hulu Selangor and were 
found to have in their possession paraphernalia supportive of, 
sympathetic with or opposed to a contesting political party during the 
campaign period. As a result, the appellants faced disciplinary 
proceedings for the alleged breach of section 15(5)(a) of the 
Universities and University Colleges Act 1971(UUCA) which 
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prohibits students’ involvement in politics.
202
 The appellants denied 
the allegations and applied to the High Court for a declaration that the 
impugned section, which restricted their right to freedom expression, 
was unconstitutional as it violated Article 10(1)(a).  
Nonetheless, their application was dismissed and the appellants then 
appealed against the decision by contending that not only restrictions 
on freedom of expression must be for one of the specified grounds, 
they must also be reasonable. In allowing the appeal and holding that 
the restrictive provisions were unconstitutional, the Court of Appeal 
by referring to the Federal Court decision in Sivarasa Rasiah
203
 ruled 
that the word ‘reasonable’ should be read into the provisions in Article 
10(2)(a) and thus any restrictions on the right must be reasonably 
necessary and expedient for one or more of the permitted purposes. 
The earlier decision by the Supreme Court
204
 in Pung Chen Choon
205
 
that held that the question of reasonableness is immaterial for any 
restrictive laws passed by Parliament was no longer a good law.
206
 It 
was highlighted by Mohd Hishamudin JCA that:  
It is now settled law that Parliament can no longer impose a 
restriction on freedom of speech, in any manner it deems fit, for the 
purpose of protecting the interests spelt out in cl 2(a) of art 10. Any 
restriction imposed on freedom of speech by Parliament must be a 
reasonable restriction, and the court, if called upon to rule (such as 
in the present case), has the power to examine whether the 
restriction so imposed is reasonable or otherwise (besides 
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determining as to whether or not the restriction falls within the 
permissible exceptions as spelt out by cl (2)(a) of art 10); and – in 
the event it were to hold that the restriction is unreasonable – to 
declare the impugned law imposing the restriction as being 
unconstitutional and accordingly null and void.
207
 
The decision has accorded a greater protection to freedom of 
expression since any restrictions on such a right must now satisfy two 
crucial requirements i.e. they must come within the ambit of the 
permitted grounds and must be reasonable. As a result, the power of 
Parliament to enact restrictive laws is no longer limitless. Further, the 
reasonableness of restrictive laws will not be determined by 
Parliament, but by the wisdom of the judges. Nonetheless, there is 
lack of clear interpretation and judicial guidelines in ascertaining the 
reasonableness of any restrictive laws on freedom of expression under 
the Malaysian Constitution. 
3.7.4 The Test of Reasonableness 
The word ‘reasonable’ was first ruled to be read into Article 10 in Dr 
Mohd Nasir.
208
 Though the case concerns freedom of association, the 
judgment is very critical as it considered the interpretation of the 
phrase ‘such restrictions as it deems necessary or expedient’ in Article 
10, which also houses freedom of expression. In holding that any 
restrictions must be reasonably necessary, the court referred to 
equality clause in Article 8
209
 and ruled that ‘only proportionate 
legislative response is permissible under art 10(2)(c)’.
210
 The word 
‘reasonable’ has then been equated with the word ‘proportionate’ and 
therefore, any restrictive laws that are disproportionate to the object 
sought to be achieved by Parliament will be rendered unreasonable 
and unconstitutional by courts.  
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The decision that requires restrictions in Article 10 to be reasonable 
was followed by the Federal Court in Sivarasa Rasiah.
211
 The 
appellant, who was an advocate and solicitor as well as a member of 
the Malaysian Parliament, challenged the constitutionality of section 
46A (1) of the Legal Profession Act 1976 which disqualified him from 
being a member of the Bar Council. He argued that the impugned 
section imposed unreasonable restrictions and violated his right to 
freedom of association. In holding that the word ‘reasonable’ should 
be read into the constitutional provisions, the court ruled that the 
disqualifications were reasonable and they were justifiable on the 
grounds of public morality as the absence of political influence 
secured an independent Bar Council.
212
 It is important to note that the 
court in this case departed from the earlier decision in Dr Mohd 
Nasir
213
 as it did not equate reasonableness with proportionality 
though the equality clause in Article 8 was discussed in details and 
was raised by the appellant. Unfortunately, the word ‘reasonable’ was 
not succinctly elaborated and its interpretation remains obscure. 
The reasonableness of laws limiting freedom of expression has been 
invoked in Muhammad Hilman.
214
 The appellant argued that the trial 
judge had erred in law and fact when he decided that the question of 
reasonableness was immaterial under Article 10(1)(a). On appeal, it 
was held that by virtue of the Federal Court’s rulings in Sivarasa 
Rasiah,
215
 any restrictions imposed on freedom of expression must be 
reasonable. However, Low Hop Bing JCA dissented and ruled that the 
impugned section was reasonable as the issue of reasonableness had 
been extensively debated in Parliament and the question of whether 
restrictive laws are harsh and unjust was beyond the purview of the 
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judiciary. However, by way of obiter he suggested Parliament to 
repeal or review the section or the whole act.
216
 
On the contrary, Mohd Hishamuddin JCA ruled that court had the 
power to determine the reasonableness of laws passed by Parliament. 
Since no clear relation between the prohibition and the object sought 
to be achieved was established, the provision was regarded 
unreasonable and accordingly, the impugned section was declared 
unconstitutional.
217
 The judgment had been conceded by Linton 
Albert JCA as the impugned section was found to be unreasonable for 
its manifest absurdity. It was further highlighted that inflexible 
propositions to determine the reasonableness of restrictive laws were 
neither necessary nor useful as each provision must be determined on 
its own facts and circumstances. 
It is pertinent to highlight that the judgment was the first authority that 
demands restrictive laws on freedom of expression to be reasonable. 
Nonetheless, it is very unfortunate that none of the judges attempted to 
define the term ‘reasonable’ or promulgate clear guidance in 
ascertaining the reasonableness of any derogatory provisions as the 
restrictive provision was held ‘self-explanatory in its manifest 
absurdity’.
218
 The earlier cases of Dr Mohd Nasir
219
 and Sivarasa 
Rasiah
220
 also did not provide a clear interpretation of the word. This 
is very undesirable and may cause uncertainty since the 
reasonableness of any legislation will be entirely dependent on the 
personal assessment of judges.  
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And in the recent case of Mat Shuhaimi bin Shafiei v Public 
Prosecutor,
221
 the constitutionality of the Sedition Act 1948 was 
challenged on the ground that it offended the ‘reasonableness test’. 
The appellant, who was charged for publishing seditious posts in his 
blog, had urged the court to adopt a liberal interpretation of the word 
‘reasonableness’ when he contended that any restrictions that derogate 
from the constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression must 
be read restrictively. In rejecting the argument, it was ruled by the 
Court of Appeal that: 
… the judicial approach in dealing with the offence of sedition in 
Malaysia has favoured the restrictive approach as compared to the 
liberal approach adopted by the English common law… In our 
judgment, the Sedition Act is constitutional and it does not violate 
arts 10(1)(a) and 10(2)(a) of the Federal Constitution. It does not 
offend the reasonableness test. It is reasonable to maintain the 
Sedition Act because the Government has a right to preserve public 
peace and order, and therefore, has a good right to prohibit the 
propagation of opinions which have a seditious tendency.
222
 
The case has clearly shown the positivist attitude of the local judges as 
they were reluctant to take a liberal interpretation of the word 
‘reasonableness’ so as to accord protection for freedom of speech in 
general and political blogs in particular. Regardless of the current 
situation in Malaysia, reference to the jurisprudence in India would 
prove crucial as the Indian authorities are highly persuasive on the 
interpretation of the Malaysian Constitution.
223
 Further, Article 10(1) 
of the Malaysian Constitution is also similar to Article 19(1) of the 
Indian Constitution. 
In the Indian jurisprudence, it is a well-established principle that any 
restrictions on freedom of expression must be reasonable as the word 
‘reasonable’ is clearly stipulated in clause 2 to Article 19. In order to 
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be reasonable, it was held that restriction must have reasonable 
relation to the object which the legislation seeks to achieve and must 
not go in excess of that object.
224
 On a similar note, the phrase 




[L]imitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should 
not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required 
in the interests of the public. The word ‘reasonable’ implies 
intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the choice of a course 
which reason dictates. Legislation arbitrarily or excessively invades 
the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness and 
unless it strikes a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed 
in article 19(1)(g) and the social control permitted by article 19(6) 
it must be held to be wanting in that quality.
226
 
Several tests of reasonableness have been promulgated by courts but it 
was held that no abstract standard reasonableness can be laid down as 
applicable to all cases. This is pursuant to the judgment of Sastri J in 
Madras v V. G. Row:
 227
 
[T]he test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be 
applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract 
standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as 
applicable to all cases.
228
 
Despite the aforesaid remarks, the Supreme Court of India in M.R.F. 
Ltd v Inspector Kerala Government
229
 has laid down the following 
principles on the reasonableness of restrictions on freedom of 
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1. While considering the reasonableness of the restrictions, the 
court has to keep in mind the Directive Principles of State 
Policy; 
2. Restrictions must not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature so 
as to go beyond the requirement of the interest of the general 
public; 
3. In order to judge the reasonableness of the restrictions, no 
abstract or general pattern or a fixed principle can be laid 
down so as to be of universal application and the same will 
vary case to case as also with regard to changing conditions, 
values of human life, social philosophy of the Constitution, 
prevailing conditions and the surrounding circumstances; 
4. A just balance has to be struck between the restrictions 
imposed and the social control envisaged by cl. (6) of Art. 19 
of the Constitution; 
5. Prevailing social values as also social needs which are 
intended to be satisfied; 
6. There must be a direct and proximate nexus or a reasonable 
connection between the restrictions and the object sought to be 
achieved. If there is a direct nexus between the restrictions and 
the object of the Act, then a strong presumption in favour of 
the constitutionality of the Act will naturally arise. 
These principles have been followed by local judges in determining 
the reasonableness of restrictive laws on freedom of expression. This 
is apparent in Muhammad Hilman’s case
231
 when the court ruled that 
the impugned provision was unreasonable because it was irrational 
and there was no nexus between the restriction and the object sought 
to be achieved. As to the requirement of proportionality as per stated 
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in Dr Mohd Nasir’s case,
232
 the principle was only referred in relation 
to equality clause in Article 8 and this has been elaborated in details 
by Gopal Sri Ram JCA in Sivarasa Rasiah.
233
 Thus, it is submitted 
that though the word ‘reasonable’ in relation to Article 10(1) has yet 
to be clearly defined, reasonableness should be distinguished from 
proportionality.  
The test of reasonableness and proportionality of restrictions on 
freedom of expression has also been developed in other foreign 
decisions including English cases that are now greatly influenced by 
the European Court of Human Right Jurisprudence. The English 
authorities may lend some assistance and have indeed been frequently 
cited in numerous arguments before local judges plainly because of 
the special position of the English common law in the Malaysian legal 
system. 
Article 160(2) of the Malaysian Constitution interprets the word ‘law’ 
to include ‘Written law, the common law in so far as it is in operation 
in the Federation or any part thereof, and any custom or usage having 
the force of law in the Federation or any part thereof’.  
It is submitted that the phrase ‘common law’ refers to the English 
common law that is considered as one of Malaysia’s unwritten 
sources.
234
 Further, the reception and application of the English law is 
clearly enunciated in the Civil Law Act 1956. Section 3(1) of the Act 
states that: 
‘Save so far as other provision has been made or may hereafter be 
made by any written law in force in Malaysia, the Court shall - 
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(a) in West Malaysia or any part thereof, apply the common law of 
England and the rules of equity as administered in England on the 
7th day of April 1956; 
(b) in Sabah, apply the common law of England and the rules of 
equity, together with statutes of general application, as 
administered or in force in England on the 1st day of December 
1951; 
(c) in Sarawak, apply the common law of England and the rules of 
equity, together with statutes of general application, as 
administered or in force in England on the 12th day of December 
1949, subject however to subsection (3)(ii): 
Provided always that the said common law, rules of equity and 
statutes of general application shall be applied so far only as the 
circumstances of the States of Malaysia and their respective 
inhabitants permit and subject to such qualifications as local 
circumstances render necessary’. 
The significant effect of this provision is that the English law as of the 
aforesaid cut-off dates shall continue to apply in Malaysia provided 
that the local circumstances permit and where no overriding provision 
has been made by statute law. With regard to the application of the 
English law after the cut-off dates, it is within the discretionary power 
of the courts on the basis of persuasive authority.  
Despite the reception and application of the English law, local judges 
were found to have preferred the Indian principles in interpreting the 
provisions of the Malaysian Constitution. The reason for such 
approach has been expressed by Lee Hun Hoe CJ (Borneo) in 




[W]e are entitled to compare with similar statutory provision in 
other Commonwealth countries. Since our Constitution was 
modelled on the Indian Constitution what is more natural than to 
look into Indian authorities for assistance.
236
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The judgment of the case has clearly indicated that the Indian cases 
are highly persuasive in interpreting the provisions of the Malaysian 
Constitution. Further, Article 10(1) of the Malaysian Constitution is 
also in pari materia with Article 19(1) of the Indian Constitution. 
Thus, it is argued that the interpretation of the word ‘reasonable’ that 
ought to be read into Article 10(1) should be rightly developed in 
parallel with the position in India. 
3.8 Application of Freedom of Expression to 
Political Blogs  
Freedom of expression is typically exercised through the media but in 
Malaysia, it appears that the exercise of this right has been made to be 
subjected to a long list of restrictive laws.
237
 As a result, the people in 
the country, particularly opposition members and human right groups, 
have hardly any avenues for expressing their views and criticisms.
238
 
They also lacked alternative news and information apart from those 
dictated to them by the traditional media.
239
 This has arguably enabled 
the ruling government, to effectively contain political dissent and 




Nonetheless, the development of new media appears to have liberated 
press freedom in Malaysia. Political blogs and other online 
publications are not susceptible to the licensing regime that controls 
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the traditional media.
241
 Further, the no censorship policy of the 
Internet as stated in the MSC Malaysia Bills of Guarantee and the 
Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 has enabled the people to 
enjoy ‘stronger’ freedom of expression in the cyber world. This 
mechanism that enables the people to make known their opinions and 
views was alleged to have improved the ranking of press freedom in 
the country.
242
 This can be seen in the 2011-2012 Press Freedom 
Index issued by Reporters Without Borders (RSF)
243





compared to the 141
st
 place in 2010.
245
  
At the international level, four international special rapporteurs on 
freedom of expression, namely the United Nations (UN), the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the 
Organization of American States and the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, have on 1 June 2011 issued a ‘Joint 
Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet’ (the Joint 
Declaration).
246
 The Joint Declaration shapes essential principles
247
 on 
Internet governance including the express guarantee of freedom of 
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expression on the Internet.
248
 Prior to this, the Council of Europe had 
developed general recommendations that promote freedom of 
expression on the Internet to its member states, most notably the 2003 
Declaration of the Committee of Minister on freedom of 
communication on the Internet.
249
 In addition, the European 
Parliament has adopted a resolution on freedom of expression on the 
Internet that demands commitment from the EU member states in 




As to the position in Malaysia, it is acknowledged that the Malaysian 
Constitution was drafted long before the advancement of the Internet. 
Freedom of expression on the Internet or political blogs is also yet to 
be discussed in great detail in any cases.
251
 Despite this uncertainty, 
since freedom of expression can be exercised regardless of frontier, 
political blogs and other online publications should therefore be 
treated in the same manner as the traditional media. Political blogs are 
comparable to the mainstream media in the sense that they accord an 
avenue for expressing information and ideas. Their role has been 
recognised by Reporters Without Borders that claimed that blogging is 
a form of independent journalism and indeed bloggers are regarded as 
the real journalists particularly in countries where the traditional 
media are heavily censored or placed under government pressure.
252
 
Thus, political blogs should rightfully be accorded at minimum a 
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similar right to freedom of the press and included within the scope of 
Article 10. Nonetheless, political blogs do not enjoy any special status 
although most of their entries consist of political ideas and 
information that is of public concern. This is because political speech 
in Malaysia is not constitutionally or judicially privileged over other 
types of expression. The position of political blog is now clear with 
the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the recent case of Mat 
Shuhaimi bin Shafiei
253
 when the appellant, an opposition politician, 
who posted his personal views in relation to the Laws of the 
Constitution of Selangor in his blog was found guilty of the offence of 
sedition under the Sedition Act 1948. 
3.9 Conclusion 
The right to freedom of speech and expression is constitutionally 
conferred on all citizens in Malaysia. The exercise of such a right is 
however not absolute as it is subjected to restrictive laws passed by 
Parliament. The legislative power of Parliament was initially rendered 
beyond courts’ power due to the existence of the clause ‘necessary or 
expedient’ in Article 10(1). Further, any restrictive laws passed by 
Parliament would be regarded constitutional so long as they were 
enacted within the purview of permissible exceptions. The legality of 
such laws could not be challenged though they were harsh and unjust 
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Nonetheless, the situation has now changed as courts are authorised to 
determine the legality of restrictive laws passed by Parliament. This is 
due to the landmark ruling in Muhammad Hilman
254
 which 
acknowledged the Federal Court decision in Sivarasa Rasiah.
255
 Thus, 
any laws that have the effect of limiting freedom of expression have to 
be reasonable as the word ‘reasonable’ should be read before 
restrictions in Article 10 of the Malaysian Constitution. Unfortunately, 
the word is yet to be clarified in details and thus reference should be 
made to the jurisprudence in India since the article is in pari materia 
with Article 19 of the Indian Constitution. In relation to this 
development, it is submitted that there will be a brighter future to 
freedom of expression in the country. As to freedom of expression in 
political blogs, arguably such a right and other restrictions should be 
equally applicable to them as well. 
                                                 
254
 Muhammad Hilman bin Idham & Ors v Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors (n 155). 
255
 Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor (n 65). 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 4: Freedom of Expression in the United Kingdom 93 
4.1 Introduction 
Freedom of expression is one of the fundamental rights and an 
indispensable characteristic of a free and democratic country. Its 
significance has been recognised in Handyside v UK that the right 
‘constitutes one of the essential foundations of such a society, one of 
the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every 
man’.
1
 Since then, the importance of the right has been repeatedly 
stressed either by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
2
 or 
domestic courts. In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
ex p Simms,
3
 the prisoners were prevented from having oral interviews 
with journalists who were interested in publishing their stories. In 
deciding that the imposition of the ban by the prison authorities was 
unlawful, Lord Steyn observed: 
Freedom of expression … serves a number of broad objectives. 
First, it promotes the self-fulfilment of individuals in society. 
Secondly, in the famous words of Holmes J (echoing John Stuart 
Mill), ‘the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market:’… Thirdly, freedom of 
speech is the lifeblood of democracy. The free flow of information 
and ideas informs political debate.
4
 
The judgment shows that apart from self-fulfilment and marketplace 
of ideas, argument from democracy is the most common justification 
for safeguarding freedom of expression. The argument, which is 
predominantly associated with the writings of Alexander Meiklejohn,
5
 
has been described as ‘the most easily understandable and fashionable 
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free speech theory in modern Western democracies’.
6
 It has also been 
regarded as ‘the most influential theory in the development of 
contemporary free speech law’ as people could only participate 
effectively in any democratic process if they are equipped with 
reasonable understanding of political issues.
7
  
In relation thereof, this chapter is devoted to discuss the right to 
freedom of expression in the UK and to consider the possibility of 
applying relevant principles to political blogs. The study commences 
with a brief analysis of the right before and after the coming into force 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), the scope and categories of 
expression, in particular political speech. Then, it will examine the 
permitted restrictions and necessary elements to justify derogation on 
freedom of expression. Finally, the application of these principles to 
political blogs will be highlighted at the concluding part of this 
chapter.  
4.2 The Position of Freedom of Expression in the 
United Kingdom 
The position of freedom of expression in the UK is relatively unique 
since the country, prior to the incorporation of the HRA, had neither a 
codified written constitution nor a specific bill of rights that sets out 
details on individual freedoms.
8
 However, such absence has not 
denied the people an access to freedom of expression as the right was 
traditionally protected by specific statutes and common law 
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principles.
9
 This has been clearly explained by Lord Goff in AG v 
Guardian Newspaper Ltd (No. 2)
10
 that ‘Freedom of speech has 
existed in this country perhaps as long as, if not longer, than it has 
existed in any other country in the world’.
11
 The judgment has then 
been echoed by the former British Prime Minister Sir John Major who 




Nonetheless, it was alleged that without a written constitution or a 
human rights instrument, individual freedoms were merely residual 
leftovers that could only be exercised when they were not restricted by 
statutes or common law rules.
13
 Due to the lack of protection in 
domestic laws, the affected parties had to file cases of human rights 
infringements against the state authorities in the ECtHR although they 
had to suffer a lengthy and expensive route to enforce their rights in 
Strasbourg. Unsurprisingly, the state was in many instances found 
guilty of violating the provisions of the European Convention on the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).
14
 
Consequently, the HRA was enacted with the prime intention of 
giving ‘further effects to rights and freedoms’
15
 of the ECHR in the 
UK. Thus, it is pertinent to analyse the position of freedom of 
expression prior to and post the operation of the HRA in the country. 
                                                 
9
 Hilaire Barnett and Robert Jago, Constitutional & Administrative Law (8th ed, 
Routledge 2011) 492. 
10
 [1990] 1 AC 109 (HL). 
11
 ibid 283. 
12
John Major, ‘Mr Major’s Speech on British Constitution’ (26 June 1996) at 
<www.johnmajor.co.uk/page846.html> [accessed 5 August 2012]. 
13
 John Wadham, Mountfield Helen and Edmundson Anna, Blackstone’s Guide to 
the Human Rights Act 1998 (4th ed, Blackstone 2007) 2. 
14
 For the list of human rights violations prior to the incorporation of the HRA, see 
Murray Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (Hart Publishing 1997). 
15
 Long title to the HRA. 
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4.2.1 Pre the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) 
Freedom of expression is not an alien concept in the UK legal system. 
It was for the first time delivered in an unequivocal language in the 
Bill of Rights 1689
16
 that ‘Freedom of speech and debates or 
proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in 
any court or place out of Parliament’.
17
 The provision affords a 
comprehensive and absolute legal immunity to members of the 
legislative body to freely express their minds and ideas in Parliament. 
It is not to be understood as a source for general freedom of 
expression. Nevertheless, the importance of such freedom had been 
recognised by the common law and it has even been labelled as a 
‘constitutional right’ by courts.
18
 In R v Comr of Police of the 
Metropolis, ex p Blackburn (No 2),
19
 the issue was whether an article 
written by an MP in the weekly newspaper ‘Punch’ which criticised 
the Court of Appeal did amount to a contempt of court. It was ruled 
that the writing was not a contempt of court as it was still within the 
limits of an individual’s right to freedom of speech. It was highlighted 
by Salmon LJ that freedom of expression was ‘one of the pillars of 
individual liberty… which our courts have always unfailing upheld’.
20
  
Unfortunately, the uncodified written constitution and the lack of a 
bill of rights prior to the coming into force of the HRA had resulted in 
the right being viewed as residual in nature. The exposition of the 
right was discussed by A.V. Dicey that ‘it is essentially false’ to say 
that: 
                                                 
16
 The Bill of Rights is not to be treated as a modern bill of rights for the UK. It is 
indeed an important historical document which regulates the relations between the 
Crown and Parliament. See Lucinda Maer and Oonagh Gay, ‘The Bill of Rights 
1689’ (House of Commons 2009) SN/PC/0293 
<http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-
00293.pdf> [accessed 11 October 2012]. 
17
 Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. 
18
 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms (n 3) 126. 
19
 [1968] 2 QB 150 (CA). 
20
 ibid 155. 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 4: Freedom of Expression in the United Kingdom 97 
The right to free expression of opinion, and especially that form of 
it which is known as the ‘liberty of the press’, are fundamental 
doctrines of the law of England … and … that our courts recognise 
the right of every man to say and write what he pleases, especially 




The precarious status of the right has been affirmed by Browne-
Wilkinson LJ in Wheeler v Leicester City Council as ‘…an immunity 
from interference by others’.
22
 On a similar note, it was expounded by 
Sir John Donaldson MR that ‘The starting point of our domestic law is 
that every citizen has a right to do what he likes, unless restrained by 
the common law, including the law of contract, or by statute’.
23
 Thus, 
it is clear that a person may say or write whatever he desires as long as 
he does not violate any rules or rights of others. 
Despite being regarded as a residual right, freedom of expression is 
and has been a value highly prized by the common law. In the absence 
of unambiguous and express provision, no statute will be construed as 
limiting such freedom.
24
 Further, the common law principles on 
freedom of expression have often been invoked by judges to limit 
other common law rules that inhibit this fundamental right, especially 
in libel, breach of confidence and contempt of court cases.
25
 
Nevertheless, there were inherent problems in relying on the common 
law alone because courts were unable to extend the common law 
                                                 
21
 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th 
ed, Macmillan Education 1959) 235. 
22
 [1985] AC 1054 (HL) 1065. 
23
 AG v Guardian Newspaper Ltd (No. 2) (n 10) 178.  
24
 The Hon Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Relationship between Freedom of Expression 
and Freedom of Information’ in J Beatson and Yvonne Cripps (eds), Freedom of 
Expression and Freedom of Information: Essays in Honour of Sir David Williams 
(Oxford University Press 2000) 231 – 232. 
25
 For instance, refer to R v Comr of Police of the Metropolis, ex p Blackburn (No 2) 
(n 19) and Derbyshire CC v Times Newspaper Ltd [1993] AC 534 (HL). 
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Domestic judges have been influenced by the ECHR when they ruled 
that Article 10 mirrored the common law principles on freedoms of 
expression.
27
 The influence of the ECHR on the domestic courts has 
been considered in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
ex p Brind.
28
 In this case, the Secretary of State had issued directions 
under the Broadcasting Act 1981 requesting the Independent 
Broadcasting Authority (IBA) and the BBC to refrain from 
broadcasting any direct speech from persons representing specified 
terrorist organisations. The applicants (broadcasters) brought judicial 
review against the Secretary alleging that the directions contravened 
Article 10. Nonetheless, the application was dismissed by the House 
of Lords as there was no ambiguity in the provisions and therefore, the 
Secretary would not be mandated to exercise his power in conformity 
with the ECHR. As to the position of the ECHR, it has been 
elaborated by Lord Bridge that: 
It is accepted … like any other treaty obligations which have not 
been embodied in the law by statute, the Convention is not part of 
the domestic law, that the courts accordingly have no power to 
enforce Convention rights directly and that, if domestic legislation 






                                                 
26
 Wadham, Helen, and Anna, Blackstone’s Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998 (n 
13) 3. 
27
 Lord Goff in AG v Guardian Newspaper Ltd (No. 2) (n 10) 283, observed that ‘… 
I can see no inconsistency between English law on this subject and article 10 of the 
European on Human Rights’.  
28
 [1991] 1 AC 696 (HL). 
29
 ibid 747. 
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The ECHR has also been referred when there is ambiguity in the 
common law. This could be illustrated with the ruling of the Court of 
Appeal in Derbyshire CC v Times Newspapers Ltd,
30
 whereby it was 
highlighted by Butler-Sloss LJ: 
[T]he principles governing the duty of the English court to take 
account of article 10 appear to be as follows: where the law is clear 
and unambiguous, either stated as the common law or enacted by 
Parliament, recourse to article 10 is unnecessary and 
inappropriate... But where there is an ambiguity, or the law is 
otherwise unclear or so far undeclared by an appellate court, the 
English court is not only entitled but, in my judgment, obliged to 
consider the implications of article 10”.
31
 
Nonetheless, the application of Article 10 of the ECHR was not 
considered on appeal to the House of Lords. The court relied on the 
common law principles and ruled that it was contrary to the public 
interest to permit governmental authority to sue for libel as it would 
restraint the right to freedom of expression.
32
 To sum up, prior to the 
coming into force of the HRA, the ECHR was only referred by 
domestic courts as the last resort when there is ambiguity in statutes or 
common law principles.  
The non-application of the ECHR principles is due to the fact that the 
country is a dualist state that regards international law and domestic 
law as two different systems.
33
 Further, the UK legal system had since 
the eighteenth–century
34
 adopted and applied the principles of 
Parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of powers between the 
Crown, the Parliament and the courts.
35
 These doctrines confer 
                                                 
30
 [1992] QB 770 (CA).   
31
 ibid 830. 
32
 Derbyshire CC v Times Newspaper Ltd (n 25). 
33
 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th ed, Oxford University 
Press 2008) 31 – 33. 
34
 Philip Sales and Joanne Clement, ‘International Law in Domestic Courts: The 
Developing Framework’ (2008) 124 LQR 388, 389. 
35
 Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd ed, Cambridge University 
Press 2007) 188. 
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Parliament with supreme power to enact laws whilst the treaty-making 
power is exclusively vested with the Crown (in practice the Secretary 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs).
36
 Any international 
treaties that was concluded and ratified by the Crown shall bind the 




This position was confirmed by the House of Lords in J.H. Rayner 
(Mincing Lane) Ltd v Dept of Trade and Industry.
38
 It was elaborated 
by Lord Oliver: 
[T]he power of the Crown to conclude treaties with other sovereign 
states is an exercise of the Royal Prerogative, the validity of which 
cannot be challenged in municipal law… the Royal Prerogative, 
whilst it embraces the making of treaties, does not extend to 
altering the law or conferring rights upon individuals or depriving 
individuals of rights which they enjoy in domestic law without the 
intervention of Parliament. …a treaty is not part of English law 




The judgment highlights the Crown’s prerogative power in making 
treaties but unincorporated treaties, including the provisions of the 
ECHR, have no legal effects domestically until they are incorporated 
into the domestic laws. Since the ECHR principles remained 
unenforceable in the domestic courts at that time, cases involving 
alleged violations of human rights by the state were filed by the 
affected parties in the ECtHR. It was argued that the loss of many 
cases in Strasbourg was among the main reasons that have prompted 
the UK government to pass the HRA that has ultimately incorporated 
                                                 
36
 Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law (Cambridge University Press 
2005) 81. 
37
 Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (n 35) 189 – 192. 
38
 [1990] 2 AC 418 (HL). 
39
 ibid 499 – 500. 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 4: Freedom of Expression in the United Kingdom 101 
the rights and fundamental freedoms in the ECHR (Convention 
rights)
40
 into the domestic law.
41
 
4.2.2 Post HRA 
The enactment of the HRA has a great impact on the landscape of 
human rights law in the UK. It was purported to have ‘brought 
home’
42
 the Convention rights
43
 and strengthened protection to the 
fundamental rights including freedom of expression. With the coming 
into force of the HRA,
44
 the ECHR principles will no longer be 
applied in very limited situations
45
 as there is a strong presumption of 
the conformity of the UK law to these principles.  
Section 2 obliges courts or tribunals in the country to ‘take into 
account’ the judgments, decisions, declarations or advisory opinions’ 
of the ECtHR, Commission and Committee of Ministers (Strasbourg 
jurisprudence) in cases involving the Convention rights. Nevertheless, 
the obligation does not render the Strasbourg jurisprudence to be 
binding on domestic courts. Arguably, this is because the ECtHR does 
not operate a rigid system of precedent, the roles of national judges 
and of the ECtHR are not identical, and there may be decisions made 
                                                 
40
 Section 1(1) of the HRA defines ‘Convention rights’ as to include Articles 2 to 12 
and 14 of the ECHR, Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol, and Articles 1 and 2 of the 
Sixth Protocol. However, the Convention Rights and other protocols set out in 
Schedule 1 are not entrenched in the HRA. For details, see Stephen Grosz, Jack 
Beatson and Peter Duffy, Human Rights: The 1998 Act and the European 
Convention (Sweet & Maxwell 2000) 6 – 10. 
41
 Anthony Aust, ‘United Kingdom’ in David Sloss (ed), The Role of Domestic 
Courts in Treaty Enforcement: A Comparative Study (Cambridge University Press 
2009) 486. 
42
 The slogan ‘rights brought home’ was used by the Labour Government to 
introduce the HRA.  
43
 It was argued that the Convention Rights reflect both ‘general legal values’ and 
‘distinctively public values’. See David Feldman, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998 and 
Constitutional Principles’ (1999) 19 LS 165, 171. 
44
 The HRA received Royal Assent on 9 November 1998 and came into force on 2 
October 2000. 
45
 Prior to the HRA, the ECHR principles were applied either indirectly through the 
ECtHR judgments against the government, or directly through the use of arguments 
based on the ECHR in local courts. 
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in Strasbourg that are considered unpersuasive.
46
 It was observed by 
Lord Phillips P in R v Horncastle: 
The requirement to take into account the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
will normally result in this Court applying principles that are 
clearly established by the Strasbourg court. There will, however, be 
rare occasions where this court has concerns as to whether a 
decision of the Strasbourg Court sufficiently appreciates or 
accommodates particular aspects of our domestic process. In such 
circumstances it is open to this court to decline to follow the 
Strasbourg decision, giving reasons for adopting this course.
47
 
Despite the non-binding status of the jurisprudence, Lord Bingham in 
Kay v Lambeth LBC pronounced that:  
The mandatory duty imposed on domestic courts by section 2 of 
the 1998 Act is to take into account any judgment of the Strasbourg 
Court and any opinion of the Commission. Thus they are not 
strictly required to follow Strasbourg rulings … But it is ordinarily 
the clear duty of our domestic courts, save where and so far as 
constrained by primary domestic legislation, to give practical 
recognition to the principles laid down by the Strasbourg Court … 
The effective implementation of the Convention depends on 
constructive collaboration between the Strasbourg court and the 
national courts of member states.
48
 
Thus, the requirement to ‘take into account’ of the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence does not create a binding obligation on domestic courts. 
Nonetheless, judges are generally requested to abide by the rulings of 
the ECtHR or of the Commission. Only in special cases where certain 
rulings are not appropriate to any particular facts and circumstances 
that national courts could depart from the Strasbourg jurisprudence. 
Apart from the requirement, the Convention rights have been 
effectively intertwined into the UK legal system by section 3. It 
imposed a statutory obligation on domestic courts wherever possible 
                                                 
46
 Human Rights Act 1998 (2nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell 1998), Current Law Statutes 
Annotated Reprints paras 42 – 10. 
47
 [2009] UKSC 4, [2010] 2 AC 373 [11]. 
48
 [2006] UKHL 10, [2006] 2 AC 465 [28], [44]. 
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to interpret and apply legislation that has been passed before or after 
the coming into force of the HRA, to be in conformity with the 
Convention rights. Lord Steyn in R v A (No 2) observed that: 
Section 3 places a duty on the court to strive to find a possible 
interpretation compatible with Convention rights … In accordance 
with the will of Parliament as reflected in section 3 it will 
sometimes be necessary to adopt an interpretation which 
linguistically may appear strained. The techniques to be used will 
not only involve the reading down of express language in a statute 
but also the implication of provisions.
49
 
Courts are required to interpret and even permitted to stretch the 
meaning of any statutory provision so as to render it compliant with 
the Convention rights.
50
 But if a Convention–compliant interpretation 
is impossible, the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any 
primary or secondary legislation
51
 (of which the parent act prevents 
removal of incompatibility)
52
 may not be affected as courts have no 
power to invalidate conflicting provisions.
53
 Lord Hope in R v 
Lambert observed that: 
[T]he obligation is one which applies to the interpretation of 
legislation. This function belongs, as it has always done, to the 
judges. But it is not for them to legislate. Section 3(1) preserves the 
sovereignty of Parliament. It does not give power to the judges to 
overrule decisions which the language of the statute shows to have 
been taken on the very point at issue by the legislator.
54
 
                                                 
49
 [2001] UKHL 25, [2002] 1 AC 45 [44]. 
50
 In Ghaidan v Godin–Mendoza [2004] 3 UKHL 30, [2004] 2 AC 557 the House of 
Lords used section 3 as a remedial section and gave a wider interpretation to the 
term ‘spouse’ under the Rent Act 1977 so as to allow surviving same-sex partners to 
enjoy equal tenancy rights and become a statutory tenant by succession. 
51
 The definition of primary and subordinate legislation is provided in section 21 of 
the HRA. 
52
 If the incompatibility of any subsidiary legislation is not prevented from removal 
by the parent act, court may declare such provision ultra vires and unlawful. Grosz, 
Beatson, and Duffy, Human rights (n 40) 52 – 58. 
53
 Section 3(2) of the HRA. 
54
 [2001] UKHL 37, [2002] 2 AC 545 [79]. 
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Notwithstanding the aforesaid position, courts are not totally 
powerless as section 4 allows higher courts
55
 to make a ‘declaration of 
incompatibility’ for any primary or subordinate legislation that 
conflict with the Convention rights. Such a declaration does not have 
the effect of striking down the offending provisions and should rather 
be avoided unless it is plainly impossible to do so. But when the 
courts have issued a declaration of incompatibility, it will certainly 
attract the attention of relevant minister and put considerable political 
pressure on the government to make legislative changes.
56
 
The application for a declaration of incompatibility has been 
considered in R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State 
for Culture, Media and Sport.
57
 The claimant sought judicial review of 
a decision by the Broadcast Advertising Clearance Centre refusing to 
advertise its proposed advertisements on the ground that it breached 
the ban on political advertising in section 321(2) of the 
Communications Act 2003. The claimant argued that the ban was 
incompatible with its right to freedom of expression in Article 10. It 
was ruled by the House of Lords that though the provisions 
constituted an interference with the claimant’s right, the ban on 
political advertising was lawful and not incompatible with the ECHR 




                                                 
55
 Higher courts refer to the High Court and above as per interpreted in section 4(5) 
of the HRA. Inferior courts have no such power but they are not refrained from 
expressing their opinion about the compatibility of any statutory provision. 
56
 A minister is authorised under section 10 of the HRA to make amendments to the 
offending legislation by means of fast track procedure which provides for a remedial 
order to be made under the supervision of Parliament provided that he believes there 
are ‘compelling reasons’ to do so. 
57
 [2008] UKHL 15, [2008] 1 AC 1312. 
58
 The House of Lords judgment affirmed the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal 
in R v Radio Authority, ex parte Bull [1998] QB 294. Nonetheless, the latter is to be 
distinguished as the judges were reluctant to interfere with the express provisions of 
the infringing statute or to refer to the ECHR principles though there was ambiguity 
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Pertaining to the interpretative requirement in section 3, the obligation 
is not limited to the past or existing legislation, but extends to future 
legislation as well. It was argued that the statutory duty has been 
rendered stronger for future government-sponsored legislation by 
section 19(1).
59
 This section mandated sponsoring minister to make a 
statement before the Second Reading of any bill that in his view the 
proposed legislation is compatible with the Convention rights, or 
alternatively to state that it is incompatible but the government still 
wishes Parliament to proceed.
60
 Notwithstanding the existence of any 
accompanying statement of compatibility, the proposed bill shall not 
be absolved from judicial scrutiny as compatibility is a question of 
law that could only be determined by courts of competent jurisdiction.  
The position of a statement of compatibility has been elaborated in R v 
A (No. 2) that ‘These statements may serve a useful purpose in 
Parliament… But they are no more than expressions of opinion by the 
minister. They are not binding on the court, nor do they have any 
persuasive authority’.
61
 Thus, any legislation that has been previously 
identified as compatible with the Convention rights by relevant 
ministers can still be examined by the judiciary and may be the subject 
of a declaration of incompatibility. As to a statement of 
incompatibility, its issuance is likely to be in very exceptional 
                                                                                                                   
in the provisions. These two cases have been subjected to a number of criticisms. 
See Byron M Sheldrick, ‘Judicial Review and Judicial Reticence: The Protection of 
Political Expression under the Common Law’ (1998) 3 JCL 191; Jacob Rowbottom, 
‘Political Advertising and the Broadcast Media’ (2008) 67 CLJ 450; Nicola 
McCormick, ‘Freedom of  Political  Expression: R. (on the Application of Animal 
Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport’ (2008) 
19 Ent LR 147; Sarah Sackman, ‘Debating “Democracy” and the Ban on Political 
Advertising’ (2009) 72 MLR 475. 
59
 Helen Fenwick, Civil Rights: New Labour, Freedom and the Human Rights Act 
(Longman 2000) 44. 
60
 A statement of incompatibility under section 19(1)(b) of the HRA was made in 
respect of section 321(2) of the Communications Act 2003 that imposed a 
prohibition on political advertising in the UK. The legality of that provision had 
become the central issue in R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State 
for Culture, Media and Sport (n 57).  
61
 R v A (No 2) (n 49), [69]. 
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situations and so far has only been taken twice by the government in 
relation to the Local Government Act 2000
62




Another core provision that gives direct effect to the ECHR principles 
is section 6. The section provides that ‘it is unlawful for a public 
authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention 
right’.
64
 The provision differs from the interpretative duty that merely 
requires courts to have regard to the Strasbourg jurisprudence.
65
 It 
imposed a strong obligation on public authorities not to act in a way 
that is incompatible with a Convention right. Further, it contains a 
broad principle, which renders all actions or inactions of public 
authorities that contravene the ECHR principles as ultra vires.
66
 But 
where incompatible behaviour is mandated by primary legislation or 
other provisions made under primary legislation, such incompatibility 
is saved from illegality.
67
 These exceptions are in parallel with 
sections 3(2)(b) and 4(6)(a) which aim to preserve the sovereignty of 
Parliament. 
As to the application of section 6, it is largely dependent on the 
interpretation of the term ‘public authority’ itself. Unfortunately, no 
exhaustive interpretation was given as the term is elusively defined to 
include court or tribunal
68
 and ‘any person certain of whose functions 
                                                 
62
 Clause 91 of the Bill (section 104 of the Local Government Act 2000) which 
provides prohibition on promotion of homosexuality is considered to be 
incompatible with Articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR. 
63
 Clause 314(2) of the Bill (section 321(2) of the Communications Act 2003) which 
bans political advertising on radio and television is regarded to be incompatible with 
Article 10 of the ECHR. 
64
 Section 6(1) of the HRA. 
65
 Section 2(1) of the HRA. 
66
 Section 6(6) of the HRA stipulates that the word ‘act’ includes omissions as well 
but excluding failure to enact or repeal any primary legislation or remedial order. 
67
 Section 6(2) of the HRA. 
68
 Section 21(1) defines ‘tribunal’ as any tribunal in which legal proceedings may be 
brought. 
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are functions of a public nature’, whilst either House of Parliament
69
 
or a person exercising functions in connection with proceedings in 
Parliament is expressly excluded.
70
 As a result, the HRA contemplates 
two types of public authorities namely core and hybrid public 
authorities. It was argued that the partial definition was purposely 




The position of ‘core’ public bodies such as local authorities, statutory 
regulators and others that can never act privately is straightforward as 
they are undoubtedly bound by the provision. But courts are faced 
with an uphill task in relation to hybrid bodies that can perform both 
public and private functions. The HRA provides that persons or bodies 
will be subjected to the statutory duty where they have ‘functions of a 
public nature’
72
 and are not carrying out an act of a ‘private’ nature.
73
 
Thus, the key factor is the type of function performed by those parties. 
In the media context, the status of regulatory bodies varies from one 
industry to another. The press industry is administered by a new self-
regulatory body, the Independent Press Standards Association (IPSO). 
It has recently been established by the industry to regulate editorial 
content on printed newspapers and magazines as well as on electronic 
services of member publishers that subscribe to the Scheme 
Membership Agreement.
74
 Currently, IPSO has neither statutory 
underpinning nor statutory power to enforce its rulings, although the 
Editor’s Code of Practice (Code) has been recognised by the Data 
                                                 
69
 Section 6(4) of the HRA. 
70
 Section 6(3) of the HRA. 
71
 Human Rights Act 1998 (n 46) paras 42–14. 
72
 Section 6(3) of the HRA. 
73
 Section 6(5) of the HRA. 
74
 IPSO is discussed in details in Part 6.2 of Chapter 6 below. 
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Protection Act 1998
75
 and the HRA.
76
 Nonetheless, since IPSO 
performs public duties and was established as an alternative to 
government regulation, it is arguably to be treated as a public body. 
As for the broadcast media, there are two separate bodies; namely 
Ofcom for commercial stations and BBC for all BBC content. Ofcom 
is a pure public authority as it was established as a ‘super-regulator’ 
for the communication industries under the Office of Communications 
Act 2002. It is vested with extensive regulatory duties and powers by 
the Communications Act 2003.
77
 On the other hand, BBC is not 
considered as a public body although it was established by a Royal 
Charter and is largely funded by licence fees.
78
 BBC will generally be 
regarded as non-governmental organisation,
79
 but in certain 
circumstances it also exercises functions of public nature and is 
therefore amenable to judicial review.
80
 
With regard to the Video on demand (VOD), Ofcom and the 
Association for Television on Demand (ATVOD) have been jointly 
entrusted as the co-regulators for the new industry. ATVOD is 
responsible to supervise editorial content of the VOD and has been 
conferred with relevant powers and duties as Ofcom’s designee by the 
Communications Act 2003.
81
 Thus, it is apparent that ATVOD is also 
a public authority under section 6 of the HRA. 
                                                 
75
 Section 32 of the Data Protection Act 1998 provides a defence for newspapers 
against action by the Information Commissioner and others if publication is in 
compliance with the Code. 
76
 Section 12 of the HRA requires courts to consider compliance with the Code in 
determining the defence on free speech 
77
 Ofcom is discussed in details in Part 6.3.2.1 of Chapter 6 below. 
78
 BBC is discussed in details in Part 6.3.2.2 of Chapter 6 below. 
79
 Andrew Nicol, Gavin Millar and Andrew Sharland, Media Law & Human Rights 
(2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2009) 53. 
80
 R (Prolife Alliance) v BBC [2003] UKHL 23, [2004] 1 AC 185. 
81
 ATVOD is discussed in details in Part 6.4.2 of Chapter 6 below. 
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As to the enforcement of the Convention rights, section 7 provides 
that a person may make an application to the appropriate court or 
tribunal if he has been or would be a ‘victim’ of an act or proposed act 
of a public authority made unlawful by section 6. The person may 
bring freestanding proceedings against the infringing authority or rely 
on the Convention rights in any other legal proceedings
82
 if he could 
satisfy the ‘victim’ test under Article 34 of the ECHR.
83
 Therefore, 
this provision has the effect of incorporating Article 34 and the 




 allows a wide range of bodies to be treated as a ‘victim’ 
of a violation of Convention rights by local authorities.
85
 The ‘victim’ 
is not confined to an individual who can establish that his rights have 
actually been infringed. Any person who could show that there is a 
potential threat to his right is likely to be considered as a ‘victim’. In 
Open Door Counselling and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland,
86
 some of 
the applicants, who were of child bearing age but not pregnant, were 
regarded as ‘victims’ as they could have been affected by the 
injunction that restrained publication of information about abortions 
abroad. Similarly, in Bowman v UK
87
 it was held that an anti–
abortionist applicant was able to complain about restrictions on 
election campaign spending though proceedings against her had been 
quashed on technical ground. The risk of further prosecutions in future 
                                                 
82
 Section 7(1) of the HRA. 
83
 Section 7(7) of the HRA. 
84
 Article 34 of the ECHR states ‘The court may receive applications from any 
person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the 
victims of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in 
the Convention or the Protocols thereto…’. 
85
 The scope of the article extends to legal persons but governmental organisations 
are not included as only non-governmental organisations are permitted to bring such 
applications. 
86
 (1992) 15 EHRR 244.  
87
 (1998) 26 EHRR 1. 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 4: Freedom of Expression in the United Kingdom 110 
campaigns was a strong indication that she could potentially be a 




As to the position of third parties or pressure groups, the Strasbourg 
case law does not directly recognise such groups as ‘victims’ under 
Article 34. It is generally accepted that the ‘victim test’ is narrower 
that the domestic rules on ‘sufficient standing’ as the latter had 
recognised public interest groups as possessing standing in any 
applications for judicial review.
89
 Due to this divergence, the 
sufficient standing test will continue to apply to non–HRA judicial 
review cases and cases involving HRA claims where applicants are 
unable to meet the strict requirements of the victim under the ECHR.
90
 
Apart from these provisions, section 12 of the HRA lays down 
specific provisions to further safeguard freedom of expression, 
especially in relation to press freedom. It applies whenever a court
91
 is 
considering whether to grant relief that might affect the exercise of 
such a right. Subsection (2) concerns the grant of relief which is 
sought ex-parte and when no notice is given to the respondent.  It 
allows the court to refuse such an application unless the applicant 
could demonstrate that necessary steps have been taken to notify the 
respondent, or that there are compelling reasons which render 
notification inappropriate.  
                                                 
88
  In R (Rusbridger) v AG [2003] UKHL 38, [2004] 1 AC 357,an application for a 
declaration that the Treason Felony Act 1848 was incompatible with freedom of 
expression was rejected as there was no significant risk of prosecution nor the 
statute had any chilling effect on the right. 
89
 Richard Drabble, James Maurici and Tim Buley (eds), Local Authorities and 
Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2004) 66. 
90
 Jack Beatson and others, Human Rights: Judicial Protection in the United 
Kingdom (Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 312 – 318. 
91
 Section 12(5) of the HRA states that ‘court’ includes a tribunal. 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 4: Freedom of Expression in the United Kingdom 111 
With regard to application for interlocutory injunction before 
publication, subsection (3) obliges the applicant to satisfy the test of 
likely success at trial before the relief could be granted by the court. 
Lastly, subsection (4) which relates to protection of journalistic, 
literary or artistic materials. It requires the court to have particular 
regard to the importance of freedom of expression and to the extent of 
publicity and public interest that attached to the materials and relevant 
privacy codes. 
These specific provisions in section 12 seem to suggest a presumption 
in favour of freedom of expression over other competing rights. 
Nonetheless, the presumptive priority is inaccurate as it was ruled by 
Keene LJ in Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No. 1): 
The subsection does not seek to give a priority to one Convention 
right over another. It is simply dealing with the interlocutory stage 
of proceedings and with how the court is to approach matters at that 
stage in advance of any ultimate balance being struck between 
rights which may be in potential conflict.
 92
 
The principle was affirmed in Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd 
93
 
whereby the court held that section 12 did not require the court to 
place extra weight on freedom of expression. It merely underlined the 
need to have regard to contexts in which the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
had given particular weight to freedom of expression. 
Thus, the HRA has brought a positive development for the protection 
of human rights in the UK. As it is expressly stated in the preamble 
that its aims is to give ‘further’ effect to the Convention rights, 
undoubtedly individual rights including freedom of expression would 
be enhanced with the operation of the HRA.
94
 The significant impact 
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 [2001] QB 967 (CA) 1008. 
93
 [2001] EWCA Civ 1142, [2002] Ch 149. 
94
 Geoffrey Robertson and Andrew Nicol, Media Law (5th ed, Penguin 2008) 76. 
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of the HRA on free speech was summarised by Lord Steyn in 
Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd
95
: 
The starting point is now the right of freedom of expression, a right 
based on a constitutional or higher legal order foundation. 
Exceptions to freedom of expression must be justified as being 
necessary in a democracy. In other words, freedom of expression is 
the rule and regulation of speech is the exception requiring 
justification. The existence and width of any exception can only be 
justified if it is underpinned by a pressing social need.
96
 
To sum up, the right to freedom of expression, which was initially 
regarded as a residual right and later has been accepted as a defence to 
other rights such as the right to reputation or fair trial rights, has now 
become a statutory right that is available to all persons in the UK. 
Thus, it is pertinent to discuss the meaning and scope of the right 
under Article 10. 
4.3 The Meaning and Scope of Freedom of 
Expression 
The right to freedom of expression is stipulated in Article 10 of the 
ECHR and it is now incorporated into Schedule I of the HRA. The 
said article provides:  
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right 
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and 
impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not 
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, 
television or cinema enterprises. 
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it 
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, 
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or 
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
                                                 
95
 [2001] 2 AC 127 (HC). 
96
 ibid 208. 
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protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure 
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining 
the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
It is clear that all persons, natural or legal persons, are permitted to 
exercise freedom of expression as the right is explicitly conferred on 
‘everyone’ in the country.
97
 As to the expression guaranteed to be 
protected against state interferences, it is not confined to words, 
written or spoken only. The word ‘expression’, which is wider in 
scope than ‘speech’,
98
 has been given a generous interpretation 












 and the Internet.
104
 Apart from that, it is also exercisable 
through certain forms of conduct such as peaceful march or 
demonstration,
105
 and is likely to extend to symbolic speech 





                                                 
97
 In principle, all natural persons including members of the armed forces, civil 
servants, judges and lawyers have the right to freedom of expression, but their status 
is likely to be relevant in determining the proportionality of any interference to the 
right.  
98
 Though the scope of the words ‘expression’ and ‘speech’ are literally dissimilar 
from each other, the phrase ‘freedom of expression’ or ‘freedom of speech’ is 
commonly used interchangeably with reference to the right under Article 10 of the 
ECHR. 
99
 Müller v Switzerland (1991) 13 EHRR 485. 
100
 Handyside v UK (n 1). 
101
 Otto-Preminger Institute v Austria (1994) 19 EHRR 34. 
102
 Barthold v Germany (1985) 7 EHRR 383. 
103
 Open Door Counselling (n 86). 
104
 Perrin v UK (App. 5446/03), Decision of 18 October 2005, ECHR 2005-XI. 
105
 For details discussion on the difference between speech and conduct, see 
Barendt, Freedom of Speech (n 6) 78 – 88. 
106
 See the concurring opinion of Judge Jambrek in Grigoriades v Greece (1997) 27 
EHRR 464, where he drew on the US flag-burning cases including Texas v Johnson 
491 US 397 (1989). 
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As to the scope of freedom of expression, plain reading of Article 10 
indicates that the right covers three main components; freedom to hold 
opinions,
107
 freedom to receive as well as to impart information and 
ideas. Nonetheless, it was argued that the right should not be limited 
to these freedoms only given that the ECtHR has avoided defining in 
exact terms which activities are covered by Article 10(1).
108
 Further, 
in certain circumstances, the right to freedom of expression has been 
ruled to include the negative right not to speak or to remain silent. 
With regard to a general right to freedom of information, the right is 
not included within the purview of Article 10. This is regardless the 
fact that the right is closely connected to freedom of expression,
109
 and 
has indeed been treated as an aspect of free speech in other 
international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR)
110
 and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).
111
 Arguably, this is due to the absence of the 
phrase ‘to seek information and ideas’, which is clearly stipulated in 
the UDHR and ICCPR, but is nowhere mentioned in the ECHR. 
Further, the textual reference to the right ‘to receive and impart 
information and ideas’ in Article 10 has been judicially interpreted as 
                                                 
107
 It was argued that freedom to hold opinions should be accorded with almost 
absolute protection as restrictions in paragraph 2 are not applicable to such freedom. 
See Monica Macovei, Freedom of Expression: A Guide to the Implementation of 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (2nd ed, 2004) 8. 
108
 Nicol, Millar, and Sharland, Media Law & Human Rights (n 79) 15. 
109
 The Hon Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Relationship between Freedom of Expression 
and Freedom of Information’ (n 24) 225. 
110
 Article 19 of the UDHR provides ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference 
and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers’ (emphasis added). 
111
 Article 19(2) of the ICCPR states ‘Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in 
the form of art, or through any other media of his choice’ (emphasis added). 
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to prevent the government from restricting a person from receiving 
information that others wish or may be willing to impart to him.
112
  
As to freedom of the press, the right is also nowhere mentioned in 
Article 10.
113
 However, the importance of media freedom
114
 and the 
role played by the media as a ‘public watchdog’
115
 has been 
recognised by the ECtHR. In Lingens v Austria,
116
 the journalist was 
found guilty of publishing defamatory remarks about the former Austrian 
Federal Chancellor and was fined by the Austrian court. In ruling that the 
conviction constituted an infringement of the journalist’s right under 
Article 10, the ECtHR ruled: 
Whilst the press must not overstep the bounds set, inter alia, for the 
‘protection of the reputation of others’, it is nevertheless incumbent 
on it to impart information and ideas on political issues just as on 
those in other areas of public interest. Not only does the press have 
the task of imparting such information and ideas: the public also 
has a right to receive them …
117
  
The prominence of press freedom has been reiterated in Castells v 
Spain.
118
 A Member of the Parliament had been convicted of insulting 
the government in an article published in a weekly magazine and was 
                                                 
112
 Leander v Sweden (1987) 9 EHRR 433, para 74. 
113
 The relationship between press freedom and freedom of expression has been 
viewed in three different perspectives. Some argued that the two freedoms are really 
equivalent whilst others claimed that they refer to two distinct meanings and that the 
press should enjoy special rights and privilege beyond freedom of speech. The third 
group alleged that press freedom is not a distinct right from free speech and the 
former is protected only to the degree to which it promotes the values underlying the 
latter. See Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (n 21) 246 
– 247; Potter Stewart, ‘Or of the Press’ (1974) 26 Hastings LJ 631, 633 – 634; Judith 
Lichtenberg, ‘Foundations and Limits of Freedoms of the Press’ in Judith 
Lichtenberg (ed), Democracy and the Mass Media: A Collection of Essays 
(Cambridge University Press 1990) 102 – 105. 
114
 It is generally acknowledged that through investigatory journalism, the media are 
able to discover and publish wrongdoings or abuses in the government to the public. 
A good illustration is the exposure of the scandal involving excessive and fraudulent 
claims by the UK MPs in 2009. 
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 Observer and Guardian v UK (1991) 14 EHRR 1537, para 59. 
116
 (1986) 8 EHRR 407. 
117
 ibid para 41. 
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 (1992) 14 EHRR 145. 
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sentenced to a term in prison. In holding that there was a violation of 
the right, it was observed by the court: 
Freedom of the press affords the public one of the best means of 
discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of 
their political leaders. In particular, it gives politicians the 




These cases have demonstrated the recognition of press freedom under 
Article 10. Nonetheless, press freedom is not confined to the print 
media per se as it has long been established to embody the 
broadcasting media as well. A good illustration is Jersild v 
Denmark
120
 whereby a journalist had been convicted by the Danish 
court for spreading racist remarks when he granted a television 
interview to a group of young racists who made several racist claims 
during their conversations. It was held that though the racist remarks 
were not protected, the conviction amounted to a violation of the 
journalist’s right to press freedom. The ECtHR ruled: 
News reporting based on interviews, whether edited or not, 
constitutes one of the most important means whereby the press is 
able to play its vital role of ‘public watchdog’… The punishment of 
a journalist for assisting in the dissemination of statements made by 
another person in an interview would seriously hamper the 
contribution of the press to discussion of matters of public interest 
and should not be envisaged unless there are particularly strong 
reasons for doing so.
121
 
The judgment has recognised the inclusion of the broadcast media 
within the scope of press freedom. Nevertheless, the broadcast media 
are not similar with the print media and have been treated differently 
from the latter.
122
 Such a treatment is not incompatible with Article 10 
                                                 
119
 ibid para 43. 
120
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as the last sentence in paragraph 1 has expressly permitted states to 
impose licensing system for broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises. The purpose of the sentence has been discussed in 
Informationsverein Lentia and Others v Austria:
123
  
[T]o make it clear that States are permitted to regulate by a 
licensing system the way in which broadcasting is organised in 
their territories, particularly in its technical aspects… Technical 
aspects are undeniably important, but the grant or refusal of a licence 
may also be made conditional on other considerations, including such 
matters as the nature and objectives of a proposed station, its potential 
audience at national, regional or local level, the rights and needs of a 




As such, licensing system for the broadcast media was considered 
necessary for technical reasons, in particular the scarcity of available 
frequencies.
125
 Further, the need has also been justified due to the 
pervasive presence and powerful nature of the broadcast media as well 
as for pluralism and programme variety.
126
 Nonetheless, the 
permission in Article 10(1) and these arguments do not render states 
to be absolved from the requirements in Article 10(2).
127
 Since 
licensing system constitutes an interference with freedom of 
expression, it is only exercisable if it could be justified as necessary in 
a democratic country on the grounds stipulated in Article 10(2). 
                                                                                                                   
of time and have been subjected to regulatory controls from their beginnings. See 
Lee C Bollinger, ‘Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of 
Partial Regulation of the Mass Media’ (1976) 75 Mich L Rev 1, 13 – 16. 
123
 (1994) 17 EHRR 93. 
124
 ibid para 32. 
125
 Scarcity of frequencies is no longer a tenable justification with the advent of 
cable, satellite and digital broadcasting that has significantly increased the number 
of frequencies and channels. 
126
 Eric Barendt and Lesley Hitchens, Media Law: Cases and Materials (Pearson 
Education 2000) 12 – 14. 
127
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4.4 Political Expression 
Article 10 confers the right to freedom of expression on everyone, and 
its protection is not restricted to certain types of speech, particularly 




 and commercial 
speech
130
 also fall within its ambit. Though the right is generally 
applicable to all types of expression, the ECtHR’s conception of free 
political expression as a central feature of a democratic society has 




The preferred position of political speech has also been recognised by 
local courts. In Derbyshire CC v Times Newspaper Ltd,
132
 the House 
of Lords gave strong protection to political speech and held that the 
libel action by the local authority should not be allowed as it would 
fetter freedom of expression. Similarly, in R (Prolife Alliance),
133
 the 
importance of political speech has been acknowledged by Lord 
Nichols that: 
Freedom of political speech is a freedom of the very highest 
importance in any country which lays claim to being a democracy. 
Restrictions on this freedom need to be examined rigorously by all 
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 Casado Coca v Spain (1994) 18 EHRR 1. 
129
 In Müller v Switzerland (n 99) para 27, the court interpreted the word 
‘expression’ in Article 10 to include ‘…freedom of artistic expression, notably 
within freedom to receive and impart information and ideas – which affords the 
opportunity to take part in the public exchange of cultural, political and social 
information and ideas of all kinds’.  
130
 In Mark Intern and Beerman v Germany (1989) 12 EHRR 161, it was ruled that 
an article published by the claimant in a bulletin describing the failure of the mail 
order firm ‘conveyed information of a commercial nature’ which could not be 
excluded by the scope of Article 10(1). 
131
 Lingens v Austria (n 116); Bowman v UK (n 87); Castells v Spain (n 118). 
132
 Derbyshire CC v Times Newspaper Ltd (n 25). 
133
 R (Prolife Alliance) v BBC (n 80). 
134
 ibid [6]. 
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Unfortunately, the phrase ‘political speech’ has yet been given a 
definite meaning. It was argued that it would be unsatisfactory to 
define such expression by reference to the intention or identity of the 
speaker, or the subject of publication.
135
 The House of Lords in 
Reynolds
136
 attempted to define political expression by confining it to: 
[S]tatements made about the actions and qualities of those currently 
or formerly elected to Parliament and those with immediate 
aspirations to be members, so far as those actions and qualities 




Nonetheless, the interpretation has been regarded as too narrow since 
it is very much unlikely to include discussion on matters of public 
interests which are not taken up by the state or political parties. The 
narrow interpretation would be in contradictory with the judgment in 
Thorgeirson v Iceland which ruled that ‘there is no warrant in its case-
law for distinguishing, in the manner suggested by the Government, 




The uncertainty as to the exact interpretation of political speech has 
been observed in VgT Verein Gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland that 
‘while the term “political” were somewhat vague, absolute precision 
were unnecessary…’.
139
 Thus, the preferred position of political 
speech remains intact though its definition is nowhere stipulated in 
definite term. This has led to the proposition that political speech 
should refer to ‘all speech relevant to the development of public 
opinion on the whole range of issues which an intelligent citizen 
                                                 
135
 Ivan Hare, ‘Is the Privileged Position of Political Expression Justified?’ in Jack 
Beatson and Yvonne M Cripps (eds), Freedom of Expression and Freedom of 
Information: Essays in Honour of Sir David Williams (Oxford University Press 
2000) 108 – 109. 
136
 Reynolds v Times Newspaper Ltd (n 95). 
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138
 (1992) 14 EHRR 843, para 64. 
139
 (2001) 34 EHRR 159, para 51. 
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should think about’.
140
 It is argued that this interpretation would be 
more appropriate as it covers political speech in its strict sense as well 
as discussion on matters of public concern.  
4.5 Restrictions on Freedom of Expression 
The right to freedom of expression is not absolute and may be 
subjected to a number of exceptions. Nevertheless, interference by the 
state entails a violation of the right unless it could satisfy the three–
stage test in Sunday Times v UK
141
 that provides: 
1. Any interference, such as formalities, conditions, restrictions 
or penalties, must be prescribed by law; 
2. The interference is aimed at protecting one or more of the 
legitimate aims: national security, territorial integrity, public 
safety; prevention of disorder or crime; protection of health or 
moral; protection of reputation or rights of others; preventing 
the disclosure of information received in confidence, and 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary; and 
3. The interference is necessary in a democratic society. 
In applying the test, the ECtHR is generally disinclined to apply the 
notion of ‘balancing’ freedom of expression in Article 10(1) against 
the permitted aims in paragraph 2.
142
 This is due to reason that the two 
paragraphs are not equal since the right protected has presumptive 
weight that any restrictions must be strongly justified and strictly 
construed.
143
 Nonetheless, the application of the test by the ECtHR is 
in stark contrast with the position in the UK. The domestic courts 
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often refer to the importance of ‘balance’ between paragraphs 1 and 2 
of Article 10 and seem to confer on each paragraph equal weight. It 
was claimed that the approach adopted by local judges was far less 
rigorous than that applied by the ECtHR.
144
  
The approach taken by the local courts in the UK could be seen in R 
(Farrakhan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department.
145
 The 
Secretary of State for the Home Department filed an appeal against 
the ruling of the High Court that had earlier quashed his decision to 
prevent the claimant, a US citizen, from entering into the UK. The 
exclusion order, which was made pursuant to the Immigration and 
Asylum Act 1999 on the ground that the claimant’s presence in the 
country was not conducive to the public good, was found by the trial 
judge to have amounted to an infringement of the claimant’s right to 
freedom of expression. In allowing the appeal, the Court of Appeal 
accorded a ‘particularly wide margin of discretion’ to the Secretary of 
the State as he was in a better position than the court to balance the 
claimant’s right to freedom of expression against the need to prevent 
disorder that would secure the broader interest of the community 
under Article 10(2).
146
 In relation to this, it was claimed that the effect 
of such a wide margin seemed to be a less than rigorous enforcement 
of the requirement that restrictions with the right to freedom of 
expression as applied by the ECtHR.
147
 
Another case that could highlight the approach by the domestic courts 
in balancing freedom of expression with the restrictions contained in 
Article 10(2) is R v Shayler.
148
 In this case, one of the issues raised by 
the appellant was whether sections 1(1)(a), 4(1) and 4(3) of the 
                                                 
144
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145
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146
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147
 Wadham, Helen and Anna, Blackstone’s Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998 (n 
13) 198. 
148
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Official Secrets Act 1989, which impose a ban on disclosure of certain 
information, were incompatible with freedom of expression in Article 
10(1). The House of Lords admitted that the ban constituted an 
interference with the apellant’s freedom of expression, but the ban 
was not absolute and it was confined to disclosure without lawful 
authority. Consequently, it was ruled that the interference was not 
greater than was required to achieve the legitimate aim of protecting 
the interests of national security and was still within the qualifications 
in Article 10(2). In addition to these local courts rulings, it is then 
pertinent to analyse each aspect of the three–stage test that was 
formulated in Sunday Times v UK.
149
  
4.5.1 Prescribed by Law 
This first condition requires any interference to be ‘prescribed by 




[T]he expression … requires first that the impugned measures 
should have a basis in domestic law. It also refers to the quality of 
the law in question, requiring that it be accessible to the persons 
concerned and formulated with sufficient precision to enable them 
– if need be, with appropriate legal advice – to foresee, to a degree 
that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a 
given action may entail. A law which confers a discretion is not in 
itself inconsistent with this requirement, provided that the scope of 
the discretion and the manner of its exercise are indicated with 
sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim in question, to 
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 Sunday Times v UK (n 141). 
150
 (1992) 14 EHRR 615. 
151
 ibid, para 75. Though the judgment in the case discussed the phrase ‘in 
accordance with law’ in Article 8(2), the court in Silver v UK (n 150) para 86 has 
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The case established that any interference must have a basis in 
domestic law. The word ‘law’ has been extensively construed to cover 
not only statutes but also unwritten laws, including the common 
law,
152
 rules of EU law,
153
 secondary legislation and even rules of a 
professional body.
154
 Interference without a legal basis would 
promptly result in a violation of the right. In Malone v UK,
155
 it was 
ruled that since interceptions on the applicant’s communications were 
solely authorised by the internal administrative practices of the police, 
the interference was then regarded as not prescribed by domestic law.  
Apart from that, the expression also demands the law in question to 
possess two important qualities (accessibility and foreseeability) in 
order to be compatible with the rule of law.
156
 The concept of 
accessibility and foreseeability has been elaborated in Sunday Times 
that:  
In the Court’s opinion, the following are two of the requirements 
that flow from the expression ‘prescribed by law’. Firstly, the law 
must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an 
indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules 
applicable to a given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as 
a ‘law’ unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable 
the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able – if need be 
with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable 




The accessibility rule is meant to counter arbitrary power as it 
mandates any law that interferes with freedom of expression to be 
published in a form that is accessible by those who are likely to be 
                                                 
152
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156
 Kopp v Sweden (1999) 27 EHRR 91, paras 55, 64. 
157
 Sunday Times v UK (n 141) para 49. 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 4: Freedom of Expression in the United Kingdom 124 
affected by it.
158
 As for the foreseeability rule, it is intended to enable 
the individuals to foresee with a reasonable degree of accuracy the 
consequences of their actions. However, the foreseeability rule does 
not demand for absolute precision in the framing of such laws as this 
may lead to excessive rigidity in interpretation. In Kokkinakis v 
Greece,
159
 the ECtHR recognised that many statutes have been 
deliberately couched in imprecise terms so that they are flexible and 
adaptable with changing situations and prevailing views of society. 
The requirements of accessibility and foreseeability had been raised in 
Silver.
160
 The court ruled that the application of censorship on 
prisoners’ correspondence that had occasionally stopped several items 
of mail was not foreseeable by the claimant. Thus, it failed to satisfy 
the qualities that are expected from law purporting to limit freedom of 
expression. Similarly, in Hashman and Harrup v UK,
161
 it was ruled 
that the binding-over order requesting anti-hunting protesters to be of 
good behaviour violated freedom of expression as the order was found 
to be too vague to be ‘prescribed by law’ under paragraph 2 of Article 
10. 
By contrast, the judgment in Steel and others v. UK
162
 provided that 
the arrest and detention of the first and second claimants for breach of 
the peace due to their protests against grouse shoot and extension of a 
motorway was lawful under the ECHR. The court ruled that the 
concept of breach of the peace had been clarified by the English courts 
and was therefore drafted with the degree of precision required by the 
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ECHR. Since it fulfilled the requirements of ‘prescribed by law’, there 
was no violation of the claimants’ right to freedom of expression.
163
 
4.5.2 Legitimate Aim 
The second requirement demands the purpose of any restrictions on 
freedom of expression to fall within one of the legitimate aims in 
paragraph 2 of Article 10. The House of Lords in A v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department
164
 stressed that there must be a link 
between the means employed and the legitimate aims pursued by the 
state. The list of legitimate aims is exhaustive but it has rarely caused 
any problems as the state is able to rely at least upon one of those 
protected interests.
165
 Further, the grounds for interference are so 
broad, such as ‘the protection of public order’, ‘the interest of national 
security’ and the ‘prevention of disorder or crime’, that the state can 
usually make a plausible case that it does have a good reason for 
interfering with the right’.
166
 Upon finding that a legitimate aim 
sufficiently underlies an interference with freedom of expression, the 
court will then look into the third requirement in Article 10(2). 
4.5.3 Necessary in a Democratic Society 
The last prerequisite in Article 10(2) mandates the state to show 
interference with freedom of expression is ‘necessary in a democratic 
country’. It is the most decisive feature which necessitates any 
exceptions ‘must be narrowly interpreted and the necessity for any 
restrictions must be convincingly convinced’.
167
 The term ‘necessary’ 
                                                 
163
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has been elaborated in Handyside as neither synonymous with 
‘indispensable’ nor has the flexibility of such expressions as 
‘admissible’, ‘ordinary’, ‘useful’, ‘reasonable’ or ‘desirable’.
168
 The 
judgment has excluded excessively strict or generous interpretation of the 
term ‘necessary’ in Article 10(2). It was further ruled that the term 
implies the existence of a ‘pressing social need’.
169
 Thus, the 
interpretation indicates that the existence of a ‘pressing need’ must be 
established in order to prove that the limitations on freedom of 
expression satisfied the necessity requirement.  
The definition of the word ‘necessary’ has been frequently quoted with 
approval in a number of the ECtHR cases,
170
 most notably the case of 
Sunday Times
171
 which has set-out a three-fold test in order to assess 
the status of limitations on freedom of expression. The test requires 
any interference to correspond with a pressing need, be proportionate 
to the legitimate aim pursued and be justified by relevant and 
sufficient reasons.
172
 For that reason, it appears that the necessity 
requirement is essentially underpinned by the principle of 
proportionality. This has been affirmed in Olsson v Sweden which 
provided that ‘according to the Court’s established case law-law, the 
notion of necessity implies that an interference corresponds to a 
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The emphasis on the proportionality principle has been asserted by the 
House of Lords in Derbyshire CC v Times Newspapers Ltd.
174
 It was 
ruled by Lord Keith: 
As regards the words ‘necessary in a democratic society’ in 
connection with the restrictions on the right to freedom of 
expression which may properly be prescribed by law, the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has 
established that ‘necessary’ requires the existence of a pressing 
social need, and that the restrictions should be no more than is 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
175
 
The principle of proportionality aims to strike a fair or proportionate 
balance between the aim pursued and the means chosen to satisfy it. 
The means must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrelevant 
considerations.
176
 They must be capable of achieving the intended 
objective and must impair the right no more than is needed i.e. the 
state cannot use ‘a sledgehammer to crack a nut’.
177
 Further, if the 
objective may be achieved in more than one way, the way that is least 
harmful to freedom of expression should be chosen.
178
 It was also 
ruled that a law that confers a discretion must indicate the scope of 
that discretion.
179
 Similarly, any limitation that has a scope that is 
wider than is required would fail the proportionality test.
180
 
The proportionality requirement has often been invoked in cases 
involving Article 10. In Sunday Times,
181
 the government was found 
guilty of violating the right to freedom of expression when the 
interference with the newspaper’s freedom to publish the thalidomide 
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tragedy was not justified by a ‘pressing social need’ and could not be 
considered ‘necessary’ within clause 2 of Article 10.  
The doctrine of proportionality is strongly linked to the margin of 
appreciation. The margin refers to a degree of latitude or deference 
accorded by the ECtHR to the state in the observance of the ECHR 
provisions. It was elaborated in Handyside that: 
Consequently, Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10 – 2) leaves to the 
Contracting States a margin of appreciation. This margin is given 
both to the domestic legislator (‘prescribed by law’) and to the 
bodies, judicial amongst others, that are called upon to interpret and 
apply the laws in force …
182
 
The justification for conferring the state with a certain extent of 
discretion is that the state is in a better position than international judges 
in Strasbourg in assessing the existence a pressing social need and 
applying the appropriate measures to deal with it. This is crucial in cases 





preference given to the local authorities has been highlighted in Mark 
Intern that ‘the ECTHR should not substitute its own evaluation for 
that of the national courts in the instant case, where those courts, on 
reasonable grounds, had considered restrictions to be necessary’.
185
 
Nonetheless, there are limits to the margin and the limits within which 
the state may act compatibly with the ECHR are determined by the 
ECtHR. They vary according to the context and importance of the 
right, the aim pursued and the degree to which practice varies among 
Convention States.
186
 It was further stipulated in Handyside that: 
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Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10 – 2) does not give the Contracting States 
an unlimited power of appreciation. The Court … is empowered to 
give the final ruling on whether a ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ is 
reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 
(art. 10). The domestic margin of appreciation thus goes hand in 
hand with a European supervision. Such supervision concerns both 
the aim of the measure challenged and its ‘necessity’ …
187
 
Thus, it is obvious that though the state is accorded with certain 
margin, the final ruling is still vested with the ECtHR in deciding 
whether such interference is reconcilable or not with freedom of 
expression under Article 10(1). 
4.6 Application of Freedom of Expression to 
Political Blogs 
The Internet has revitalised the notion of freedom of expression as an 
individual liberty.
188
 It offers a novel platform for expressing 
information and ideas, especially the unrepresented individuals and 
minority groups in the society.
189
 Above all, the Internet affords much 
more equal opportunities for mass communication than the traditional 
media, which are largely dominated by professional journalists and 
few individuals who hold media control and political power. Thus, it 
is apparent that the Internet plays a critical role in liberating the right 
to freedom of expression. 
As to the application of the right on the Internet, Article 10 is 
apparently technology–neutral as it explicitly stipulates that the right 
to freedom of expression is exercisable ‘regardless of frontiers’. 
Without doubt, plain reading of the provision indicates that the 
Internet should be included within the scope of the provision. Thus, 
                                                 
187
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any persons are permitted to freely express themselves on the Internet 
as well as to receive information through the media. 
Apart from the provision in Article 10, freedom of expression on the 
Internet has also been established in a number of cases at the ECtHR. 
In Perrin,
190
 the claimant argued that his criminal conviction and 
sentence in relation to pornographic material exhibited on a US based 
web site constituted an unjustified interference with his right to 
freedom of expression. Nevertheless, the court ruled that there was no 
violation of Article 10 as it was satisfied that the conviction was 
necessary in a democratic society, in the interest of the protection of 
morals and the rights of others and that the sentence was not 
disproportionate. 
In Times Newspaper Ltd v UK (nos. 1 and 2), the court ruled that 
Internet archives should also be included within the ambit of Article 
10. It was observed that: 
In light of its accessibility and its capacity to store and 
communicate vast amounts of information, the Internet plays an 
important role in enhancing the public’s access to news and 
facilitating the dissemination of information generally.
191
 
And in the recent judgment of Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and 
Shtekel v. Ukraine, the ECtHR admitted the importance of the Internet 
and it has indirectly imposed an obligation on the state to provide an 
appropriate regulatory framework in reassuring journalists’ freedom 
of speech on the Internet. The court said: 
[H]aving regard to the role the Internet plays in the context of 
professional media activities and its importance for the exercise of 
the right to freedom of expression generally, … the Court considers 
that the absence of a sufficient legal framework at the domestic 
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level allowing journalists to use information obtained from the 
Internet without fear of incurring sanctions seriously hinders the 




These judgments have demonstrated that the ECtHR equally protects 
expression on the Internet. Thus, online expression communicated on 
the Internet via Web 2.0 applications such as blogs and social 
networking sites should also be accorded due protection against 
interference by the state. The safeguard is particularly necessary for 
blogs which have been distinctively characterised as the closest 
representation of the Internet’s democratisation of publishing.
193
  
Freedom of expression in blogs has been discussed in Perry v Chief 
Constable of Humberside Police.
194
 The claimant sought to set aside 
an Anti–Social Behaviour Order that was imposed on him following 
the publication of several entries in his blog and the commission of 
certain physical contacts, which were regarded as anti-social in nature. 
It was ruled by Openshaw J that the postings in the blog may have 
been offensive, but they were largely related to the exposure of 
corruption and public wrongdoing. Thus, the qualified right under 
Article 10 including the right to hold opinions and to receive and 
impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authorities will be engaged. Since the District Judge had previously 
failed to establish that the order was necessary and proportionate to 
the risks that he presented, the court decided that the order should be 
quashed. 
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Blogs have also been resorted to disseminate political speech by 
politicians and political activists as they are able to enhance political 
debate and opinion of the people in matters of public interest.
195
 The 
use of political blogs can be seen in R (on the application of Calver) v 
Adjudication Panel for Wales.
196
 The claimant councillor applied for 
judicial review of a decision of the defendant panel that found 
postings on his blog breached a local authority’s code of conduct. 
Further, the panel found that the blog entries, which were critical of 
the conduct of other councillors and the general running of the 
council, did not constitute political expression that was worthy of 
higher protection under Article 10. Beatson J observed that the panel 
had taken ‘an over–narrow view of what amounts to “political 
expression”…’ and held that the comments did ‘fall within the term 
“political expression” in the broader sense the term has been applied 
in the Strasbourg jurisprudence’.
197
 In view of that, it was ruled that 
the panel’s decision that had found the postings in the claimant’s blog 
broke the local authority’s code of conduct was a disproportionate 
interference with his freedom of expression. 
Apart from that, blogs are also widely used in journalism and they 
have often been seen as a ‘watchdog’ to ‘the watchdog’ due to their 
role in exposing and highlighting bias or omission in the coverage of 
the mainstream media.
198
 Due to their popularity and widespread 
acceptance, it is not unexpected that the traditional media too have 
established their presence in the blogosphere.
199
 Nonetheless, the 
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position of amateur bloggers in the context of journalistic privilege 
under the UK laws remains unsettled.  
Protection of confidential source is arguably among the most crucial 
rights for professional journalists and bloggers as citizen journalists. 
The importance of the privilege has been highlighted by the ECtHR in 
Goodwin v United Kingdom that: 
Protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for 
press freedom … Without such protection, sources may be deterred 
from assisting the press in informing the public on matters of 
public interest. As a result the vital public watchdog role of the 
press may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide 
accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected.
200
 
The right not to disclose confidential source has also been explicitly 
stated in section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 which 
provides that:  
No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty 
of contempt of court for refusing to disclose, the source of 
information contained in a publication for which he is responsible, 
unless it be established to the satisfaction of the court that 
disclosure is necessary in the interest of justice or national security 
or for the prevention of disorder or crime. 
It is obvious from the aforesaid provisions that the statutory protection 
is conferred on any persons who wish to publish any kinds of 
publication to the public at large. It is not exclusively confined to 
institutional media alone
201
 though it is acknowledged that 
professional journalists are imposed with a moral obligation not to 
disclose their sources
202
 and that so far, reported cases on section 10 
related with attempts by professional journalists to protect their 
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confidential sources.
203
 In relation to this, it is submitted that bloggers 
who style themselves as citizen journalists should be rightfully 
entitled to claim this statutory protection as well.  
Another important privilege for journalists is the exemption from 
compliance with certain obligations in the Data Protection Act 1998 
(DPA). Section 32 excludes any person processing personal data for 
the special purposes
204
 from the data protection principles provided 
that the processing is undertaken with a view to the publication of 
journalistic material; the data controller reasonably believes that 
having regard to the special importance of the public interest in 
freedom of expression, publication would be in the public interest; and 
the data controller reasonably believes that, in all the circumstances, 
compliance with the provisions in the DPA is incompatible with the 
journalistic purpose.
205
 At this point, it is imperative to stress that this 
privilege is also not exclusively reserved for professional journalists 
only. This is due to the express provision in the DPA that clearly 
stipulates that the exemption is available to ‘any person’ that fulfils 
the prescribed criteria in section 32. For this reason, it was claimed 
that amateur bloggers who act as citizen journalists should also be 
entitled to the ‘special purpose’ exemption.
206
 
Nonetheless, an uncertainty arises over the application of the two 
aforementioned privileges to amateur bloggers since the majority of 
them do not receive any formal or proper training in journalism. 
Further, bloggers are also not bound by any standards or code such as 
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the Editor’s Code of Practice that is enshrined in the contractual 
agreement between IPSO and member publishers that voluntarily 
subscribe to the self-regulatory regime of the press. On the contrary, it 
should be noted that journalism is an ‘open profession’ and anyone 
can be a journalist without the need to subscribe to any code of ethics 
or joining any professional body.
207
 This is highlighted by the UN 
Human Rights Committee in its General Comment N0 34 that 
‘Journalism is a function shared by a wide range of actors, including 
… bloggers and others who engage in forms of self-publication in 
print, on the Internet or elsewhere…’.
208
 For that reason, it is 
submitted that the statutory right not to disclose confidential sources 
and the ‘special purposes’ exemption under the DPA accorded to 
professional journalists should be equally extended to amateur 
bloggers. 
The relation between bloggers and journalism has been considered in 
Author of a Blog v Times Newspaper Ltd.
209
 The claimant was a 
serving police officer and the author of ‘NightJack’, a popular blog, 
which was critical of politicians and police activities. The claimant 
applied for an interim injunction to restrain the defendant from 
publishing information that might reveal his true identity to the public. 
Private information about the claimant has been uncovered by one of 
the defendant’s journalists, who had no direct relationship with the 
claimant but managed to deduce his identity by using information 
available on the Internet. The central issue was whether the claimant’s 
identity was information capable of protection under the traditional 
                                                 
207
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law of confidence and / or the newer tort of misuse of private 
information. In refusing the application, it was decided by Eady J that: 
[T]he information does not have about it the necessary ‘quality of 
confidence’…; nor does it qualify as information in respect of 
which the claimant has a reasonable expectation of privacy – 
essentially because blogging is a public activity. Furthermore, even 
if I were wrong about this, I consider that any such right of privacy 
on the claimant’s part would be likely to be outweighed at trial by a 
countervailing public interest in revealing that a particular police 
officer has been making these communications.
210
 
The judgment has a significant impact on bloggers in the UK as their 
names or identities have been regarded as public information that is 
not capable of any reasonable expectation of privacy under Article 8. 
The decision has however been met with severe criticisms for the 
failure of the court to provide satisfactory clarification on a number of 
difficult issues.  
The principal argument is largely centred on the question of whether 
there was a reasonable expectation of privacy that the claimant’s 
identity would not be revealed to the public.
211
 The claimant argued 
that the revelation would infringe his right to freedom of expression 
under Article 10 as his right to impart information would be inhibited 
as the exposure would enable the police authority to identify and take 
disciplinary proceedings against him.
212
 For that reason, it was 
submitted that the judge should have thoroughly analysed the question 
by looking at the circumstances of the case,
213
 rather than quickly 
adopting a ‘no’ answer simply because blogging was considered a 
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public activity.
214
 Further, the decision is also in stark contrast with 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence that acknowledges anonymity–related 
interests in one’s name or identity.
215
 Accordingly, it has been claimed 
that the case does not put an end to all anonymous blogging.
216
 At this 
point, it is therefore worthwhile to briefly discuss the significance of 
anonymity in blogging. 
Anonymity is generally crucial in facilitating freedom of 
expression,
217
 particularly in the online environment. The invisibility 
of bloggers’ real identities enables them to provide and disseminate 
information of public interest without fear of reprisals, or at least with 
a highly reduced risk of detriments. Thus, bloggers may, as citizen 
journalists, cover certain areas or subject matters which professional 
journalists of the mainstream media ignore or have too little 
inclination or time to investigate. Nonetheless, there is a potential loss 
of trust and credibility in blog posts if bloggers’ identities cannot be 
identified. Further, anonymity may be easily abused to make baseless 
claims or harmful allegations in the cyber world. Thus, it is submitted 
that neither absolute right to anonymity nor absolute ban on this 
protection would be in parallel with the exercise of the right to 
freedom of expression. 
Apart from that, the ruling in Author of a Blog,
218
 which stipulated 
that even if the claimant’s rights to freedom of expression and privacy 
(anonymity) were engaged, they were ultimately trumped by the 
defendant’s freedom of the press, has been argued to be at odds with 
                                                 
214
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the statutory privilege of not disclosing the sources of information.
219
 
The qualified privilege is meant to protect the sources of information 
for without such privilege, it would be difficult for journalists to 
obtain information that is of real interest to the public. Ironically, by 
permitting the defendant to publish the identity of the claimant who 
had been anonymously disseminating information of public interest, 
the decision appeared to suggest that the protection of sources of 
information is a privilege for the media, or for the other person 
claiming it, rather than for the source. It was alleged that the action by 
the defendant signified the burgeoning competition between the 
traditional and the new media.
220
 
Regardless of the criticisms, the decision is noteworthy as the court 
for the first time has expressly admitted bloggers, who undertook 
almost similar journalistic tasks such as disseminating relevant 
information and reacting to newsworthy events, to be analogous with 
professional journalists of the traditional media.
221
 For that reason, it 
was claimed that the special rights and privileges accorded to 
professional journalists should be extended to amateur bloggers as 
well.
222
 Nevertheless, blogs in general are still being perceived as 
subordinate or alternative to the traditional media since the latter 
remains the dominant sources for news and political expression.
223
  
Apart from that, it was submitted that online expression of Internet 
users in blogs and other web-based platforms is to be regarded as a 
‘low level’ speech as it ‘undergoes little preparation, is inexpensive, 
normally reaches a small audience and it is possible for anyone to 
                                                 
219
 Eric Barendt, ‘Bad News for Bloggers’ (2009) 1(2) JML 141, 146. 
220
 ibid 146 – 147. 
221
 Author of a Blog v Times Newspaper Ltd (n 209) [10]. 
222
 Flanagan, ‘The Blogger As Journalist under UK Law’ (n 206); Flanagan, 
‘Blogging’ (n 206). 
223
 Sunny Woan, ‘The Blogosphere: Past, Present, and Future - Preserving the 
Unfettered Development of Alternative Journalism, The’ (2007) 44 Cal W L Rev 
477, 485. 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 4: Freedom of Expression in the United Kingdom 139 
engage in such expression’.
224
 This is in stark contrast with expression 
by professional journalists in the mainstream media which is deemed 
‘high level’ since such speech is ‘normally intended to be widely 
disseminated, well prepared and researched in advance, presented with 
authority and supported with considerable resources to evaluate the 
legal risks’.
225
 For that reason, it was previously argued that online 
expression of the established media should preferably be tiered at one 
level whilst smaller sites and amateurs at a different level.
226
 
Accordingly, it was further claimed that the low level speech deserves 
some protections and any restrictions on such speech must be 
proportionate to it.
227
   
In addition, it has also been suggested that the protection to be 
accorded to entries in blogs and other online platforms should take 
into consideration the ‘value’ of the expression as well.
228
 Online 
expression that largely focuses on political speech and public affairs 
should be treated as of ‘high value’ and therefore be granted the 
highest protection under Article 10. Whilst ‘low value’ online 
communications that are unlikely related to matters of public 
importance, should not be treated on the same footing but should 
nevertheless still enjoy certain limited protection under the law.
229
 
Therefore, it is submitted that political blogs should be regarded as 
‘high value’ and should rightfully be afforded the same status as the 
traditional media that carry political expression. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
To sum up, prior to the coming into force of the HRA, the right to 
freedom of expression in the UK was largely considered as residual in 
nature. This is mainly due to the reason that there was no codified 
written constitution or a specific bill of rights that guarantees the 
exercise of such a right in the country. Consequently, the right could 
only be applied when there was ambiguity in statutes or common law 
principles. The absence of sufficient protection in domestic laws had 
caused victims of human rights violation to bring their cases against 
the state authorities in the ECtHR in Strasbourg. The position has 
nonetheless changed when freedom of expression and other 
fundamental rights in the ECHR were later incorporated into Schedule 
I of the HRA. As a result, the right is now statutorily conferred on all 
persons, natural and legal alike, in the UK. 
The statutory right covers a wide range of expression and is 
exercisable regardless of medium. It empowers any person freedom to 
hold opinions, freedom to receive and freedom to impart information 
and ideas. Freedom of the press (and broadcast media) is also included 
within the scope of freedom of expression. In addition, it has also been 
judicially acknowledged that political expression should enjoy a 
preferred legal status over other types of speech such as commercial 
or artistic.  
Nonetheless, the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, 
particularly political speech, is not absolute. The state is permitted to 
impose restrictions on such a right provided that they are prescribed 
by law, made in pursuance of legitimate aims and necessary in 
democratic society. In determining the status of such interference, 
local courts are equipped with a certain margin of appreciation but the 
final say is reserved to the ECtHR.  
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As to the online expression in the blogosphere, it is submitted that the 
general rules and principles in Article 10 should be equally applicable 
to the cyber world as well. Alternatively, it has been claimed that 
since the majority of the digital communications in the blogosphere as 
well as other web-based platforms is deemed to be low level speech, 
such expression merits some protections and should be tiered at a 
different level from the offline or online expression of the traditional 
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5.1 Introduction 
The traditional print and broadcast media in Malaysia have been 
subjected to a strict regulatory regime since the British colonial rule 
and the position remained even after the country gained her 
independence in 1957. A number of specific media statutes have been 
enacted to curtail media freedom, most notably through the imposition 
of prior restraints in the form of licence and permit requirements.  
Apart from formal constraints via rules and regulations, the media 
have also been informally controlled through ownership mechanisms. 
This is clearly reflected in the ownership of the media industry that is 
largely dominated by certain groups and individuals who are either 
politically linked to the ruling party or closely aligned and friendly 
with the government.
1
 As a result, news and information disseminated 
by the traditional media are often perceived as biased and partial 
towards the establishment, whilst critical and constructive comments, 
though genuine, will never get published. 
The scenario has started to change with the convergence of 
communication, broadcasting and information technology and the 
advent of various forms of the Internet communications. These 
developments have not only rendered the previous controls to be less 
effective, but also caused the public to be less dependent on the 
traditional media. The technological advancements have empowered 
the public to express views and comments on any issue via various 
types of online publications, particularly political blogs that are 
claimed to have reshaped the landscape of the media in the country.
2
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As such, this chapter examines in detail the justifications for adopting 
strict regulatory controls over the traditional media, the statutory rules 
and regulations that are currently being used to govern the traditional 
print and broadcast media as well as the Internet industry and, finally, 
to evaluate the possibility of applying any of these legal regimes to the 
blogosphere. 
5.2 Overview of Statutory Controls of the Media in Malaysia 
The historical background
3
 and political experiences in the past
4
 are 
generally accepted to have had a significant impact on the regulatory 
system of the print and broadcast media in the country. Malaysia has a 
pluralistic society that consists of three main races namely Malays, 
Chinese and Indians.
5
 Historically, the Malays were the natives while 
the Chinese and Indians were brought into the country from mainland 
China and the Indian subcontinent during the British colonization 
period.
6
 As a result of this arrangement, Malaysia has become a 
multiracial, multicultural, multireligious and multilingual country.  
Strict regulatory control over the traditional print and broadcast media 
has been introduced by the government because the media were 
perceived as ‘vital agents of social change’ in promoting unity among 
the people of different races and ethnics post-independence era.
7
 This 
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justification appears to be fundamental, particularly in the aftermath of 
bloody racial riots on 13 May 1969, which erupted out of tensions 
between the Malays and the Chinese after the general elections prior 
to the tragedy.
8
 Since the tragic riots were alleged to have been partly 
triggered by reckless reporting of racially sensitive issues,
9
 the 
government immediately after the incident stiffened the rules relating 
to the traditional media. The Printing Press Ordinance 1948 which 
controlled the print industry was revised into the Printing Press Act 
1948 (Revised 1971), whilst the broadcast stations continued to be 
directly controlled by the authorities and were for the most part 
employed as ‘the mouthpiece of the government of the day’
10
 in 
promoting national unity, developing civic consciousness and 
providing information and entertainment.
11
 Thus, strict regulatory 
control of the traditional media was considered indispensable to the 




Similar to other developing countries, the mass media in Malaysia are 
also regarded as important instruments for modernization and 
development.
13
 Since the early 1990s, regulatory control over the 
mainstream media has been shaped towards urging the people to 
support the government and promoting nation building in parallel with 
                                                 
8
 For details on the 13
th
 May tragedy, see Kee Beng Ooi, March 8: Eclipsing May 13 
(Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008); Kia Soong Kua, May 13: Declassified 
Documents on the Malaysian Riots of 1969 (SUARAM, 2007); Tunku Abdul 
Rahman Putra AlHaj, 13 Mei Sebelum Dan Selepas (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan 
Publications, 2007); Leon Comber, 13 May 1969: A Historical Survey of Sino-
Malay Relations (Singapore: Graham Brash (Pte.) Ltd, 2001). 
9
 Faruqi, Mass Media Laws and Regulations in Malaysia (n 4). 
10
 Zaharom Nain, ‘Globalized Theories and National Controls: The State, the Market 
and the Malaysian Media’ in Myung-Jin Park and James Curran (eds), De-
Westernizing Media Studies (Routledge 2000) 146. 
11
 Halim and Salim, 'The Media System and Co-operative Regulatory Systems in the 
Media Sector of Malaysia' (n 3) 8. 
12
 Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani, The Public Sphere and Media Politics in Malaysia 
(Cambridge Scholars Publisher 2009) 37. 
13
 Mustafa K. Anuar, ‘Politics and the Media in Malaysia’ (2007) 20(1) Kasarinlan 
25, 27. 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 5: Specific Regulatory Regime of the Media in Malaysia 145 
the Vision 2020.
14
 The vision, which was launched in 1991 by the 
Fourth Malaysian Prime Minister, maps out the government’s 
intention of turning the nation into a fully developed country by the 
year 2020.
15
 In realising the plan, numerous projects have been 
developed, particularly the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC 
Malaysia),
16
 which aims to become a world-class technology hub
17
 
that would transform the country into a knowledge-based society 
driven by new economy.
18
 In relation to this, the media are expected 
to collaborate with the government in portraying positive images 
about its economic policies to attract local and foreign investors.
19
 It is 
even alleged that the media have indirectly been instructed to apply 
self-censorship or they face the consequences of being censored.
20
 
The media have also been urged not to publish confrontational 
criticisms or contentious remarks that may be detrimental to the nation 
building process.
21
 In addition, protection of morals and culture from 
foreign programmes that are unacceptable to the local values has been 
invoked to validate stringent media control.
22
 It was claimed that the 
state’s control is necessary to ensure the media publish information 
                                                 
14
 Juriah Abd Jalil, ‘Media in Digital Environment Legal Development of Television 
Broadcasting in Malaysia’ (International Islamic University Malaysia 2002) 2 – 3. 
15
 Vision 2020 was introduced by the former Malaysian PM, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, 
in a working paper titled ‘Malaysia: The Way Forward’. The full text of the speech 
is accessible at <www.wawasan2020.com/vision/> [accessed 10 October 2011]. 
16
 MSC Malaysia was launched on 1
st
 August 1996 at the inaugural Multimedia Asia 
Conference and Exhibition. For historical conceptualisation of MSC Malaysia, see 
<www.mscmalaysia.my/topic/12073059315399> [accessed 11 October 2011]. 
17
  The words used by the fifth Malaysian PM, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi in his 
opening remarks at the launch of the 8
th
 MSC International Advisory Panel (IAP) 
Meeting on 2
nd 
September 2004. The full text of Mr Abdullah’s speech is available 
at <www.pmo.gov.my/ucapan/?m=p&p=paklah&id=2889> [accessed 12 October 
2011].  
18
 Vision and Mission of MSC Malaysia. See 
<www.mscmalaysia.my/topic/12073059198422> [accessed 12 October 2011]. 
19
 Kim, ‘Malaysia: Ownership as Control’ (n 1) 62. 
20
 ibid 63. 
21
 Anuar, ‘Politics and the Media in Malaysia’ (n 13) 28. 
22
 Peter G. Leonard and Kate Harrison, ‘Satellite Broadcasting: An Overview of the 
Asian Market’ (1998) 4 (4) CTLR 119, 124 – 125. 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 5: Specific Regulatory Regime of the Media in Malaysia 146 
relevant for positive development of the country and to accommodate 
the information technology revolution.
23
 In short, the foregoing 
reasons have been conveniently resorted to by the government to 
justify the adoption of strict regulatory controls over the media in the 
country. 
Nonetheless, the government’s approach towards the media has 
severely tarnished the latter’s image and their role as sources of 
accurate and reliable information providers. Since more often than not 
the scope and nature of the media content are glaringly biased and 
favourable towards the government, the people have started to 
question the credibility and reliability of the news and coverage of the 
mainstream media.
24
 Some have even launched boycotts of these 
media as they failed to act as a watchdog to the government.
25
 In view 
of that, excessive control and biased reporting would have resulted not 
only in abuse and exploitation of the media, but the people’s right to 
accurate and impartial information would also be eventually denied.  
Consequently, the public has resorted to the Internet and other online 
publications, especially political blogs, in seeking alternative and 
impartial information. These new media have fast gained widespread 
popularity and have been highly sought after by the public, 
particularly after the shock dismissal of the former Malaysian Deputy 
Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, and his incredulous criminal trials in 
1998.
26
  Since then, alternative media and political blogs have 
flourished and become influential sources of information and effective 
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platform for expressing views and critical dissent which are unlikely 
to be published in the mainstream media.
27
 
5.3 Print Industry 
5.3.1 Historical Background of the Regulatory System of 
the Press 
The regulatory system of the press was introduced into the country 
during the British colonial rule after the end of World War II.
28
 The 
Japanese occupation of Malaya
29
 and British Borneo
30
 from 1942 to 
1945 made the British realise the influence of the press, which was 
effectively used by the Japanese military to spread propaganda against 
them. Afterwards, in order to contain the spread of anti-government 
propaganda by the Malayan Communist Party during the state of 
emergency,
31
 the British government passed the Printing Press 
Ordinance 1948
32
 which prevented the usage and storage of printing 
machines without licenses and mandated application for permit before 
publications.
33
 When the country was granted her independence in 
1957, the new government of the Alliance (Perikatan) party 
comprehended the significance of the press and decided to continue 
with the strict regulatory control over the press.
34
 The occurrence of 
the racial riot on 13 Mac 1969 has led the government to revise the 
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Printing Press Ordinance 1948 into the Printing Press Act 1948 
(Revised 1971). The amendment has further augmented the 
government’s power to the extent of revoking licenses of newspapers 
that aggravated national sensitivities or were detrimental to national 
development goals.
35
 Since then, the printing press continued to be 
statutorily controlled by the government through the provisions of the 
Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984. 
5.3.2 The Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 
The Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 (PPA) is specific 
legislation enacted to regulate the use of printing presses and the 
printing, importation, production, reproduction, publishing and 
distribution of publications and for matters connected therewith.
36
 It 
consolidates the Printing Presses Act 1948 and the Control of 
Imported Publications Act 1958 and covers all domestic publications 
including books, pamphlets and newspapers and publications imported 
from abroad.
37
 The PPA, which is currently placed under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs,
38
 exerts strict regulatory 
controls over the print industry through licensing system and content 
regulation. 
5.3.2.1 The Licensing System of the Press 
The crux of the PPA is the application of prior restraints in the form of 
licences and permits. Owners or operators of printing press, i.e. 
printing machine or equipment which can produce 1,000 impressions 
or more in one hour,
39
 are required to apply for a licence from the 
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Minister of Home Affairs to keep for use or to use a printing press.
40
 
On a similar note, newspaper publishers are also mandated to procure 
permits before they can engage in printing, publishing, selling, 
circulating and distributing any newspaper in the country.
41
 
As to the term ‘newspaper’, it has been given a very broad 
interpretation in the PPA so as to include almost anything that 
disseminates information. The term is defined to cover any magazine, 
comic, periodical or publication containing news, reports of 
occurrences or any comments in relation to such news, or to any other 
matter of public interest, irrespective of whether the publication is free 
or for sale.
42
 And the term ‘publication’ refers to a document, 
newspaper, book, periodical, all written or printed matter, anything 
containing visible representation or suggesting words or ideas, and 
audio recording.
43
 Unfortunately, these sweeping definitions, which 
encompass audio recording
44
 as well, seem to include almost all 
publishers, except publications by the federal or state governments 
and statutory bodies.
45
 This is likely to create confusion as the PPA is 
primarily enacted to regulate the printing press, whilst audio visual 
services are regulated by the Communications and Multimedia Act 
                                                                                                                   
Schedule I’. And Schedule I of the PPA stipulates that ‘Letterpress, Lithography, 
Gravure, Intaglio or any other process of printing capable of printing at a rate of 
1,000 impressions per hour or more’. 
40
 Section 3(1) of the PPA provides ‘no person shall keep for use or use a printing 
press unless he has been granted a licence under subsection (3)’. Nonetheless, 
section 3(8) of the PPA stipulates that no licence is necessary when the press is 
engaged in engraving, printing of any visiting or business cards, billheads, 
letterheads or any letter, memorandum or document in the ordinary course of 
business. 
41
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 The phrase ‘audio recording’ is defined in section 2 as any material on which is 
recorded a recording of a human voice or of instrumental music or other sounds and 
includes phonograph records, tapes and laser disc. 
45
 Section 25(1) of the PPA. 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 5: Specific Regulatory Regime of the Media in Malaysia 150 
1998.
46
 It is thus submitted that the phrase ‘audio recording’ should be 
removed from the interpretation of the term ‘publication’ in order to 
guarantee certainty and avoid impending conflict with other laws. 
Apart from the indefinite interpretations, the central issue of the 
licensing system relates with the provision of a very wide power on 







 of the PPA, the Minister has been conferred with absolute 
discretion not only to grant or refuse application for printing press 
licence or publication permit, but also to revoke or suspend licence or 
permit which has been issued earlier. Further, such licence or permit is 
only valid for twelve months or such other shorter periods as 
determined by the Minister.
50
 As a result, all proprietors and 
publishers have to make a fresh application every year because non-
compliance with the rigid licensing system will expose them to 
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49
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50
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51
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The licensing system of the press is further worsened subsequent to 
the amendment to the PPA in 1998
52
 that introduced an ouster clause 
that seeks to exclude judicial review of the Minister’s decision. 
Section 13A(1) provides ‘Any decision of the Minister to refuse to 
grant or to revoke or to suspend a licence or permit shall be final and 
shall not be called in question by any court on any ground 
whatsoever’. In addition, section 13B states that ‘No person shall be 
given an opportunity to be heard with regard to his application for a 
licence or permit or relating to the revocation or suspension of the 
licence or permit granted to him under this Act’. These provisions 
have statutorily rendered any decisions made by the Minister under 
the PPA as final and not susceptible to judicial review. Further, the 
Minister is neither required to accommodate prior hearing nor furnish 
grounds of his decision
53
 to applicants in relation to any application, 
suspension or revocation of licence or permit under the PPA. This 
setup is obviously inconsistent with Article 10(1) of the Malaysian 
Constitution that guarantees freedom of expression and freedom of the 
press in the country unless on specified permitted grounds. 
The constitutionality of seemingly unlimited power of the Minister 
and the exclusion of judicial review by the PPA has been challenged 
in Persatuan Aliran Kesedaran Negara v Minister of Home Affairs.
54
 
In this case, the applicant had on a couple of times sought a permit to 
publish its English monthly magazine in the Malay language. 
However, the applications were turned down on both occasions and no 
specific reasons were offered by the Minister. The applicant then 
applied to the High Court for a judicial review of the Minister’s 
decision. In holding that the Minister had no good reasons to refuse 
                                                 
52
 The Printing Presses and Publications (Amendment) Act 1987 was passed on 29 
December 1987 and came into force on 8 January 1998. 
53
 Section 13A(2) of the PPA states that ‘decision’ includes any ‘order or direction 
of the Minister’. 
54
 [1988] 1 MLJ 440. 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 5: Specific Regulatory Regime of the Media in Malaysia 152 
the applications, it was highlighted by Harun J that ‘It is common 
ground that although the discretion is absolute it is not unfettered. It 




Unfortunately, the decision was reversed on appeal and the Minister’s 
decision to refuse the publication permit was upheld by the Supreme 
Court.
56
 In delivering the judgment, Ajaib Singh SCJ ruled: 
Section 12(2) of the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 
gives the Minister of Home Affairs ‘absolute discretion to refuse an 
application for a licence or permit.’ So unless it can be clearly 
established that the Minister of Home Affairs had in any way 
exercised his discretion wrongfully, unfairly, dishonestly or in bad 




The judgment should be seen as a blessing in disguise though the 
application for judicial review was rejected as the court found the 
Minister had not exercised his discretion wrongfully, unfairly, 
dishonestly or in bad faith. The ruling has recognised that the 
constitutionality of any provisions that would derogate the 
fundamental rights, including freedom of expression and press 
freedom, could not be prevented from the scrutiny of courts. Thus, any 
future application for judicial review can be initiated on the grounds 
of illegality, irrationality and procedural impartiality even with the 
existence of the ouster clause such as section 13A of the PPA. 
The decision has been invoked in Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop 
of Kuala Lumpur v Menteri Dalam Negeri & Anor.
58
 In this case, the 
Minister had inter alia claimed that the ouster clause in section 13A 
prevented the applicant from challenging the Minister’s absolute 
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discretion. It was decided by Lau Bee Lan J that the Minister’s 
contention of the ouster clause is misconceived as there are many 
authorities which indicate that judicial review is not ousted to correct 
errors of law by an administrative body or tribunal. 
Notwithstanding the positive development on the reviewability of the 
Minister’s discretion, the struggle towards press freedom has still a 
long journey to go. This is partly due to the government’s treatment of 
licence and permit as a privilege of the Minister and not a right of the 
people.
59
 This has resulted in many local newspapers  are directly 
owned and controlled by those who have good relations with the 
ruling party, whilst opposition parties and civil groups are prevented 
from publishing their newspapers on a daily basis.
60
 The situation is 
further undermined with the application of self-censorship by editors
61
 
and their inclination to avoid controversial issues and to set aside 




Since the licensing system has been successfully resorted in the past to 
instil public faith in the government and to alleviate political 
criticisms and dissent views from entering the public sphere,
63
 it is 
very much expected that the system will remain in operation in the 
near future. Due to this situation, proponents of media freedom and 
media practitioners have frequently demanded the government to 
review the PPA in order to allow critical views to be published in the 
print media
64
 or even to abolish it altogether.
65
 Surprisingly, the Prime 
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Minister has announced drastic plans to review or abolish a number of 
laws including the PPA as part of his political transformation 
programmes.
66
 Subsequently, the long awaited amendment, the PPA 




The PPA (Amendment) Act 2012 has removed the Minister’s 





 It has also removed the twelve-month 
validity period for a licence and permit and has allowed such licence 
and permit to remain valid as long as it is not revoked by the 
Minister.
70
 As a result, proprietors of printing press and publishers of 
newspapers are no longer required to renew their licence or permit 
annually. Apart from that, the ouster clause which prevented any 
application for judicial review on the decision of the Minister to grant, 
refuse to grant, revoke or suspend a licence or permit has been 
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 The draft bill was presented on 19
th
 April 2012. It received Royal Assent on 18
th
 
June 2012 and came into operation on 22
nd
 June 2012. 
68
 Section 2 of the PPA (Amendment) Act 2012 substitutes subsection 3(3) of the 
PPA with the following: ‘The Minister may grant to any person a licence to keep for 
use or use a printing press and he may refuse any application for such licence or may 
at any time revoke or suspend such licence for any period as he considers desirable’. 
69
 Section 3 of the PPA (Amendment) Act 2012 stated that subsection 6(1) of the 
PPA is amended by deleting the words ‘in his absolute discretion’. 
70
 Section 4 of the PPA (Amendment) Act 2012 substituted section 12 of the PPA 
with the following: ‘A licence or permit granted under this Act shall be subject to 
such conditions as may be endorsed in the licence or permit and shall remain valid 
for so long as it is not revoked’. 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 5: Specific Regulatory Regime of the Media in Malaysia 155 
altogether removed from the PPA.
71
 In addition, the amendment has 
established a right to be heard for licence or permit holders before the 




The efficacy of the latest amendment to the PPA has been put to test 
in the unreported case of Mkini Dotcom Sdn Bhd v Ketua Setiausaha 
Kementerian Dalam Negeri & Ors.
73
 By way of judicial review, the 
applicant sought to quash the decision of the second respondent who 
had earlier refused to grant publishing permit on the ground of 
procedural unfairness as the latter did not furnish any reasons for 
refusing to grant the permit to the applicant. The respondents argued 
that the Minister is not bound by any statutory duty to give reasons in 
the exercise of his discretion under the PPA and that the issuance of a 
permit is a privilege of the Minister and not a right of the applicant. It 
was observed by Tuan Abang Iskandar J that ‘This Court had found 
that the matter of printing permit is a right that emanates from Article 
10 of the Federal Constitution and that it was not a mere privilege’.
74
 
Accordingly, the court ruled that the decision of the second 
respondent was defective for want of procedural fairness, as he had 
misconstrued the extent of the Minister’s power as a privilege and for 
his failure to provide any grounds of rejection to the applicant. The 
court then ordered the application for the publishing permit by the 
applicant to be remitted to the Minister so that it could be considered 
according to law and to make another lawful decision. 
                                                 
71
 Section 5 of the PPA (Amendment) Act 2012 deleted the words ‘and shall not be 
called in question by any court on any ground whatsoever’ in section 13A(1) of the 
PPA. 
72
 Section 6 of the PPA (Amendment) Act 2012 replaced section 13B of the PPA 
with the following ‘A person who has been granted a licence or permit under this 
Act shall be given an opportunity to be heard before a decision to revoke or suspend 
such licence or permit is made under subsection 3(3), 6(2) or 13(1), as the case may 
be’. 
73
 Semakan Kehakiman: R1-25-455-2010. 
74
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The aforesaid judgment, which was delivered
75
 after the amendment 
to the PPA that abolished the ‘absolute discretion’ of the Minister in 
exercising his power and the removal of the ouster clause which 
prevented judicial review of the Minister’s decision, has judicially put 
a rest to the long-standing perception that the grant or refusal of a 
printing licence and publishing permit under the PPA is the privilege 
of the government and not part of the fundamental rights of the 
citizens to freedom of expression. Thus, it is submitted that the ruling 
has arguably indicated the inclination and recent trend of the courts in 
according greater protection to freedom of the press and freedom of 
expression in Malaysia. 
The Home Ministry Secretary General had then filed an appeal against 
the judgment of the High Court. Later, on 30 October 2013, a three-
member Court of Appeal panel unanimously rejected the 
government’s appeal and upheld the earlier decision that ordered the 
Home Ministry to issue a publication permit to Mkini.
76
 Surprisingly, 
the government did not file an appeal to the Federal Court and this has 
led Mkini to resubmit a new application for a publication permit.
77
 
Nonetheless, it is too early to predict the fate of the print media in 
Malaysia after the latest amendment to the PPA as it still mandates the 
acquisition of printing licence and publishing permit. Further, Mkini’s 
new application for a permit to publish daily newspaper has yet to be 
decided by the Minister. 
                                                 
75
 The decision of the case was pronounced on 10
th
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76
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<http://www.thestar.com.my/News/Nation/2013/10/30/malaysiakini-COA-judicial-
review-allowed/> [accessed 3 February 2015]. 
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<http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/media-freedom-not-without-
limits-says-minister> [accessed 3 February 2015]. 
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5.3.2.2 Content Regulation 
The print industry is also subjected to content regulation under the 
PPA. The formulation of such regulation is arguably necessary and 
justified under Article 10(2) of the Malaysian Constitution in order to 
preserve the social values and ethical fabrics of the multicultural 
society in the country. Further, the content regulation is also crucial to 
prohibit the printing and dissemination of publication that is likely to 
be prejudicial to public interest and national security. For this reason, 
section 4(1) forbids the use of printing press from printing documents 
which are obscene or against public decency, or which incite to 
violence against persons or property, or which promote feelings of ill-
will, hostility, enmity, hatred, disharmony or disunity. Further, section 
7(1) permits the Minister to prohibit publishers from publishing 
materials that are deemed ‘undesirable’. This includes the publication 
of article, caricature, photograph, report, notes, writing, sound, music, 
statement or any other content which is prejudicial or likely to be 
prejudicial to public order, morality, security or likely to alarm public 
opinion or likely to be contrary to any law or likely to be prejudicial to 
public interest or national interest. It is argued that the restrictions in 
section 4(1) are reasonably necessary and expedient with the object of 
restricting the circulation of materials that are specifically mentioned 
in the provision. However, section 7(1) appears to have accorded too 
much power to the Minister to the extent that he may even restrain the 
dissemination of content that may not be really undesirable as the 
criteria for undesirable publications are ill defined and ambiguous. 
The print industry is further restrained with the inclusion of the 
offence of malicious publication of false news. Section 8A states that 
such an offence will be established if there is a publication, the 
publication contains false news and the accused maliciously published 
the false news. The malice will be presumed if the false news is 
published and no reasonable measures to verify the truth have been 
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established prior to the publication.
78
 Criminal prosecution will be 
initiated against the printer, publisher, editor and the writer, and if 
convicted, they are liable to be punished with imprisonment for up to 
three years, or a fine of maximum RM 20,000 or both.
79
  




… Parliament’s aim in enacting the provision was obviously to 
ensure truth in publication of news and providing severe penal 
consequences for those who publish false news maliciously. It is a 
serious thing in itself to publish false news. The seriousness of the 
matter is compounded when the publication is malicious.
81
  
It is argued that although the provision was intended to counteract 
unsubstantiated allegations,
82
 the conferment of too wide power on the 
authorities is open to abuse since it can be manipulated to silence 
criticisms and adversarial political speech, particularly against 
members of opposition parties and civic groups.  
The offence has been invoked against politicians in Lim Guan Eng v 
Public Prosecutor.
83
 The appellant, a Member of Parliament from the 
opposition party, was convicted by the High Court for maliciously 
publishing false news in the form of a pamphlet. The pamphlet related 
to the non-prosecution of an alleged rape case involving the former 
Chief Minister with an under-aged girl. On appeal to the Court of 
Appeal, the guilty finding of the appellant was upheld and the 
sentence was even increased to 18 months’ imprisonment. The 
appellant appealed to the Federal Court and it was held that since the 
words were found to be false and there was no evidence that he took 
                                                 
78
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79
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80
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81
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reasonable measures to verify the truth of the words, the appellant was 




A similar charge was also brought against Irene Fernandez, a social 
activist and director of Tenaganita,
85
 for publishing a memorandum 
entitled ‘Abuse, Torture and Dehumanised Conditions of Migrant 
Workers in Detention Centres’. The memorandum exposed the ill-
treatment, sex abuse and denial of adequate medical care to migrant 
workers in detention camps.
86
 The criminal charge against her 
commenced in 1996 but she was only found guilty and sentenced to 
twelve months’ imprisonment on 16 October 2003. She then appealed 
against her conviction to the High Court and on 24 October 2008, her 




In relation to this, it was contended that the content regulation of the 
PPA has created a serious derogation to press freedom as it empowers 
the authorities to censor publications on dubious grounds of 
undesirable and malicious content.
88
 Thus, it is submitted that so long 
as the statutory provisions on content regulation of the print media 
have not been revised by the government, there is still uncertainty on 
the future of press freedom even though the latest amendment to the 
PPA seems to have relaxed the rigid licensing system of the PPA.  
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2011]. 
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5.3.3 Application of the Press Regulatory System to 
Political Blogs 
The preamble to the PPA has explicitly indicated that the PPA is 
primarily enacted to regulate the printing presses and publications. In 
essence, the term ‘printing  press’ which is interpreted in section 
3(2)
89
 and Schedule I
90
 of the PPA refers to any printing machine or 
equipment that can produce 1,000 impressions or more in one hour. 
Whilst the term ‘publication’ has been given a very wide 
interpretation under section 2 of the PPA so as to include any written 
or printed materials, as well as audio recording. Thus, based on these 
provisions, it is obvious that political blogs and other web-based 
communications would fall outside of the interpretation of the term 
‘printing press’ as they are clearly not a printing machine. 
Nonetheless, uncertainty arises as political blogs may contain audio 
materials that could have consequently resulted in such blogs to be 
regarded as ‘audio recording’ within the sweeping definition of the 
term ‘publication’ in the PPA. In that case, though political blogs are 
largely text based publications, the regulatory regime of the print 
media in Malaysia may arguably be extended to political blogs and 
other online platforms once it is established that they do incorporate 
audio postings and therefore satisfy the statutory interpretation of 
‘publication’ in the PPA. 
Despite the slight possibility of applying the licensing system of the 
press to political blogs and other online platforms, the provisions of 
the PPA have yet to be extended to the cyber world. Due to this, the 
government has proposed to prolong the remit of the PPA to political 
                                                 
89
 Section 3(2) of the PPA provides that ‘printing press’ means the machine, 
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Schedule I. 
90
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blogs and online news portal.
91
 The proposal suggested that the PPA 
should be amended so that it could be extended to the online 
environment.
92
 The proposal has however received strong objections 
from local bloggers and proponents of media freedom.
93
 Thus, so long 
as the proposal is yet to be materialised, the regulatory regime of the 
press will not be implemented in the cyber world. Although it is 
acknowledged that cyberspace is not totally unregulable and that 
Internet freedom is neither permanent nor absolute, it is argued that 
any attempts by the government to apply unnecessary and 
inappropriate prior restraints may lead to a violation of the no 
censorship guarantee of the Internet in the Communications and 
Multimedia Commission Act 1998
94




5.4 Broadcasting Industry 
5.4.1 Historical Background of the Broadcast Media in 
Malaysia 
The development of the broadcast industry in Malaysia can be traced 
back to the introduction of the first radio set in 1921 and the setting up 
of wireless associations in Kuala Lumpur and Penang that broadcasted 
radio waves in the 1930s.
96
 Later, the Department of Broadcasting was 
established by the British government in Singapore on 1
st
 April 1946 
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n>  [accessed 27 October 2011]. 
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and afterwards several radio stations were built to broadcast radio 
services across the country.
97
 After independence, the government 
proposed the initiation of a television service and accordingly, 
technical experts from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
(CBC)
98
 were engaged to advice on the setting up of such service.
99
 
The first television broadcast was aired on 28 December 1963 and it 
was inaugurated by the first Prime Minister as ‘Talivishen Malaysia’ 
or TV Malaysia.
100
 In October 1969, the second television channel 
was launched and later, radio and television services were merged and 
placed under the Department of Broadcasting, or popularly known as 
RTM (Radio Television Malaysia).
101
 
Since their inception, the broadcast media have been regarded as 
government tools to promote national policies and agenda.
102
 This has 
only changed after more than 20 years when the first private 
commercial television, TV Tiga or TV3, was permitted to operate in 
1984 under the privatisation policy.
103
 The policy was adopted to 
reduce the participation of the government in the economy and to 
make the industry more profitable.
104
 At the same time, it was also 
hoped that the provision of higher quality entertainment programmes 
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The broadcast industry experienced noteworthy development in the 
1990s when a number of private companies were granted broadcasting 
licences by the government. Metro Vision was the second private 
television station that commenced services in July 1995
106
 and three 
months later, Mega TV became the first subscription cable service 
offered to the Malaysian audience.
107
 After the nation’s first 
communication satellite, MEASAT-1 (Malaysian East Asia Satellite), 
was launched in January 1996, satellite station, ASTRO (All Asia 
Television and Radio Company), was introduced in September 
1996.
108
 Later, another private company, NTV (National Television 
Network) was granted licence to broadcast the third commercial 
television service in 1998 under the name NTV7.
109
 Since then, the 
broadcast media have further expanded with more private companies 
granted licences to broadcast their services. 
5.4.2 Legislative Framework of the Broadcast Media 
The broadcast media have been subjected to strict government 
controls since television was first introduced in 1963. Though the 
early government stations were neither set up through an Act of 
Parliament nor a Royal Charter,
110
 they were bound by statutory 




 Metro Vision was operated by City Television Sdn Bhd but unfortunately due to 
the Asian financial crisis, it ceased operation in November 1999. Later, the station 
was taken over by Media Prima Berhad and after being restructured, it was 
relaunched as 8TV in January 2004. 
107
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provisions as they were treated as being within the 
telecommunications sector and therefore subjected to the 
Telecommunications Act 1950.
111
 The legal position remained the 
same for more than 20 years until the first private station was 
introduced in 1984. Consequently, the Broadcasting Act 1988
112
 was 
enacted to enable the government to retain control over commercial 
stations and regulate content broadcast by these channels via the 
licensing mechanism.
113
 Nevertheless, the convergence of 
communications, broadcasting and information technology has 
rendered the Broadcasting Act 1988 and the Telecommunications Act 
1950 ineffective and as a result, these statutes were repealed and 
replaced by the Communications and Multimedia Act 1988. 
5.4.3 The Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 
The Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (CMA) was 
specifically enacted to cater for convergence among different 
industries that were previously regulated by separate statutes. The 
broadcasting and telecommunications industries were governed by the 
Broadcasting Act 1988 and the Telecommunications Act 1950 
respectively whilst the information technology was very much 
unregulated as it was not subjected to any licensing system.
114
 With 
the passage of the CMA, these distinct industries are now being 
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grouped as a new ‘communications and multimedia industry’
115
 and 
subjected to a single regulatory framework under the CMA. In 
overseeing the operation of the converging industry, the government 
has established a new state regulator, the Malaysian Communications 
and Multimedia Commission.  
5.4.3.1 Malaysian Communications and Multimedia 
Commission  
The Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission 
(Commission) was established as a body corporate by the Malaysian 
Communications and Multimedia Commission Act 1998 
(MCMCA).
116
 The Commission is a single regulator entrusted to 
regulate and supervise the communications and multimedia industry
117
 
as well as other services which come within the ambit of the Postal 
Services Act 1991 and the Digital Signature Act 1997.
118
 As such, the 
Commission is regarded as a ‘super regulator’ for all types of media 
but the print industry, which is still subjected to the provisions of the 
PPA. 
The Commission is composed of a chairman, representatives from the 
government and other non-government members
119
 who are appointed 
by the Minister.
120
 It is empowered to establish and administer its own 
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staff recruitment policy
121
 and sources of fund.
122
 The Commission is 
vested with extensive powers as stipulated in Part V of the CMA and 
Part III of the MCMCA. It is authorised to issue directions to licensee 
relating to non-compliance of licence conditions
123
 and to make 
determinations on matters specified in the CMA.
124





 gather information 
relevant to the performance of its functions,
127
 resolve disputes 
between conflicting parties
128
 and draw up voluntary industry codes of 
conduct.
129
 Further, the Commission is entrusted to advise the 
Minister on all matters relating to the national policy objectives for the 
converged industry,
130
 to administer application and renewal process 
of licences under the CMA and to make recommendations to the 
Minister regarding the application and renewal of such licences.
131
 
The establishment and provision of those powers on the Commission 
indicates the government’s effort of promoting transparency in 
regulating the broadcasting media. This is due to the fact that prior to 
the existence of the Commission, all matters related to broadcasting 
industry were determined and regulated solely by the Minister 
pursuant to the provisions of the old Broadcasting Act 1998.
132
 
Undoubtedly, this was an unhealthy arrangement as there would be no 
check and balance on the exercise of such wide powers by the 
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Minister. As such, it is submitted that the regulatory system of the 
broadcast media, which is placed under the purview of the 
Commission, differs significantly from the previous regime as it 
strives to offer transparency, efficiency and less government control 
over communications and multimedia industry. In relation to this, it 
has been claimed that the Commission must be kept free from 
unnecessary government interferences in order to preserve its position 
as an independent regulatory body.
133
 
5.4.3.2 The Licensing System of the Broadcast Media 
The regulatory system for the communications and multimedia 
industry has also affected the licensing system of the broadcast media. 
The CMA employs a non-specific set of statutory provisions based on 
generic definitions of activities and services. Instead of the former 
familiar words such as ‘broadcast, television and radio’, new phrases 
of ‘network facilities’, ‘network services’, ‘application services’ and 
‘content application services’ were used in the CMA. These 
provisions are specifically formulated to be technology and service 
neutral covering all areas of convergence and future changes. It has 




The CMA recognises only four categories of licensable activities; 
network facilities providers, network services providers, applications 
service providers and content applications service providers. Thus, 
broadcast media need to be licensed within these newly created 
groups. Based on the interpretations and the Commission’s website,
135
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the broadcast media are considered to fall within the scope of content 
applications services. Content applications services are defined in 
section 6 as ‘an applications service that provides content’. 
Applications service refers to ‘a service provided by means of, but not 
solely by means of, one or more network services’, and the word 
content means ‘any sound, text, still picture, moving picture or other 
audio-visual representation, tactile representation or any combination 
of the preceding which is capable of being created, manipulated, 
stored, retrieved or communicated electronically’. It is submitted that 
the phrase ‘content applications services’, which is very loosely 
defined, will cover a wide range of broadcasting services including 
terrestrial, satellite, cable as well as online publications. 
Apart from the classification of the licensable activities, licences 
issued under the CMA are further divided into two; individual and 
class licence.  The former refers to ‘a licence for a specified person to 
conduct a specified activity and may include conditions to which the 
conduct of that activity shall be subject’ whilst the latter means ‘a 
licence for any or all persons to conduct a specified activity and may 
include conditions to which the conduct of that activity shall be 
subject’.
136
 The difference is not clearly articulated but the 
Commission’s website provides useful assistance in distinguishing 
between individual and class licence. An individual licence is 
described as a type of licence granted for activities that require a high 
degree of regulatory control, whilst class licence is a light-handed 
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With regard to the broadcast media, which are regarded to have 
widespread coverage and great influence over the public, they require 
a high degree of control and thus need to be licensed as content 
applications service provider individual licensees.
138
 It is also stated in 
Regulation 22 of the Communications and Multimedia (Licensing) 
Regulations 2000 that such a licence may be granted to those who 
provide satellite broadcasting, subscription broadcasting, terrestrial 
free to air TV, terrestrial radio broadcasting, or other content 
applications services which are not exempt under the CMA or not 
subject to a class licence under Part IV of these Regulations. 
Nonetheless, the licence cannot be conferred on a foreign company, an 
individual or a sole proprietorship, a partnership and other classes of 
persons as decided by the Minister to be ineligible to apply for an 
individual licence.
139
 Apart from these groups of persons, any 
potential broadcasters need to possess individual licence for content 
applications service provider and failure to do so will expose them to a 
fine not exceeding RM500,000 or five years’ imprisonment or both.
140
 
Application for such a licence must be made in writing to the 
Commission
141
 and it is then obliged to process the application and 
make a written recommendation to Minister within 60 days of the 
                                                 
137
 See the MCMC’s website on categories of licensable activities and types of 
licences at <www.skmm.gov.my/index.php?c=public&v=art_view&art_id=76>  
[accessed 14 November 2011]. 
138
 The list of content applications service provider individual licensee as at 30 June 
2011 is available at <www.skmm.gov.my/attachment/Statistics/Q2_2011_Eng.pdf> 
[accessed 15 November 2011]. 
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receipt of complete information.
142
 If the Minister agrees with the 
recommendation, he will grant the licence and the Commission will 
notify the applicant by written notice.
143
 And if the Minister rejects the 
application, the applicant will also be notified of the refusal in writing 
and the reasons for the refusals.
144
 In case no feedback is received 
from the Minister within 30 days from the receipt of the 
Commission’s recommendation, the application is deemed to be 
rejected.
145
 Further, the Minister is empowered to suspend or cancel 




The CMA also contains a chapter (Chapter 13) that provides review 
mechanisms to any aggrieved parties. The parties are even permitted 
to apply for judicial review of any decision either made by the 
Commission or the Minister once other remedies under the CMA have 
been exhausted.
147
 As such, it is obvious that the licensing system of 
the broadcast media administered by the Commission under the CMA 
offers greater transparency and fairness compared to the regulatory 
regime of the print industry that is fully entrusted and administered by 
the Minister alone. 
5.4.4 Application of the Broadcast Regulatory System to 
Political Blogs 
The regulatory regime of the converged industry has classified the 
broadcast media as content applications service providers and 
accordingly they are obliged to procure individual licences under the 
CMA. Interestingly, the phrase ‘content applications service’ is given 
                                                 
142
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143
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144
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145
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146
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147
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a very wide statutory interpretation so as to encompass all types of 
broadcasting services and online publications including political 
blogs. Thus, the regulatory system of the broadcast media can possibly 
be applied to political blogs and consequently bloggers may be 
mandated to possess either individual or class licences as the CMA 
prohibits any persons from providing content applications service 
unless with a valid licence.
148
  
The licensing requirements must be read together with the 
Communications and Multimedia (Licensing) Regulations 2000. 
Regulation 22 provides that a content applications service providers’ 
individual licence is available to providers of broadcasting services or 
other content applications services which are not exempted (closed 
content, incidental content or limited content)
149
 or not subject to a 
class licence. With regard to class licences, regulation 31 states that 
such a licence is applicable to providers of content which is limited in 
its availability, or of limited appeal or targeted at a special interest 
group and only available through subscription, or remotely generated 
and distributed through a network service and displayed on a screen, 
or content for distance learning or content for one-off event. Political 
blogs qualify to apply for an individual licence as they do not fall 
within the exemptions and do not fit within class licence.  
Nonetheless, regulation 5 provides that an individual licence shall 
only be granted to a local corporate entity established under the 
Companies Act 1965 and not individuals or unincorporated bodies or 
groups. Since political blogs are largely operated by individuals or 
groups that are not registered as a corporate body, they are clearly 
                                                 
148
 Section 205(1) provides ‘Subject to such exemptions as may be determined by 
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ineligible to apply for individual licences under the CMA. Further, 
order 6 of the Communications and Multimedia (Licensing) 
(Exemption) Order 2000 stipulates that providers of Internet content 
applications services are exempted from having individual or class 
licences. In short, it is submitted that the regulatory regime of the 
broadcast media in Malaysia will not be applicable to political blogs. 
5.5 Internet Industry 
5.5.1 Overview of the Internet Industry in Malaysia 
The Malaysian community first experienced the Internet when the 
Malaysian Institute of Microelectronic Systems (MIMOS) launched 
the country’s first ISP, the Joint Advance Research Integrated 
Networking System (JARING), in 1992.
150
 Later, a range of policies 





 were developed to exploit the economic 
potential of the Internet and to bolster its take-up by the public.
153
 At 
present, the usage of the Internet in Malaysia has soared tremendously 
with the latest report indicates that the Internet usage has reached 
60.7% out of the total population at mid-year 2012
154
 compared to 
merely 28 subscribers when JARING was commercialised in 1992.
155
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The Internet has had a great impact on the country, particularly in the 
dissemination of information and news to the public. Although the 
claim that the Internet is an inherently democratizing force was 
rejected,
156
 it is generally accepted that the Internet posed an 
automatic threat to the ruling government.
157
 This can be seen in the 
shock dismissal of Anwar Ibrahim as the Deputy Prime Minister and 
his antagonistic arrest by the police in September 1998 that led to the 
explosion of anti-establishment activities on the Internet.
158
 Numerous 
websites such as Sang Kancil, Anwar, Voice of Freedom, Where Is 
Justice,
 159
 and other online discussion groups were created to provide 
updates and fill the void in information since the traditional media 
have provided insufficient or no coverage of these incidents.
160
  
This scenario is not unexpected as the Internet has altered the media 
landscape by shifting the power to publish to the new media.
161
 The 
Internet has enabled the previously marginalised groups,
162
 including 
the opposition parties and civil groups, to engage and compete with 
the mainstream media and even the government. Further, coverage on 
controversial issues, particularly relating to political economy or 
ethnic politics, that appears on web based communications such as 
online news portals and political blogs also differs greatly from the 
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2011]. 
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traditional media.
163
 Consequently, the Internet has become a viable 
alternative source of information and news, and ‘considerably more 
hospitable to contentious journalism’
164
 since it is the only avenue 
which is not susceptible to the government’s prior restraints.  
Unfortunately, the Internet has been misused to channel hatred and 
spread lies, particularly against the government and the cabinet 
ministers from the ruling party. Thereafter, a series of legal actions, 
including the blocking of access to certain blogs and websites, have 
been initiated to tackle the alleged ‘misuse’ of the Internet.
165
 As such, 
the regulatory regime governing the Internet needs to be critically 
examined in order to ascertain the legal position of the Internet and 
other online publications, including political blogs in Malaysia. 
5.5.2 The Internet Governance in Malaysia 
5.5.2.1 The Licensing of the Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) 
Prior to the coming into force of the CMA, the Internet industry was 
basically unregulated. The ISPs were not required to possess licences 
arguably because MIMOS that operated the only ISP at that time, 
JARING, was a unit under the Prime Minister’s Department.
166
 The 
government could then exert direct control over the Internet without 
any specific regulations. The position has later changed when the 
second ISP, TM Net, was offered by the private sector in 1996. 
Subsequently, the CMA was passed in 1998 to regulate the converged 
communications and multimedia industry including the Internet. 
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The CMA requires owners or providers of network facilities, network 
services and application services to possess valid licences to own or 
operate such facilities and services.
167
 Though licensing for the 
Internet is not specifically mentioned, regulation 30 of the 
Communications and Multimedia (Licensing) Regulations 2000 
stipulates that providers of Internet access services
168
 are to be 
registered as applications service provider class licensees.
169
 Thus, the 
ISPs that provide access to the Internet are no longer left unregulated 
as they are now required to possess applications service provider class 
license under the CMA. 
5.5.2.2 No Censorship of the Internet Policy 
Apart from the licensing requirement for the ISPs, regulations for the 
Internet appears to be minimal compared to the traditional print and 
broadcast media.
170
 This is due to the promise of the no censorship on 
the Internet that was first announced by the former Prime Minister 
when he promoted the MSC Malaysia overseas.
171
 The pledge was 
then incorporated into the MSC Malaysia Bill of Guarantees (Bill of 
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Guarantees)
172
 and the CMA.
173
 Despite the fact that cyber threats 
have been on the rise,
174
 the government has maintained its 
commitment towards the no censorship guarantee.
175
 The policy was 
part of the country’s marketing effort to attract foreign investors to the 
MSC Malaysia
176
 and to address the scepticism of investors and 
competition for investment from Singapore or other high-tech 
ventures in the Southeast Asia.
177
 In relation to this, it is submitted 
that the Internet’s perceived economic value has resulted in the 
government to adopt the ‘no censorship’ policy and disregard its strict 
regulatory controls that have been applied to regulate the traditional 
print and broadcast media in the country. 
The existence of the no censorship policy has led to a speculative 
assertion that the Internet in Malaysia should be free from any 
shackles of rules and regulations.
178
 The assumption is obviously 
unsubstantiated because the interpretation accompanying the Bill of 
Guarantees
179
 provides that the government does not distinguish 
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between content published in the online and offline world.
180
 Further, 
section 3(3), which incorporates the no censorship policy, does not 
prevent the imposition of any laws including defamation, sedition and 
even the provisions of the CMA on online content post-
publications.
181
 Therefore, it is wrong to regard the Internet as a legal 
vacuum merely with the existence of the no censorship guarantee 
because the government has been permitted to take appropriate actions 
against the illegal use of the Internet. 
This would be best illustrated with a long list of criminal charges that 
have been initiated by the government commencing with the arrest of 
four persons in 1998 for spreading rumours on the Internet about 
knife-wielding Indonesians rioting in Kuala Lumpur.
182
 Over the 
years, several other Internet users were charged mostly under 
defamation and sedition.
183
 It was however alleged that though 
traditional laws may be used to govern the Internet, it would be 
preferable to charge those culprits under the provisions of the 
Malaysian cyber laws, namely the Computer Crimes Act 1997, the 
Digital Signature Act 1997 and the Telemedicine Act 1997, as well as 
the CMA because these statutes were specifically enacted to handle 
issues emerging in the cyberspace.
184
 
In short, the no censorship policy on the Internet in Malaysia signifies 
the government’s pledge that the online environment is generally 
protected from prior interference by the state. Such a guarantee is very 
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significant looking from the context of statutory restraints that 
mandate the print and broadcast media to procure permits and licences 
before publications.
185
 As such, the promise of no censorship is very 
critical as it excludes publications on the Internet from the 
requirement of permits and licences.
186
 Nonetheless, the no censorship 
guarantee does not render the cyber world a legal vacuum as it is 
generally accepted that what is illegal offline is also illegal online. 
Therefore, existing laws such as the Sedition Act 1948, the 
Defamation Act 1957 as well as the Penal Code could be applied to 
unlawful publications on the Internet. In addition, the CMA, which 
provides the no censorship policy, also lays down certain provisions 
on the regulation of the online content.  
5.5.2.3 Regulation of the Online Content 
Content published in the cyber world is bound by the provisions of the 
CMA. Section 6 defines the word ‘content’ as ‘any sound, text, still 
picture, moving picture or other audio-visual representation, tactile 
representation or any combination of the preceding which is capable 
of being created, manipulated, stored, retrieved or communicated 
electronically’.  The definition is all-inclusive to cover any materials 
published electronically either via the Internet or the broadcast media. 
Section 211(1) provides that it is a criminal offence to provide online 
content which is ‘indecent, obscene, false, menacing or offensive 
content with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass any person’. 
Such offence carries a maximum fine of RM50,000 or one year 
imprisonment or both.
187
 Improper use of network facilities, network 
services or applications service to transmit illegal content is also not 
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permitted. Section 233(1) states that the use of any facilities or 
services to transmit content which is ‘obscene, indecent, false, 
menacing or offensive in character with intent to annoy, abuse, 
threaten or harass another’ would amount to a criminal offence which 
carries a fine not exceeding RM50,000 or one year imprisonment or 
both.
188
 It is argued that these provisions, which prohibit provision of 
illegal content and improper use of the Internet, are not contrary to the 
guarantee of no censorship on the Internet. 
There is however uncertainty pertaining to blocking of access to the 
Internet as this may lead to violation of the no censorship policy. The 
most infamous censorship of political blogs occurred in August 2008 
when all local ISPs were instructed by the Commission to block 
access to Malaysia Today.
189
 It was alleged that the blog had been 
censored because its editors continuously ignored the government’s 
warnings of not publishing defamatory statements.
190
 The incident has 
raised fierce criticisms from the blogging community, politicians, civil 
rights groups and many others.
191
 However, the Home Minister 
claimed that the Commission was permitted to issue the censorship 
order as the blog contained prohibited content.
192
 This is pursuant to 
section 263(1) that requires licensees, including the ISPs, to prevent 
their facilities from being used in the commission of any offence. It is 
further stipulated that upon written request from the Commission or 
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other authority, the ISPs shall provide assistance in deterring the 
occurrence or future commission of such offence.
193
  
Nonetheless, it is argued that instead of cutting of access to the blogs, 
it would be more effective if the blog owners were to be charged 
either under section 211 or section 233 of the CMA in order to avoid 
potential breach of the no censorship policy. Apart from that, the 
efficacy of filtering by the ISPs is also in doubt as mirror sites or other 
technical measures can be easily established to circumvent the ban. 
Hence, it is submitted that though the blocking of access has been 
adopted on several occassions, such action should only be resorted to 
handle evidently undisputed and appropriate cases such as copyright 
infringement and child pornography. 
Apart from the statutory measures, the CMA has also advocated the 
industry players to adopt a self-regulatory approach in governing the 
online content with the application of the Malaysian Communications 
& Multimedia Content Code (Content Code).
194
 The Content Code 
was formulated by the Communications & Multimedia Content Forum 
of Malaysia (Content Forum), an industry body designated to be a 
content forum by the Commission and to self-regulate online content 
and related issues.
195
 Compliance with the Content Code is voluntary 
but it shall be a defence against legal actions under the CMA.
196
 
In general, the Content Code sets out guidelines and procedures for 
the dissemination of materials which are regarded as ‘indecent 
content, obscene content, violence, menacing content, bad language, 
false content, children’s content, family values and persons with 
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special needs’.
197
 The Content Code also contains specific guidelines 
for providers and access providers to online content including Internet 
access service providers, Internet content hosts, online content 
developers, online content aggregators and link providers.
198
 It was 
alleged that the scope of the Content Code is quite narrow as it does 
not cover other areas such as defamation and sedition.
199
 Interestingly, 
the proclaimed ‘self-regulatory’ style of the online content is also 
supported by fall-back provisions administered by the Commission.
200
 
For this reason, it is argued that the regulatory regime should be 
properly termed as co-regulation instead of self-regulation. 
5.5.3 Application of the Internet Regulatory Regime to 
Political Blogs 
The CMA and the Communications and Multimedia (Licensing) 
Regulations 2000 have introduced the licensing system for the Internet 
industry as it mandated providers of applications service,
201
 including 
the ISPs, to possess class licences under the CMA.
202
 Nonetheless, 
political blogs and other online publications do not fall within the 
meaning of applications service
203
 and accordingly they will not be 
obliged to possess such licences. Section 6 renders political blogs to 
be included within the scope of content applications service,
204
 but 
bloggers do not have to apply for licences because providers of 
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Internet content applications services are excluded by the 
Communications and Multimedia (Licensing) (Exemption) Order 
2000.
205
 Further, the government has provided that it has no intention 
to issue licence for blogging activities or to set up a special body to 
supervise irresponsible blogging.
206
 Thus, political blogs and other 
online services are basically free to publish content without the need 
to procure any licences, and arguably this appears to be in parallel 
with the no censorship of the Internet policy in the CMA and the Bill 
of Guarantees.  
However, the absence of licensing requirements does not absolve 
political blogs and online publications from legal liabilities. Though 
political blogs are exempted from having content applications service 
licences, they are still subjected to the content regulations in the 
CMA. Section 211(1) prohibits political blogs and other online 
platforms from publishing indecent, obscene, false, menacing or 
offensive content with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass any 
person. Further, political blogs are not permitted to use the ISPs to 
transmit illegal content. Section 233(1) prevents the ISPs from being 
used to transmit content that is obscene, indecent, false, menacing or 
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207
 On conviction, sections 211(2) and 233(3) of the CMA provide that the offenders 
will be exposed to a maximum fine of RM50,000 or imprisonment not more than 
one year or both. 
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The efficacy of section 211 has yet to be tested in courts, but section 
233 has been invoked for the first time in 2009 against six people, 
who posted offensive comments towards the King of Perak in several 
blogs that were linked to the King’s official website or to the Perak 
state government website.
208
 The comments were made following the 
political crisis in Perak that caused the collapse of the Pakatan 
Rakyat-led government.
209
 The King then ordered the Chief Minister 
from the ousted Pakatan Rakyat to make way for an assemblyman 
from Barisan Nasional, the ruling party at the federal level.
210
 One of 
the accused pleaded guilty to the charge and was fined RM 10,000 or 
in default five months jail, whilst the others pleaded not guilty and 
claimed trial.
211
 Recently, criminal charges for improper use of 
network facilities or network service have also been brought against 
Facebook
212
 and Twitter users.
213
 
As to the application of the Content Code to political blogs, some 
argued that the position is still unclear as the provision of personal 
content is not included within the interpretation of applications service 
                                                 
208
 Lourders Charles, ‘Six to Be Charged for Insulting Perak Sultan via Blogs, 
Postings (Update 2)’ The Star Online (Kuala Lumpur, 12 March 2009) 
<http://www.thestar.com.my/story/?file=%2F2009%2F3%2F12%2Fnation%2F2009
0312194041> [accessed 8 February 2015]. 
209
 Further details, see ‘Chronology of Events of the Perak’s Political Crisis’ 
<http://www.malaysia-today.net/chronology-of-events-of-the-peraks-political-




 ‘Six Charged for Insulting Perak Sultan, One Fined RM10,000’ The Sundaily 
(Kuala Lumpur, 14 March 2009) <http://www.thesundaily.my/node/157949> 
[accessed 8 February 2015]. 
212
 A man pleaded guilty to making offensive comments on his Facebook account 
disparaging Muslim and the Prophet Muhammad. See Hidir Reduan, ‘FB User 
Jailed for Posting Offensive Hari Raya Greeting’ NST Online (Kuala Lumpur, 9 
September 2014) <http://www.nst.com.my/node/31563> [accessed 8 February 
2015]. 
213
 A Twitter user was charged under section 233 of the CMA for likening the 
Inspector-General of Police to Hitler. For details, see Pathma Subramaniam, 
‘Twitter User Charged with Provocation for Likening IGP to Nazi’s Himmler’ The 
Malay Mail Online (Kuala Lumpur, 15 September 2014) 
<http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/twitter-user-charged-with-
provocation-for-likening-igp-to-nazis-himmler> [accessed 8 February 2015]. 
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provider.
214
 Nonetheless, it is submitted that though political blogs 
contain personal content of bloggers, blog entries are freely accessible 
to the public and they should not be treated similar to ordinary private 
and / or personal electronic mail. Alternatively, if political blogs do 
not fall within the interpretation of applications service provider, they 
could be regarded as content application service provider
215
 under the 
Content Code. Further, political blogs could also be included within 
the scope of ‘code subjects’ as they are ‘providers of online content or 
those who provide access to online content’ within Part 5 of the 
Content Code. Thus, it is argued that the Content Code is and should 
be available to political blogs and other online publications as its 
provisions are specially designed to voluntarily prevent publication of 
content that is ‘indecent, obscene, false, menacing or offensive in 
character with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass any person’. 
5.6 Conclusion 
To sum up, comprehensive analysis of the existing regulatory systems, 
which are currently being applied to regulate the traditional print and 
broadcast media as well as the Internet industry in Malaysia, clearly 
indicates that at present political blogs and other online publications 
are not bound by any specific statutory controls. Even though there is 
a slight possibility of extending the regulatory regime of the print 
media to the online publications, it is very much unlikely that the 
statutory requirement of permit and licence under the PPA would be 
applied to the Internet as such prior constraints would definitely 
amount to an express violation of the government’s no censorship 
                                                 
214
 Azmi, ‘Legal and Ethical Issues in Knowledge Management in Malaysia’ (n 165) 
69. 
215
 Item 5.0 of Part 1 of the Content Code defines ‘content application service 
provider’ as ‘a person who provides a content application service. Examples of 
content applications services include:- i) Direct To Home (DTH) subscription 
broadcasting, whether via satellite or cable; ii) Terrestrial Free-to-Air TV and Radio; 
and iii) Internet Web casting and Streaming Videos.’ 
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policy on the Internet. In relation thereof, it has been alleged that the 
existing regulatory framework of the traditional and new media is still 




Several recommendations have been proposed including the 
enactment of a code of ethics that specifies rights, duties and liabilities 
of bloggers; compulsory registration for all bloggers with the 
government registry;
217
 and classification of bloggers into 
professionals or non-professionals.
218
 Regardless of these 
propositions, it is submitted that the statutory provisions of the CMA 
and the industry’s Content Code, which are specifically enacted to 
regulate the communications and multimedia industry, are more than 
adequate to tackle issues related with political blogs and other web-
based communications. Further, there also exists a long list of general 
laws such as defamation and sedition that could equally be applied to 
govern political blogs in the country. Thus, it is submitted that such 
proposals are plainly unnecessary and may be prejudicial to the 
development of the communications and multimedia industry in 
Malaysia. 
                                                 
216
 Aishath Muneeza, ‘The Milestone of Blogs and Bloggers in Malaysia’ (2010) 3 




 ‘Zam: Classify Bloggers’, The Star Online (Kuala Lumpur, 6 May 2007), 
<http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2007/5/6/nation/17648170&sec=nation
>  [accessed 12 September 2009]. 
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The evolution of the Web 2.0,
1
 commonly referred to as the ‘new’ 





 Its emergence through a variety of platforms 
including blogs, wikis, social networking sites and other user 
generated media sites has expanded the range of new media services.
4
 
Though the availability of vast arrays of new media services are 
expected not to replace but simply to complement and coexist 
alongside with the traditional media,
5
 this development will 
undoubtedly pose serious challenges to the existing regulatory bodies 
and regulations of the media industry in the UK.  
Unlike the traditional media, which are currently governed either by 
the industry, the state or both, the new media particularly blogs are 
merely subjected to general laws. This raises a cause for concern as 
convergence and digital technology have enabled the traditional media 
to emulate and establish their presence in the blogosphere as well, and 
                                                 
1
 The term was first used by Dale Dougherty of O’ Reilly Media Inc. in 2004. Paul 
Anderson, What is Web 2.0? Ideas, Technologies and Implications for Education, 
Joint Information Systems Committee (JISC), 2007, 
<www.jisc.ac.uk/media/documents/techwatch/tsw0701b.pdf> [accessed 20 January 
2011]. 
2
 There is no specific definition of UGC but it is generally understood to cover 
content that is put online by users, regardless of whether the content is created by the 
users or not. Katrien Lefever and Evi Werkers, ‘Digital Sports Content: The Rise of 
New Media Players and the Legal Consequences in Terms of Obligations and 
Liability Risk’ (2010) 21(6) Ent LR 215, 218. 
3
 Peggy Valcke and Marieke Lenaerts, ‘Who’s Author, Editor and Publisher in User-
Generated Content? Applying Traditional Media Concepts to UGC - Providers’ 
(2010) 24(1) IRLCT 119. 
4
 New media services is regarded to be synonymous with ‘Information Society 
Services’ which is defined in section 2(1) of the Electronic Commerce (EC 
Directive) Regulations 2002 as ‘any service normally provided for remuneration, at 
a distance, by means of electronic equipment for the processing (including digital 
compression) and storage of data, and at the individual request of a recipient of a 
service’. See Tarlach McGonagle, ‘Does the Existing Regulatory Framework for 
Television Apply to the New Media?’ [2001] Iris PLUS, European Audiovisual 
Observatory 3. <http://dare.uva.nl/record/93782> [accessed 29 November 2010]. 
5
 Mike Feintuck and Mike Varney, Media Regulation, Public Interest and the Law 
(2nd ed, Edinburgh University Press 2006) 3. 
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these blogs, which are associated with the traditional media, are 
currently being governed by different regulatory bodies. As such, this 
part of the thesis seeks to analyse the existing specific media laws and 
the regulatory bodies for the printing, broadcasting, on-demand and 
the Internet industries and to evaluate the possibility of applying any 
of these legal regimes to political blogs.  
6.2 Print Industry 
6.2.1 Overview of the Regulatory System of the Print 
Industry 
The print industry in the UK has been subjected to self-regulatory 
system since the establishment of the Press Council in 1953.
6
 The 
Press Council however failed to perform its functions, particularly in 
handling privacy issues,
7
 and was largely perceived to have ‘reached a 
state of terminal discredit’.
8
 As a result, the Report of the Calcutt 
Committee in 1990 recommended the Press Council to be replaced 
with a statutory tribunal, but a last opportunity was given to industry 
to set up a self-regulatory body.
9
 Subsequently, the Press Complaints 
Commission (the PCC) was established ‘with almost indecent haste’
10
 
a year later to convince the government that the industry could 
regulate itself without resorting to any form of statutory body.
11
 Since 
then, the self-regulatory system administered by the PCC continued to 
be in operation though it had over the years been subjected to 
                                                 
6
 For chronological events on press regulation in the UK, see Culture, Media and 
Sport Committee, Privacy and Media Intrusion, (HC 2002-03, 458-I). 
7
 Damian Tambini, Danilo Leonardi and Chris Marsden, Codifying Cyberspace: 
Communications Self-Regulation in the Age of Internet Convergence (Routledge 
2008) 66. 
8
 Richard Shannon, A Press Free and Responsible: Self-Regulation and the Press 
Complaints Commission, 1991-2001 (John Murray 2001) 2. 
9
 Committee on Privacy and Related Matters, Report of the Committee on Privacy 
and Related Matters (Cm 1102, 1990) para 10. 
10
 Colin Munro, ‘Self-Regulation in the Media’ (1997) Spring PL 6, 6. 
11
 Geoffrey Robertson and Andrew Nicol, Media Law (5th ed, Penguin 2008) 757. 
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numerous criticisms, particularly the call for its abolition that was 
made within two years of its inception.
12
  
After more than 20 years in operation, the efficacy of the PCC has 
been seriously questioned following the hacking scandal at the News 
of the World.
13
 This has prompted the setting-up of the Leveson 
Inquiry to investigate the culture, practices and ethics of the press.
14
 
On 29 November 2012, the Leveson Inquiry published its findings and 
recommendations including the proposal for the establishment of a 
‘genuinely independent and effective system of self-regulation’ that 
would safeguard the interest of the public and the press industry.
15
 It 
was further emphasised that legislation should underpin the new 
system of press-regulation.
16
 In response to the Leveson Report, the 
PCC Chairman admitted that there is a need for a new regulator with 
effective sanctions and ‘teeth’, and independent from the industry and 
the government, but without statutory regulations.
17
 This has led to the 
establishment of the Independent Press Standards Organisation 
(IPSO), which was launched on 8 September 2014 as a new press self-
regulatory body to replace the PCC. 
 
                                                 
12
 Department of National Heritage, Review of Press Self-Regulation (Cm 2135, 
1993) ch 5. 
13
 For chronological occurrence of the hacking scandal, see 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-14124020> [accessed 7 January 2015]. 
14
 The Leveson Inquiry was chaired by Lord Justice Leveson with a panel of six 
independent assessors. For details, see <http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk> 
[accessed 12 January 2015]. 
15
 Lord Justice Leveson, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the 
Press: Executive Summary and Recommendations (HC 779, 2012) para 51. 
16
 ibid para 70. 
17
 The press statement of the last PCC Chairman, Lord Hunt of Wirral, is available at 
<http://www.pcc.org.uk/assets/111/Letter_to_Media_Standards_Trust_28_Feb.pdf> 
[accessed 7 January 2015]. 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 6: Specific Regulatory Regime of the Media in the United 
Kingdom 
189 
6.2.2 Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) 
The new self-regulatory system of the press is administered by IPSO, 
although in practice the whole system is not entirely dependent on 
IPSO alone.
18
 There are a number of distinct bodies that have been 
specifically established to ensure the smooth running of the system 
particularly the Editor’s Code of Practice Committee (the Code 
Committee)
19
 and the Regulatory Funding Company (the RFC).
20
 
Nonetheless, IPSO plays a central role in overseeing the smooth 
running of the system and therefore it is pertinent to discuss IPSO in 
details. 
6.2.2.1 IPSO’s Remit 
The remit of IPSO is expressly stipulated in its Articles of Association 
(AOA) and Regulations.
21
 Article 7.1 of IPSO AOA
22
 states that IPSO 
shall regulate ‘editorial content included in a printed newspaper or 
magazine’ and ‘editorial content on electronic services operated by 
Regulated Entities
23
 such as websites and apps, including text, 
pictures, video, audio/visual and interactive content’. As such, all 
editorial materials published by member publishers, whether in print 
or online, shall be subject to IPSO’s regulation. Nonetheless, Article 
7.3 of IPSO AOA
24
 sets out certain exclusions to IPSO’s remit, 
including complaints about ‘user generated content’ posted on 
                                                 
18
 For details on IPSO, see <www.ipso.co.uk> [accessed 7 January 2015]. 
19
 The Code Committee is responsible for writing the Editor’s Code of Practice and 
it shall comprise both independent members and serving editors that are or could be 
regulated entities.  
20
 For more about the RFC, visit <www.regulatoryfunding.co.uk> [accessed 7 
January 2015]. 
21
 The documents are available 
<https://www.ipso.co.uk/assets/1/IPSO_Articles_of_Association.pdf> and 
<https://www.ipso.co.uk/assets/1/REGULATIONS__PDF_.PDF> [accessed 8 
January 2015]. 
22
 Similar provision on the remit of IPSO is contained in IPSO Regulation 1. 
23
 The phrase ‘regulated entities’ is defined in the Schedule to IPSO AOA to mean 
all publishers who have entered into the Scheme Membership Agreement and 
Regulated Entity refers to any one of them. 
24
 Similar exclusion clauses are stipulated in IPSO Regulation 3. 
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member publishers’ websites which has not been reviewed or 
moderated by them.
25
 Apart from that, complaints about online 
content that is not on member publishers’ website is also excluded 
form IPSO’s remit.
26
 This indicates the requirement of actual 
knowledge on the part of member publishers before they could be held 
accountable for any online third party content.  
The remit of IPSO appears to be similar to the remit of its predecessor, 
the PCC. The PCC’s remit, which was set by the Press Standards 
Board of Finance (PressBof), was initially applicable to editorial 
content of print publications only. Subsequently, the remit was 
extended in 1997 to online versions of the press that replicate the print 
form.
27
 Two years later, the PCC’s remit has again been amended to 
embrace freestanding or online-only publications provided that they 
are primarily based in the UK and subscribe to the Code and the 
PressBof.
28
 As such, it is obvious that IPSO’s remit is very much 
equivalent with the PCC as IPSO is expressly empowered to 
adjudicate complaints on edited materials published by member 
publishers regardless of whether the publications are in the traditional 
printed form or online version.  
6.2.2.2 The Editor’s Code of Practice (the Code) 
The Editor’s Code of Practice (the Code) remains central to the new 
self-regulatory regime of the print industry administered by IPSO. Its 
provisions have been adopted in total and without any changes by 
IPSO from the PCC’s most recent version. The Code is the principal 
                                                 
25
 IPSO AOA 7.3.6; IPSO Regulation 3.6. 
26
 IPSO AOA 7.3.7; IPSO Regulation 3.7. 
27
 PressBof, ‘PCC’s Remit Extended to Include Editorial Audio-visual Material on 
Newspaper and Magazine Websites’ 
<www.pcc.org.uk/news/index.html?article=NDMyMg==> [accessed 20 December 
2010]. 
28
 PressBof, ‘PCC’s Remit Extended to Include On-line Only Publications’, 
<www.pcc.org.uk/news/index.html?article=NjEwOQ==> [accessed 20 December 
2010]. 
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source in adjudicating complaints against the press. The Code is 
independently framed and revised by the industry through the Code 
Committee. As such, it is believed that editors and journalists will be 
more inclined to respect their own formulated Code.
29
 This can be 
supported by several reports showing that even after more than 20 
years the Code has been in operation, no editors have failed to publish 
adverse adjudications awarded against them.
30
 Further, non-
compliance with the Code is also prone to endanger the regulatory 
regime of the press as has been highlighted in McIntosh v Sunday 
World
31
 that self-regulation could work only by the voluntary 
participation of the industry.
32
  
The Code contains a preamble that expresses the ‘spirit of the Code’
33
 
and underlines the utmost responsibility of the press to balance the 
competing rights of individuals, especially privacy with freedom of 
expression. It is for the sake of maintaining the right to free speech 
that issues of taste and decency are not governed by the Code as these 
matters are highly subjective and cover a very broad range of readers’ 
tastes. It is to be noted that the Code neither replaces the law nor 
afford special protections to editors or journalists from civil or 
criminal liabilities.
34
 Though the Code is distinct from the law, its 
significance is duly recognised by statutes. This can be illustrated with 
the Data Protection Act 1998 that provides a defence for newspapers 
                                                 
29
 Eric Barendt and Lesley Hitchens, Media Law: Cases and Materials (Pearson 
Education 2000) 44. 
30
 Ian Beales, ‘The Editor’s Codebook’ 9. 
31
 Report No. 60 of 2002, see 
<www.pcc.org.uk/news/index.html?article=MjA4Ng==> [accessed 12 September 
2010]. 
32
 Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Press Standards, Privacy and Libel: 
Responses to the Committee’s Second Report of Session 2009-10 (HC 2010 – 11, 
351). 
33
 For more about the Code, visit <www.editorscode.org.uk> [accessed 8 January 
2015]. 
34
 Brid Jordan, ‘The Editors’ Codebook - The Second Edition’ (2009) 20(7) Ent LR 
249. 
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against action by the Information Commissioner and others if 
publication is in compliance with the Code.
35
 Similarly, the Human 
Rights Act 1998 requires courts to consider compliance with the Code 
in determining the defence on free speech.
36
 
6.2.2.3 IPSO’s Sanctions 
Unlike the PCC, which only had at its disposal publication of critical 
adjudication against newspapers or magazines that have breached the 
Code, IPSO is permitted to impose some other sanctions when a 
complaint is upheld by the Complaints Committee.
37
 However, despite 
the availability of these sanctions, it is claimed that the publicity from 
publishing adverse adjudication in full and with due prominence is a 
very influential ‘name and shame’
38
 sanction as no publishers would 
like to make known their errors. This is based on past year records 
from the PCC annual reviews that showed majority of complaints 
were settled amicably through conciliation and without formal 
adjudication.
39
 Due to this reason, Regulation 22 states that remedial 
actions shall include a requirement for member publishers to publish a 
correction or adjudication. It is further provided that IPSO has the 
power to determine the nature, extent and placement of corrections 
and adjudications as long as it acts proportionately and takes into 
consideration the nature of member publishers and their publications. 
                                                 
35
 Section 32 of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
36
 Section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
37
 The Complaints Committee has 12 members including the Chairman. A majority 
of the members are independent members (7), while the other members (5) represent 
the newspaper and magazine industry. Composition of the Complaints Committee is 
stated in Regulation 33 of IPSO Regulations. 
38
 Simon Sellars, ‘Online Privacy: Do We Have It and Do We Want It? A Review of 
the Risks and UK Case Law’ (2011) 33(1) EIPR 9, 14. 
39
 Numerous types of remedial actions have been offered to complainants including 
publication of an apology or correction, removal of offending material from the 
publications’ websites, publication of letters from the complainants and many 
others. For details see PCC Annual Reviews at 
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Such power has been exercised in Wilson v The Press Journal
40
 when 
the newspaper was ordered to publish its correction ‘in full, on page 3 
or further forward’ instead of page 5 or 6 as per the newspaper’s 
initial proposal. 
In addition, IPSO is now permitted to impose financial penalties or 
award monetary compensation to aggrieved complainants.
41
 Any fines 
or costs will be flexible in amount and will be determined in 
accordance with IPSO Financial Sanctions Guidance
42
 that is issued 
by the RFC.
43
 Paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 of IPSO Financial Sanctions 
Guidance provide that when a Standards Investigation has found 
member publishers to have committed a Systemic Failure,
44
 they may 
be imposed a fine of up to 1% of their annual turnover, but subject to 
the maximum of £1,000,000 for each Standards Investigation. IPSO 
may also require publishers to pay reasonable costs of a Standards 
Investigation.
45
 In relation to this, it is submitted that the introduction 
of monetary sanction is very much timely to address persistent critics 
that labelled IPSO’s predecessor, the PCC, as toothless and ineffective 
for its lack of power to impose fines. Further, this would be in parallel 
with the claim that the imposition of financial penalties is a vital 
balance as newspapers breach the Code for commercial gains in the 
form of readership ratings, advertising revenue and many others.
46
 
                                                 
40
 Decision of the Complaints Committee in Wilson v The Press Journal 0120-14.  
41
 Regulation 63.2 of IPSO Regulations. 
42
 IPSO Financial Sanctions Guide is designed to assist IPSO in imposing financial 
sanctions. Further details 
see<https://www.ipso.co.uk/assets/1/FINANCIAL_SANCTIONS_GUIDANCE__P
DF_.PDF> [accessed 8 January 2015]. 
43
 Regulations 64 and 65 of IPSO Regulations. 
44
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45
 Regulations 63.3 of IPSO Regulations. 
46
 Jonathan Coad, ‘The Press Complaints Commission - Some Myths about Self-
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6.2.3 Application of the Press Regulatory Regime to Blogs 
With the coming into operation of the new self-regulatory regime of 
the press administered by IPSO, only user generated content including 
blogs that appear on member publishers’ newspaper and magazine 
websites and has been reviewed and moderated by member publishers 
will be subjected to the self-regulation by IPSO.
47
 It is further clarified 
that IPSO will not be accountable for online material that is not on 
sites owned by or under the control of its member publishers.
48
 This 
would expressly exclude blog entries published by journalists in their 
personal blogs that are not associated with or under the control of 
member publishers. Similarly, any comments by readers, which have 
been posted on member publishers’ websites but have yet to be 
reviewed or moderated by them, will also be considered to fall outside 
of IPSO’s remit. Therefore, the key factor in determining the remit of 
IPSO is the existence of actual knowledge as well as the exercise of 
prior editorial control on any online materials. To sum up, it is 
submitted that apart from blog postings that are posted on member 
publishers’ online services and have been pre-moderated by their 
editors, it is very much unlikely for the new self-regulatory regime of 
the press administered by IPSO to be applicable to amateur blogs, 
which are largely published by individuals, or even personal blogs of 
their journalists that are not under the control and knowledge of 
IPSO’s member publishers. 
                                                 
47
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6.3 Broadcasting Industry 
6.3.1 Overview and Rationales for Strict Statutory 
Regulations 
The broadcasting industry in the UK has been made subject to 





 The introduction of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 
1904 and the subsequent conclusion of the Licence and Agreement 
between the Postmaster-General and the British Broadcasting 
Company
50
 on 18 January 1923,
51
 which had formally granted a single 
broadcasting licence to the BBC to broadcast ‘news, speeches, 
lectures, educational matter, weather reports, concerts and theatrical 
entertainment’,
52
 clearly showed that the government has always 
intended the broadcast media to be governed by special statutory 
regulations. In relation thereof, rationales for establishing specific 
statutory regulatory system for the broadcasting industry need to be 
scrutinised. 
The most common argument is the scarcity of spectrum that has in the 
past accorded strong weightage to the government to exert strict 
regulatory control. The situation has now changed with the availability 
of cable and satellite televisions, and modern shift towards digital 
technology have enabled broadcasting services to be transmitted over 
                                                 
49
 Ingrid Silver and Denton Wilde Sapte, ‘Content Regulation’ in Mike Conradi and 
Kemp Little (eds), Communications Law Handbook (Bloomsbury Professional 
2009) 125 – 128. 
50
 The British Broadcasting Company was formed on 18 October 1922 by a 
consortium of wireless manufacturers in the UK. It was later dissolved on 31 
December 1926 to make way for the establishment of a new public service 
corporation, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), on 1 January 1927. BBC is 
discussed in details in Part 6.3.2.2 of Chapter 6 below. 
51
 For full chronology, see Barrie MacDonald, Broadcasting in the United Kingdom: 
A Guide to Information Sources, Rev. 2nd ed (London: Mansell, 1994). 
52
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a variety of delivery services, other than the analogue terrestrial.
53
 
These technological advancements have resulted in less reliance on 
broadcast spectrum and consequently the government’s control over 
the broadcast media is increasingly becoming limited. Therefore, the 
scarcity rationale is no longer a strong justification for imposing 
specific regulatory control over the broadcast media. 
Another early justification for regulating broadcasting is that it was 
‘broad-casting to a universal audience, in terms of geographic reach 
and personal, and the audience has no effective control over the 
scheduling and content of the material received’.
54
 With their unique 
ability to select and thrust information to the audience, the broadcast 
media are capable of shaping and influencing the audiences’ views 
and opinions.
55
 For this reason, they are considered the most pervasive 
and influential medium of communications and should thus be made 
subject to special regulatory framework. 
Beside the scarcity of frequencies and the special impact theory, it is 
argued that specific broadcast regulation is necessary to preserve 
plurality and impartiality.
56
 Since the newer forms of communication 
infrastructures are largely owned and controlled by private media 
corporations, they appear to have absolute powers in pursuing their 
own agenda and limiting other dissenting views from being delivered 
in their programmes. Thus, such development poses serious threat to 
freedom of expression and therefore special regulations for the 
broadcast industry are crucial in guaranteeing diversity of programmes 
for the audience.  
                                                 
53
 Barendt and Hitchens, Media Law (n 29) 12 – 13. 
54
 Thomas Gibbons, Regulating the Media (2nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell 1998) 302. 
55
 Barendt and Hitchens, Media Law (n 29) 10 – 11 
56
 Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights 
Act (Oxford University Press 2006) 565. 
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6.3.2 Regulatory System of the UK Broadcast Media 
At present, the broadcast media in the UK are governed by two 
separate regulatory bodies namely Office of Communications 
(Ofcom) for commercial television and radio stations, and the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) for all BBC content whether 
transmitted over the television, radio or online. 
6.3.2.1 The Office of Communications (Ofcom) 
Ofcom was established as a body corporate by the Office of 
Communications Act 2002. It is regarded a ‘super-regulator’ for the 
UK communications industries covering television, radio, postal, 
telecommunications and wireless communications services.
57
 With 
regard to the Internet, Ofcom’s remit was initially not applicable to the 
online communications as it has been clearly stipulated in the 
Communications White Paper
58
 and the scope of the CA itself.
59
 
However, with the implementation of the Audiovisual Media Services 
Regulations 2009, Ofcom is now empowered to regulate television 
channels delivered over the Internet and notified on demand 
programme services (ODPS) where they are established in the UK.
60
 
Further, Ofcom has also certain functions under the Digital Economy 
Act 2010 in respect of ISPs and online copyright infringement.  
                                                 
57
 Due to the convergence of the broadcasting, telecommunications and computing 
industries, the government has preferred the establishment of a single regulator to 
oversee the converged sector. For detailed discussions see Barendt and Hitchens, 
Media Law (n 24) 310 – 318 
58
 Further details, see discussion at para 6.5.1 below on ‘Overview of the UK 
Internet Governance’. 
59
 Department of Trade and Industry and Department of Culture, Media and Sport, 
The Draft Communications Bill: The Policy. (Cm 5508-III, 2002) 48. 
60
 On demand industry is elaborated in details at para 6.4 below.  
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Ofcom is vested with extensive regulatory powers covering those that 
were inherited from five ‘legacy’ regulators
61
 that it replaced, powers 
that were previously exercised directly by the Secretary of State,
62
 and 
other powers that are specially conferred on Ofcom by a number of 
statutes including the Communications Act 2003 (CA), the Wireless 
Telegraphy Act 2006, the Broadcasting Acts 1990 and 1996, the 
Digital Economy Act 2010 and the Postal Services Act 2011. With 
these considerable powers, Ofcom is expected to perform a wide 
range of duties
63
 including licensing of television and radio services 
and establishing a broadcasting code for setting standards for content 
of all programmes transmitted in the broadcast media. 
6.3.2.2 The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is a body corporate that 
was firstly established by a Royal Charter granted on 20 December 
1926.
64
 Since then, a number of Royal Charters were granted to the 
BBC to preserve its status as a corporation. The latest Royal Charter 
was granted on 19 September 2006 (the current Royal Charter).
65
 The 
incorporation of the BBC by a Royal Charter enables the government 
to directly determine the BBC’s remit and duties without the need to 
legislate any statute through Parliament debate.
66
 
                                                 
61
 The five regulatory bodies are the Independent Television Commission (ITC), the 
Broadcasting Standards Commission (BSC), the Radio Authority, Oftel and the 
Radio Communications Agency.  
62
 Alex Haffner and Denton Wilde Sapte, ‘Powers and Duties’ in Mike Conradi and 
Kemp Little (eds), Communications Law Handbook (Bloomsbury Professional 
2009) 177. 
63
 It is reported that Ofcom has identified 263 duties to be performed under the CA.  
64
 By Letters made Patent under the Great Seal, the first Royal Charter was granted 
by His Majesty King George the Fifth on 20 December 1926 and this marks the 
incorporation date of the BBC as a public service broadcaster in the UK. 
65
 The current Royal Charter was granted by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the 
Second and it will be effective for the period of 10 years commencing from 1 
January 2007 until 31 December 2016. 
66
 Silver and Sapte, ‘Content Regulation’ (n 49) 136. 
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A Royal Charter is a constitutional basis that sets out the BBC’s 
objects and defines its constitution and governance. It stipulates the 
BBC’s main activities as to promote the BBC’s Public Purposes
67
 
through the provision of television, radio and online services and other 
related services that will inform, educate and entertain the people in 
the country.
68
 The independence of the BBC in relation to its content 
and management is also guaranteed by a Royal Charter.
69
 A Royal 
Charter is always accompanied by an Agreement made by a Deed 
between the BBC and the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and 
Sport. The present Agreement (the Framework Agreement)
70
 was laid 
in Parliament in July 2006 and came into force on 1 January 2007.
71
 It 
affirms the independence of the BBC as contained in the Royal 
Charter
72
 and provides details of the BBC’s role, rights and 
obligations as a public service broadcaster. 
The current Royal Charter and the Framework Agreement have also 
laid down functions that are expected to be performed by the BBC. 
These functions shall be performed by two separate bodies that 
comprise of the corporation; namely the BBC Trust and the Executive 
Board.
73
 The BBC Trust shall be the sovereign body
74
 within the BBC 
                                                 
67
 Article 4 of the Royal Charter provides that the six public purposes of the BBC 
are ‘sustaining citizenship and civil society; promoting education and learning; 
stimulating creativity and cultural excellence; representing the UK, its nations, 
regions and communities; bringing the UK to the world and the world to the UK; 
and in promoting its other purposes, helping to deliver to the public the benefit of 
emerging communications technologies and services and, in addition, taking a 
leading role in the switchover to digital television’. 
68
 Article 5(1) of the current Royal Charter. 
69
 Article 6(1) of the current Royal Charter provides that ‘The BBC shall be 
independent in all matters concerning the content of its output, the times and manner 
in which it is supplied, and in the management of its affairs’. 
70
 Clause 2 of the Framework Agreement expressly stipulates its status as 
‘Framework Agreement’ for BBC Charter purposes. 
71
 Clause 3(1) of the Framework Agreement. 
72
 Clause 4 of the Framework Agreement. 
73
 Article 8 of the current Royal Charter stipulates ‘…all the functions of the 
Corporation shall be exercised through either the Trust or the Board in accordance 
with the provisions set out in this Charter and any Framework Agreement…’. 
74
 Article 9 of the current Royal Charter. 
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and it is responsible to set the overall strategic direction of the BBC 
and to oversee the work of the Executive Board in the interest of 
licence fee payers.
75
 Meanwhile the Executive Board is entrusted to 
deliver the BBC’s services according to the priorities set by the BBC 
Trust and to conduct the operational management of the BBC (except 
the BBC Trust Unit).
76
 Nonetheless, despite the existence of close 
relationship between these two bodies, they should not act as a single 
corporate body and the BBC Trust is requested to keep its 
independence of the Executive Board.
77
 
6.3.2.3 Licensing of the Broadcast Media 
At present, the regulation of the broadcast media is specifically 
undertaken through the medium of licence. Thus, any would be 
broadcasters must possess a valid licence before they could broadcast 
their programmes to the public. The CA
78
 empowers Ofcom to 
regulate any public service and commercial broadcasters (excluding 
BBC) that operate terrestrial television channels (digital and analogue) 
and satellite and cable television services (which are called as 
‘television licensable content services’).
79
 In applying the licence, the 
broadcasters need to comply with a number of basic conditions and 
once all of these requirements are all met, Ofcom may only refuse to 
award the licence on very restricted grounds.
80
 The licence will last 
for 10 years but Ofcom may reduce or even revoke the licences if the 
                                                 
75
 Article 24 of the current Royal Charter provides detailed functions of the BBC 
Trust. 
76
 Article 38 of the current Royal Charter provides detailed functions of the 
Executive Board. 
77
 Articles 8 and 9 of the current Royal Charter. 
78
 Section 211 of the Communications Act 2003. 
79
 Sections 232 - 240 of the Communications Act 2003. 
80
 These include where Ofcom is satisfied that the applicant is not a fit and proper 
person to hold such licence under section 3(3)(a) of the Broadcasting Act 1990, 
there is likelihood that the applicant would breach restrictions under the 
Broadcasting Act 1990 or where the applicant is likely to contravene the Ofcom’s 
Broadcasting Code. 
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In addition, Ofcom is obliged by section 245 to regulate independent 
radio stations (not operated by BBC). Ofcom is not only responsible 
for licensing ‘independent radio services’ (which are referred to as 
sound broadcasting services, radio licensable content services and 
additional radio services)
82
 but it has to ensure that a variety of radio 
services are offered to cater wide different tastes of the radio listeners. 
As such, among the radio services granted licences by Ofcom, there is 
at least one service that predominantly consists of spoken words and 
one service that broadcasts ‘music other than pop music’, together 
with a range and diversity of local services.
83
 Ofcom may grant radio 
licences for up to 12 years to any persons that are satisfied to be ‘fit 
and proper’ but those who have been convicted of radio piracy and 
related offences in the preceding five years are not permitted to hold a 
radio licence.
84
 Similar to the television licences, Ofcom also has a 
wide range of sanctions to enforce any breaches of the licence 
conditions including the ultimate revocation of the licences.
85
 
6.3.2.4 The Broadcasting Code 
Apart from the licensing system, the broadcast media is also made 
subject to strict content regulations, particularly the requirement of 
due accuracy and impartiality.
86
 Ofcom is required by section 319(1) 
to produce a code, the Ofcom Broadcasting Code (Code) that 
establishes standards for television and radio programmes to be 
                                                 
81
 Sections 40 – 42 of the Communications Act 2003. 
82
 Section 85(1) and (8) of the Broadcasting Act 1990. 
83
 Section 85(2) of the Broadcasting Act 1990. 
84
 Sections 86 - 89 of the Broadcasting Act 1990. 
85
 Sections 109 - 111 of the Broadcasting Act 1990. 
86
 Barendt and Hitchens, Media Law (n 29) 9. 
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transmitted in the country.
87
 The Code is accompanied by non-binding 
Broadcasting Code Guidance issued by Ofcom in assisting the 
interpretation of the provisions of the Code.
88
 All radio and television 
broadcasters licensed by Ofcom, and to some extent the BBC, are 
required to observe the provisions of the Code. The BBC’s publicly 
funded TV and radio services are obliged to comply with the 
provisions of the Code in certain areas
89
 only whilst the BBC’s 




Non-compliance with the rules will expose them to sanctions by 
Ofcom’s Content Sanctions Committee. There is a wide range of 
sanctions available at its disposal that range from a direction not to 
repeat a programme, publication of correction or Ofcom’s findings on 
its service, imposition of financial penalty, reduction of the licence 
period or revocation of the licence.
91
 Nonetheless, in certain cases, 
Ofcom may not impose sanctions on the breaches but they will be 
reported in the Broadcast Bulletins
92
 and such publication will give 
bad publicity to the broadcasters. 
 
                                                 
87
 The most recent version of the Ofcom Code took effect on 21 March 2013 and it 
covers all programmes that are broadcast on or after 21 March 2013. See 
<http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/broadcasting/broadcast-codes/broadcast-code> 
[accessed 1 January 2015]. 
88
 The latest version of the Ofcom Broadcasting Code Guidance is issued in 
February 2011 and applies to all programmes that are broadcast on or after 28 
February 2011. See 
<http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/broadcasting/guidance/programme-
guidance/bguidance> [accessed 1 January 2015].  
89
 Six areas which need to be observed by the BBC are protecting the under-
eighteens, harm and offence, crime, religion, fairness and privacy. 
90
 Robertson and Nicol, Media Law (n 11) 887. 
91
 Sections 344 – 345 of the Communications Act 2003. 
92
 Ofcom’s Broadcast Bulletin is accessible at 
<http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/enforcement/broadcast-bulletins> [accessed 30 
August 2011]. 
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As to the content regulation of the BBC, it is largely self-regulated by 
its own code, the BBC’s Editorial Guidelines (the Editorial 
Guidelines) that set out standards expected of the BBC content.
93
 The 
provisions of the Editorial Guidelines are nevertheless derived from 
the Royal Charter and the Framework Agreement
94
 and they are 
commissioned and approved by the BBC Trust. The Editorial 
Guidelines are in most instances comparable to the Ofcom 
Broadcasting Code but broader as they apply to all types of content 
whilst the Ofcom Broadcasting Code is only applicable to radio and 
television services.
95
 The Editorial Guidelines are supplemented by 
Guidance that provides further explanation and the Guidance is 
published on the Editorial Guidelines website.
96
 
6.3.3 Application of the Broadcasting Regulatory System to 
Blogs 
The statutory regime of the broadcast media administered by Ofcom is 
applicable to television (including Internet live TV) and radio services 
that are licensed by Ofcom. Whilst Internet communications are 
generally not subject to Ofcom’s regulation, a different approach 
applies to blogs or other UGC that are associated with the BBC. This 
is because the Editorial Guidelines explicitly provide that the 
standards expected of BBC content are not limited to television and 
radio programmes only but to other forms of communication 
platforms including the Internet. Therefore, it is argued that apart from 
blogs that are related with BBC, it is very much unlikely for other 
blogs that are largely published by individuals to be governed by the 
                                                 
93
 The Editorial Guidelines are published every five years. The latest version, the 
Editorial Guidelines 2010, was published on 12 October 2010. See 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/editorialguidelines> [accessed 1 January 2015]. 
94
 Section 1.3 of the Editorial Guidelines. 
95
 Section 2 of the Editorial Guidelines. 
96
 The Guidance is accessible at 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/editorialguidelines/guidance> [accessed 30 
August 2011]. 
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specific regulatory rules and regulations established by Ofcom and the 
BBC. 
6.4 On Demand Industry 
6.4.1 Overview of Video on Demand (VOD) Services  
Video on demand (VOD) is a new rising technology that permits 
viewers to select and watch audiovisual (‘television-like’) content at 
their own preferred time, rather than the normal fixed time slots 
determined by broadcasters for traditional television services. VOD 
services are based on one-to-one connection between viewers and 
providers, in contrast with the one-to-many relationship between 
television broadcasters and viewers. VOD services are accessible over 
a variety of distribution platforms including the Internet, Internet 
Protocol television (IPTV), cable, satellite and digital terrestrial 
television (DTT), smart phones and games consoles such as 
Nintendo’s Wii, Sony’s PlayStation 3 and Microsoft’s Xbox.
97
 The 
VOD industry is expected to flourish in line with the exploitation of 
new digital services and rapid growth of high-speed broadband 
connections. Since it has huge potential to become a serious rival to 
the traditional broadcast media, it would be pertinent to examine the 
regulatory system of the VOD and the potential of applying the 
system to blogs. 
 
                                                 
97
 Ofcom, Proposal for the Regulation of Video on Demand Services, 14 December 
2009, para 2.17 
<http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/vod/summary/vod.pdf>  
[accessed 20 December 2010]. 
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6.4.2 Regulatory System of the VOD 
6.4.2.1 Self-regulation by the Old ATVOD 
VOD services in the UK ceased to be regulated by specific statutory 
provisions upon the enactment of the CA. This reflected the UK’s 
manifestation for light-touch regulation of VOD services and the 
prevailing perception that the industry would be in a better position to 
regulate itself.
98
 It was also claimed that neither statutory nor co-
regulation was favourable as it would be ‘costly to tax payer and 
industry, bureaucratic, inflexible, slow moving, anachronistic, 
reactive, and not pro-active’.
99
 Thus, self-regulation was considered as 
the preferred regulatory approach and later the Association for 
Television on Demand (the old ATVOD) was established in 2003 as 




The old ATVOD was based on the industry’s interest of making VOD 
services free from detailed requirements for content.
101
 The old 
ATVOD formulated its own Code of Practice and it contained 
minimal content related provisions; namely protection for children and 
young people under eighteen from adult content and provision of 
sufficient advice and guidance to VOD consumers to enable informed 
selection of content and commercial services.
102
 Nonetheless, these 
requirements were only imposed on service providers that voluntarily 
subscribed to the old ATVOD Code and were admitted as members by 
the old ATVOD Board. Service providers that did not subscribe to the 
                                                 
98
 Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Self-Regulation of the Press, (HC 2006 – 
07, 375). 
99
 Elizabeth Filkin, ‘Regulatory Forbearance in Operation’, 2005  
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/47/34985339.pdf> [accessed 10 March 2011]. 
100
 ATVOD, ATVOD Contribution to the Public Consultation on the Revision of the 
TVWF Directive Issue Paper on Commercial Communication, 5 September 2005 
<http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/docs/reg/modernisation/issue_papers/contributions/ip4
-atvod.pdf> [accessed 20 December 2010]. 
101
 Tambini, Leonardi, and Marsden, Codifying Cyberspace (n 7) 99 
102
 Section 3.1 of the ATVOD Code of Practice. 
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self-regulatory body were not expected to comply with these 
requirements. Similarly, private websites and blogs were excluded 
from the remit of the old ATVOD and exempted from its content rules 
since the audiovisual content that appeared in such sites was 
considered to be incidental to their main services.
103
 
6.4.2.2 Co-regulation by the New ATVOD and Ofcom 
The short-lived self-regulatory system of VOD services has come to 
an end with the implementation of the Audiovisual Media Services 
Regulations 2009 (2009 Regulations) on 19 December 2009.
104
 The 
2009 Regulations, which inserted a new ‘Part 4A – On-Demand 
Programme Services (ODPS)’
105
 into the CA, signify the dawn of a 
new co-regulatory system with the appointment of Ofcom as the 
appropriate regulatory body for the VOD industry. Nonetheless, the 
new regime was not fully in operation until formal designation of 
ATVOD (the new ATVOD
106
 which is also called ATVOD 2.0)
107
 as 
co-regulator for editorial content was made on 18 March 2010.
108
 In 
performing its designated functions,
109
 the new ATVOD (hereinafter 
referred to as ATVOD) has been conferred with relevant powers and 
duties as Ofcom’s designee by the CA. Apart from the designation, 
                                                 
103
 Silver and Sapte, ‘Content Regulation’ (n 49) 139. 
104
 The 2009 Regulations were made on 9 November 2009 and laid before 
Parliament on 10 November 2009. 
105
 The phrase ‘on-demand programme service’ (ODPS) echoes the definition of 
‘on-demand audiovisual media service’ (i.e. a non-linear audiovisual media service) 
in the AVMS Directive. 
106
 The old ATVOD has remodelled itself into a new ATVOD that is sufficiently 
independent of ODPS providers. ATVOD was previously known as the Association 
for Television on Demand, but subsequently changed its name to the Authority for 
Television on Demand on 21 March 2011. 
107
 Daithi Mac Sithigh, ‘Co-Regulation, Video-on-Demand and the Legal Status of 
Audio-Visual Media’ (2011) 2(1) JDTV 49, 57. 
108
 Ofcom, Designation Pursuant to section 368B of the Communications Act 2003 
of functions to the Association for Television On-Demand in Relation to the 
Regulation of On-Demand Programme Services, 18 March 2010 
<http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/broadcast/tv-ops/designation180310.pdf>  
[accessed 24 January 2011]. 
109
 The designated functions are set out in paragraph 5 of the designation document. 
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the Audiovisual Media Services Regulations 2010 (the 2010 
Regulations) have also been passed on the same day to complement 
the remaining aspects of the co-regulatory system.  
The inherent feature of the co-regulatory regime is the imposition of a 
wide range of duties and obligation on VOD providers falling within 
the scope of ODPS.
110
 Section 368A (1) provides that ‘a service is an 
“on-demand programme service” if –  
(a) its principal purpose is the provision of the programmes the 
form and content of which are comparable to the form and 
content or programmes normally included in television 
programme services; 
(b) access to it is on-demand; 
(c) there is a person who has editorial responsibility for it; 
(d) it is made available by that person for use by members of the 
public; and 
(e) that person is under the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom for 
the purposes of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive. 
In short, the section outlines statutory prerequisites of ODPS providers 
as those that principally offer television-like programmes,
111
 empower 
viewers to freely select and watch the programmes at their own 
preferred time, possess control over selection and organisation of the 
programmes, offer the programmes to the public at large and that they 
are bound by the jurisdiction of the country. These requirements are 
cumulative in nature and non-fulfilment of any criterion will exclude a 
service from being categorised as ODPS under the CA. In addition, 
ATVOD has also issued a non-binding guidance (ATVOD Guidance) 
that offers interpretative assistance on the meaning of an ODPS to 
existing and future ODPS providers.  
                                                 
110
 The phrase on-demand programme service (ODPS) echoes the definition of ‘on-
demand audiovisual media service’ (i.e. a non-linear audiovisual media service) 
defined in Article 1(g) of the AVMS Directive. 
111
 The phrase ‘television-like’ is used in Recital 17 of the AVMS Directive / Recital 
24 of the Codified AVMS Directive.  
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Another noteworthy feature of the system is the return of content 
regulation on VOD services that were absent during the previous 
regime. The CA transposed the minimum standards for VOD 
programmes in the AVMS Directive
112
 by prohibiting any materials 
that are likely to cause hatred based on race, sex, religion or 
nationality to be included in any ODPS.
113
 Further, any materials that 
might seriously impair the physical, mental or moral development of 
persons under the age of eighteen are also prohibited unless such 
materials are provided in a manner that is not accessible by those 
persons.
114
 These editorial content rules have been reproduced as the 
ATVOD Rules
115
 and shall be observed by ODPS providers. 
Undoubtedly, these provisions provide certainty and comprehensive 
safeguards against the provision of harmful materials on VOD 
content. Contravention of the content rules will permit Ofcom to 
enforce the provisions of the CA either by imposing financial 
penalties or suspending or restricting the services of the ODPS 
providers.  
6.4.3 Application of the ODPS Co-regulatory System to 
Blogs 
Blogs and other UGC will be subjected to the VOD co-regulatory 
system if they are regarded as ODPS under the CA. Section 368A 
provides that all of the ODPS criteria are cumulative in nature and a 
service would simply fall outside the scope even if only one criterion 
is not satisfied by the service provider. The defining character of 
ODPS is the provision of programmes, the form and content of which 
are comparable to the form and content of programmes normally 
                                                 
112
 Articles 3b and 3h of the AVMS Directive / Articles 6 and 12 of the Codified 
AVMS Directive. 
113
 Section 368E (1) of the Communications Act 2003. 
114
 Section 368E (2) of the Communications Act 2003. 
115
 Rules 10 and 11 of the ATVOD Rules. 
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included in television programme services. These programmes are 
referred to as ‘television-like’
116
 programmes in the AVMS Directive 
that compete for the same audience as television broadcast. 
Programmes that are not television-like such as videos intended for 
specific groups of viewers only or short extracts from longer 
programmes and audio-only services fall outside the scope of the CA. 
 In addition, it must be the principal purpose of the VOD service 
providers to offer such services to viewers. If these services are 
included as supplementary to the main services, such as video reports 
in text-based online news, then they are not ODPS under the CA. The 
principal purpose test has been analysed by Ofcom in deciding the 
appeal by News Group Newspapers Ltd, the parent company of the 
Sun, against ATVOD’s determination which ruled that the ‘Sun 
Video’ section of the Sun website was an ODPS and thus fell within 
its remit. In upholding the appeal, Ofcom ruled that the ‘Sun Video’ 
section was clearly ancillary to the main function of the Sun website 
which provided an online version of the Sun newspaper. Thus, the Sun 
Video was not regarded as an ODPS under Part 4A of the CA and 
should therefore not subject to regulation by ATVOD.
117
 As a result of 
the appeal ruling by Ofcom, ATVOD has immediately withdrawn its 
earlier determinations that video services from newspapers and 
magazine publishers including the Sunday Times Video Library, the 
Independent Video, Telegraph TV, FT Video, Guardian You Tube, 




                                                 
116
 Recital 17 of the AVMS Directive / Recital 24 of the codified AVMS Directive. 
117
 Ofcom decision in ‘The Sun Video’ appeal against ATVOD’s determination is 
available at <http://www.atvod.co.uk/uploads/files/Ofcom_Decision_-
_SUN_VIDEO_211211.pdf> [accessed 3 January 2015].  
118
 For details, see ATVOD’s response to Ofcom appeal decision in 
<http://www.atvod.co.uk/news-consultations/news-consultationsnews/20111221-
sun-appeal-verdict> [accessed 3 January 2015]. 
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By applying the aforesaid principle, it is submitted that since the 
provision of audiovisual materials in most political blogs and other 
user-generated political content is normally incidental to their largely 
text-based services, therefore political blogs and other largely text-
based UGC sites should not be subjected to the ATVOD’s remit. 
Conversely, where the offering of television-like content in blogs 
(especially for video blogs or vlogs) or other UGC sites is their 
principal service or alternatively if there is a distinct section in blogs 
or websites that principally provides television-like content and that 
section exists as a stand-alone service, then such blogs or websites 
may be considered as ODPS.  
Another important feature of ODPS is that providers of such services 
have editorial responsibilities regarding the selection and organisation 
of the television-like programmes. As for political blogs and other 
UGC political content media sites, it is common for bloggers and 
UGC producers to possess absolute control over the posting and audio 
content or even readers’ comments that appear in their blogs or sites. 
In such a case, it is submitted that political blogs or UGC political 
content media sites do satisfy the element of editorial responsibility 
required of ODPS. 
Apart from these key requirements, reference should be made to the 
ATVOD Guidance issued by ATVOD. Though the ATVOD Guidance 
is not legally enforceable, the power to determine the status of any 
services is solely vested with ATVOD,
119
 and undoubtedly it will be 
referred to by ATVOD in its determination process. The ATVOD 
Guidance provides a non-exhaustive illustrative list of types of 
services that are likely to be regarded as out of ODPS scope, 
particularly services that are primarily non-economic and not in 
                                                 
119
 Section 368BA of the Communications Act and Rule 1 of the ATVOD Rules. 
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competition with television broadcasting.
120
 Though the economic 
dimension is not mentioned in the CA, the AVMS Directive
121
 has 
clarified this point by excluding ‘private websites and services 
consisting of the provision or distribution of audiovisual content 
generated by private users for the purposes of sharing and exchange 
within communities of interest’ as they are not normally provided for 
remuneration. Nevertheless, the demarcation line between economic 
and non-economic services begins to blur as YouTube has in January 
2007
122
 launched YouTube Partner Program whereby popular content 
contributors within the YouTube community will be entitled to a 
portion of revenue from advertisement that run next to their videos.
123
 
Thus, it is argued that the UGC videos are likely to fall within the 
scope of the AVMS Directive as the contributors’ motive for 
uploading such content becomes commercial.
124
 
Aside from those YouTube contributors, majority of political blogs 
and other user-generated political content sites do not acquire 
considerable economic value so as to be excluded from the scope of 
the regulations. Thus, it is argued that though certain blogs (such as 
video blogs but not text-based political blogs) may have fulfilled the 
prescribed elements of ODPS under the Act, they may still lack the 
economic motive prescribed by the ATVOD Guidance and the AVMS 
Directive and would therefore be unlikely to be governed by ATVOD.  
                                                 
120
 Section 3 of the ATVOD Guidance. 
121
 Recital 16 of the AVMS Directive / Recital 21 of the Codified AVMS Directive.  
122
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2011]. 
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6.5 Internet Industry 
6.5.1 Overview of the UK Internet Governance 
In general, the Internet industry in the UK is currently not subjected to 
any specific self-regulatory or statutory bodies like the traditional 
media. The fact that the IPSO’s remit applies to online editorial 
content of its member publishers and the ATVOD’s remit is also 
applicable to all types of ODPS regardless of the platform including 
the Internet do not render these bodies to be regulators for the Internet 
as they are not specifically established to govern the Internet industry. 
Nevertheless, the emergence of technical and self-regulations has 
appeared as alternative sources to the Internet regulation.
125
 Further, a 
new set of mechanisms in the form of hierarchical, market and 
network governance have also been developed and adopted by public 
and private institutions.
126
 Thus, this indicates that the absence of 
formal regulatory control does not render the Internet industry to be in 
lawlessness as other forms of controls had been developed to address 
the gap in the Internet regulation. 
6.5.2 Industrial and Legal Control of the Internet in the UK 
6.5.2.1 ISPs Liability & the E-Commerce Regulations 
2002 
A formal form of the Internet governance has been initiated by the 
Internet industry in the UK in mid-1990s,
127
 in parallel with the 
‘Green Paper on the protection of minors and human dignity in audio-
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visual and information services’.
128
 The industry players, particularly 
the UK Internet service providers (ISPs), have been pressured into 
self-regulation in order to avoid statutory regulation.
129
 The wide 
availability of child pornography on Usenet discussion groups 
prompted the Metropolitan Police to issue stern warning to the 
ISPs,
130
 as they were perceived to be accountable for the materials 
they transmit
131
 though they were neither producers nor consumers of 
such content. The enrolment of the ISPs as ‘Internet porn cops’ is not 
unexpected as it is claimed to be the most obvious way to regulate the 
Internet
132
 after the earlier strategies of targeting producers or 




Despite being regarded as natural gatekeepers to the Internet, the ISPs 
should not be imposed full liability as they lack legal and actual 
capacity to effectively check the legality of all online content on their 
servers; they are merely messengers and not content providers; and the 
imposition of unlimited content liability on the ISPs for third party 
content would affect the public interest in term of access to the 
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Internet as their business could not sustain such profound burden.
134
 In 
view of that, the European Parliament and Council had issued the 
Directive on Electronic Commerce (the EU E-Commerce Directive) 
on 8 June 2000.
135
 The EU E-Commerce Directive has spelt out 
limitations on the liability of the ISPs in order to remove ‘existing and 
emerging disparities in Member States’
136
 legislation and case-law 
concerning liability of service providers acting as intermediaries’ 
which ‘prevent the smooth functioning of the internal market, in 
particular by impairing the development of cross-border services and 
producing distortions of competition’.
137
 It is important to note that 
the immunity accorded by the EU E-Commerce Directive covers an 
array of information society services providers
138
 (or alternatively 
referred to as intermediary service providers)
139
 ranging from the 
traditional ISP sector as well as the newer forms of online 
intermediaries,
140
 which are labelled as the new ‘Internet points of 
control’, such as search engines, hosting providers and many others.
141
 
The EU E-Commerce Directive has been incorporated into the UK 
law with the enactment of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) 
Regulations 2002 (E-Commerce Regulations).
142
 As a result, all UK 
ISPs and other online intermediaries that are considered as ‘service 
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providers’ of an ‘information society service’ under the E-Commerce 
Regulations are exempted from liabilities for mere conduit, caching 
and hosting information by regulations 17, 18 and 19 respectively.
143
 
However, the immunity from hosting is subject to the ISPs’ actual 
knowledge or awareness of the third party content. Service provider 
(including ISPs) will be exempted from criminal sanction if it ‘does 
not have actual knowledge of unlawful activity or information’; and 
will be protected from civil liability if it has no such actual knowledge 
and is ‘not aware of facts or circumstances from which it would have 
been apparent to the service provider that the activity or information 
was unlawful’.
144
 Thus, notice of actual knowledge is the key factor in 
determining the liability of the ISPs but the onus of proving such 
knowledge would not be imposed on the ISPs. The enforcement 
authorities or any other parties who intend to implicate the ISPs are 
expected to prove that the ISPs are actually aware of such content and 
yet fail to take appropriate action.
145
 
The E-Commerce Regulations do not explain how actual knowledge is 
obtained by the ISPs but it do provide a clear interpretation on the 
phrase ‘notice for the purpose of actual knowledge’ of the ISPs, 
though such definition was nowhere mentioned in the EU E-
Commerce Directive. Regulation 22 mandates the courts to consider a 
number of relevant factors including the full name and address of the 
sender of the notice, details of the location of the information and 
details of the unlawful nature of the information in order to ascertain 
the actual knowledge of the ISPs pursuant to regulations 18(b)(v) and 
19(a)(i) of the E-Commerce Regulations.  
                                                 
143
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The significance of this requirement was highlighted in Bunt v. 
Tilley,
146
 whereby three ISP defendants were sued in respect of 
defamatory posting made by their customers in the Internet chat 
rooms. The defendants invoked the defence under the E-Commerce 
Regulations to escape from liability in defamation. It was ruled by 
Eady J that since the notice by the claimant did not include details of 
the location or the unlawful nature of the information, the defendants 
were not liable for hosting the content as they did not have actual 
knowledge of the alleged content.  
The judgment is highly commendable as it would be wholly 
impractical to rule the ISP defendants as having actual knowledge 
without furnishing specific details, and to hold them otherwise would 
require the ISPs to vigorously check enormous amount of third party 
materials in their servers. The finding is in line with the government’s 
derogation of Article 15 of the EU E-Commerce Directive which 
provides a ‘no general obligation to monitor’ to the ISPs. It is claimed 
that the inclusion of the aforesaid article ‘would not only confer no 
additional legal certainty on intermediaries but could even introduce 
uncertainty if the prohibition were interpreted differently from its 
meaning in the Directive’.
147
 
Although actual knowledge is critical in determining the liability of 
the ISPs, its presence or existence does not automatically render ISPs 
to be liable for hosting illegal content. ISPs would be extinguished 
from civil or criminal liability if they ‘act expeditiously to remove or 
to disable access to the information’.
148
 Unfortunately, there is no 
clear explanation as to what constitutes ‘expeditious’ and whether 
ISPs are required to check the alleged illegality before removing or 
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disabling access to it. It is suggested that instead of simply removing 
such content upon receiving the notice, ISPs should ‘do what is 
reasonable to prevent further communication of that notified 
content’.
149
 Nonetheless, it is argued that the lack of formal guidance 
has resulted in the removal of the content by ISPs as they seek to 
avoid any legal liability for hosting third party content.
150
 
Regulation 19 of the E-Commerce Regulations is claimed to have 
inserted notice and takedown provisions for third party content.
151
 
Nevertheless, the UK Government insisted that the Regulations do not 
include any ‘statutory notice and takedown procedures’ as it persisted 
to promote self-regulation and industrial codes of conduct.
152
 The 
establishment of the Internet Services Providers’ Association (ISPA) 
in 1995 as the ISPs’ trade association is in line with the Government’s 
policy. All of the UK ISPs that have voluntarily become ISPA 
members are obliged to abide by the rules contained in the ISPA Code 
of Practice (the ISPA Code).
153
 The ISPA Code, which was adopted in 
January 1999 and lastly amended in July 2007,
154
 mandates its 
members to protect consumers and adhere to the law in promoting 
their services, and to ensure that ‘child abuse images’ are not offered 
by the ISPA members.
155
 In the meantime, the government limits its 
role to merely being a facilitator as it preferred a co-regulatory 
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 In relation to criminal matters, there is however a 
statutory notice and takedown procedure being incorporated into the 
Terrorism Act 2006 pertaining to encouragement of terrorism and 
dissemination of terrorist publications over the Internet.
157
 Apart from 
terrorism-related materials, it is observed that the UK ISPs could still 
technically be requested to monitor illegal activities or content in 
specific cases,
158
 particularly child abuse images that have been placed 
under the supervision of the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF). 
6.5.2.2 Internet Watch Foundation (IWF)  
The Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) is a self-regulatory association 
that was jointly established by several players of the UK Internet 
industry in September 1996.
159
 It is the only private establishment that 
is officially recognised as a quasi-governmental body
160
 and funded 
by voluntary contributions from the European Union and its members 
in the Internet industry.
161
 Its set up has been initiated by the industry 
as self-regulation was preferred over government regulation in 
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controlling access to illegal and unsuitable materials on the Internet.
162
 
The IWF was entrusted to tackle the online content related issues and 
this approach was in parallel with the popular belief in the 1990s that 
regarded self-regulation as the most effective means of regulating the 
Internet.
163
 Though the IWF could also be perceived as the industry’s 
effort of evading regulatory controls, it should be noted that several 
governmental agencies
164
 had also directly involved in discussions 
with the industry prior to its establishment. Thus, the IWF should 
ideally be regarded as a co-operation between the government and the 
industry as a partnership approach between them has been regarded as 
the best solution to the illegal content issues
165
 and in meeting with the 
European Union’s objective of ensuring the Internet as a safe and 
secure place to work, learn and play.
166
  
The IWF operates a national Internet Hotline that receives complaints 
on potentially illegal materials from the public and IT professionals. 
At present, the IWF remit covers child pornography (child sexual 
abuse images)
167
 hosted anywhere in the world, non-photographic 
materials of child pornography, such as computer generated images, 
animated images and cartoon drawings, and obscene adult content 
hosted in the UK.
168
 Incitement to racial hatred has been removed 
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from its remit as a new online service, True Vision,
169
 has been 
launched by the police to handle complaints on such materials.
170
 This 
development will definitely be applauded since many scholars have 
for long proposed for the elimination of such content alleging that any 
extension to the IWF original remit beyond child pornography is 
prone to mission creep.
171
 Further, the complexity and seriousness of 
online hate crime and the lack of expertise and authority on the IWF 
to investigate criminal activity
172
 may have also rendered the IWF to 
be an incompetent body. Thus, it is timely for hate speech to be 
removed from the IWF remit and be handled by a dedicated online 
reporting service that is monitored by the police.  
Apart from the Internet Hotline, the IWF also provides a ‘notice and 
takedown service’ to the Internet hosting providers. Complaints 
received by the IWF will be checked and assessed by its trained staffs, 
Internet Content Analysts, against a number of laws.
173
 Where the 
materials found to be illegal are hosted in the UK, relevant reports will 
be forwarded to the police and the UK ISPs.
174
 As for overseas hosted 
content, the IWF will pass the reports to international Hotlines, 
particularly members of International Association of Internet Hotlines 
(INHOPE)
175
 and police agency in that particular country. The 
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identified web pages are added to the IWF block list to prevent 
accidental access until they are removed from the source.
176
 
Nonetheless, concerns arise over the transparency and legitimacy of 
the assessment made by the IWF over complaints handled by the 
Internet Hotline. It is stipulated that once the illegality of such content 
has been established, the UK police will be notified for further 
investigation. But it is uncertain whether the police, assuming that 
they have completed the investigation and discovered that the 
materials are not illegal, are empowered to overturn the IWF earlier 
judgments. Though such event is highly unlikely to occur since the 
IWF team of analysts are trained by the police themselves,
177
 the 
position should be clearly spelt out to avoid any misconception.  
Apart from the police, a takedown notice will be issued to the UK 
ISPs requesting them to remove at source materials rendered as illegal 
by the IWF. Following the decision in Godfrey v Demon Internet 
Ltd
178
 and the E-Commerce Regulations,
179
 it is observed that ISPs are 
generally keen to immediately disable access or remove illegal 
materials from their servers upon notification.
180
 These principles, 
which impose knowledge-based liability on ISPs, is claimed to have 
led to a ‘takedown first, ask question later’ approach.
181
 The claim 
was proved by the ‘Mystery Shopper’ test which concludes that ‘the 
current regulatory settlement has created an environment in which the 
incentive to take down content from the Internet is higher than the 
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potential costs of not taking it down’.
182
 As a result, it is almost 
unlikely for ISPs to spend additional times and efforts to investigate 
the accuracy of such notice. The accuracy of the notice will remain 
unchecked even the IWF Board has approved content assessment 
appeal that permits anyone, including content owners and Internet 
users, to challenge and appeal against the accuracy of the IWF 
assessment. This assertion could be supported with the latest IWF 
Annual Report that reveals that no appeals have been received by the 
IWF from the UK ISPs in 2010.
183
 Thus, it is claimed that the 
transparency and legitimacy of the IWF assessment will remain 
disputable as the UK ISPs are basically left with no options but to 
respond to the takedown notice to avoid any legal implications. 
The approach adopted by the UK ISPs in response to the IWF 
takedown notice is liable to constitute a direct infringement on content 
producers’ right to freedom of expression. This is because ISPs are 
inclined to substitute their views of harmful or potentially illegal 
content without providing proper mechanisms and effective legal 
procedures for content producers to challenge and appeal against such 
judgment.
184
 Though the takedown notice is aimed at illegal materials, 
the probability that this enforcement could have affected legitimate 
content should not be totally ruled out. For this reason, a ‘put back 
procedure’ has been proposed to be inserted into the E-Commerce 
Directive so that materials that have been wrongly removed could be 
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 It is believed that the rights of content producers 
and Internet users to freedom of expression would be protected if the 
proposal were implemented. 
The efficacy of the notice and takedown system administered by the 
IWF has also been criticised as under-effective.
186
 It is reported that 
the system can only trace illegal materials distributed over websites 
but not other channels such as peer-to-peer (P2P), Internet Relay Chat, 
ICQ Environment and other file sharing networks like Kazaa and 
eDonkey.
187
 This shortcoming is very serious as recent records show 
that P2P sites are the most preferred channels for distributing illegal 
content and they are also difficult to be traced and intercepted.
188
 
The effectiveness of the system in handling illegal materials hosted 
abroad also remains questionable. Even though the IWF proudly 
claimed that it has successfully reduced illegal content hosted in the 
UK from 18% in 1997 to less than 1% since 2003,
189
 the same success 
story is yet to be seen for non-UK hosted content which currently 
amounts to almost 99% of the total numbers of illegal content. The 
problem is intensified as illegal materials hosted overseas are said to 
have remained accessible to Internet users in the UK at a longer period 
compared to the UK hosted content. This is reflected in the recent 
report that shows materials hosted in the UK are removed within one 
day
190
 compared to weeks or days for the materials hosted abroad. The 
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cause of this discrepancy is attributed to the jurisdictional limitation 
on the part of the IWF as it has no authority to directly liaise with the 
foreign ISPs and could only notify the local enforcement agency and 
members of INHOPE in that country about the illegal materials.  
To sum up, the IWF is regarded as a macro-gatekeeper that possesses 
absolute power over the UK ISPs and greater capacity to control the 
conduct of the Internet users in relation to child pornography and 
obscene adult content.
191
 Although it has demonstrated great ability in 
tackling the UK hosted child pornography via its notice and takedown 
services and has attempted to solve the non-UK child pornography 
content by way of the Internet filtering, a number of issues particularly 
relating to the legitimacy, transparency and efficacy of the IWF 
remain in doubt. Thus, the recommendation for the IWF to be 
reconstituted as a public body for specifically handling child 
pornography and obscene adult content, and managed by a team of 




6.5.2.3 Cleanfeed System  
‘Cleanfeed’ system is the Internet blocking system that has currently 
been applied in the UK to prevent inadvertent access to illegal content 
hosted abroad. The system was originally developed and implemented 
by the British Telecom (BT) in 2004.
193
 It was designed as a short 
term solution to protect the UK Internet users’ access from inadvertent 
                                                                                                                   
(IWF & Nominet Trust, May 2011)  <http://www.iwf.org.uk/resources/independent-
report> [accessed 6 August 2011]. 
191
 Emily B Laidlaw, ‘A Framework for Identifying Internet Information 
Gatekeepers’ (2010) 24(3) IRLCT 263, 273. 
192
 Edwards, ‘Pornography, Censorship and the Internet’ (n 132) 658. 
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 Philip Hunter, ‘BT’s Bold Pioneering Child Porn Block Wins Plaudits amid 
Internet Censorship Concerns’ [2004] Comp Fr & Sec 4, 4. 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 6: Specific Regulatory Regime of the Media in the United 
Kingdom 
225 
exposure to web sites that have been added to the IWF blocklist
194
 i.e. 
child pornography sites hosted abroad.
195
 The system is 
‘voluntarily’
196
 being adopted by almost all UK ISPs after the 
government threatened to legislate if ISPs refused to subscribe to the 
IWF blocklist by the end of 2007.
197
 The legislation has never been 
passed
198
 and this has led to numerous criticisms, in particular on the 
issues of legitimacy, transparency and accountability of the system.
199
 
The Internet blocking system has been jointly implemented by the 
private parties, namely the IWF and the UK ISPs, with the 
government threat at the background and without public debate.
200
 It 
is also argued that this mechanism results in ‘legal action is nearly 




Since the IWF’s role in the application of the filtering system is 
limited to providing the IWF blocklist, the transparency of the alleged 
illegal websites has become the central issue, as they will be deployed 
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<http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2006/jun/29/guardianweeklytechnologysect
ion> [accessed 12 July 2011]. 
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 HC Deb 15 May 2006, col 716W. 
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Register, 16 October 2009, 
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/10/16/home_office_iwf_legislation> [accessed 
15 August 2011]. 
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April 2011]. 
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by ISPs. However, the IWF blocklist has never been published to the 
public for fearing that they would be a roadmap for paedophiles. 
Unfortunately, this opaque application is prone to manipulation and 
susceptible to function creep as the list could include not only child 
pornography but other materials as well.
202
 For this reason, it has been 
proposed that an external audit of blocking databases against clear 
agreed criteria should be regularly conducted
203
 so that the occurrence 
of similar incident to the Wikipedia blocking in 2008
204
 could be 
avoided in the future.
205
  
Apart from that, other issues on the Internet blocking system are 
related with the role of ISPs in filtering users’ access. It is argued that 
the adoption of the system by ISPs could deprive users’ right to 
freedom of expression and privacy since the blocking system will 
limit the accessibility of online content and monitor users’ 
communications and behaviours over the Internet.
206
 It is claimed that 
the Internet blocking does not facilitate police investigation and 
prosecution of offenders, as it could not preserve the evidence of the 
illegal materials.
207
 Further, the filtering system is unlikely to accord 
total protection to Internet users as it merely misleads them by 
presenting an error message rather than specifying that a site is 
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203
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 and it is also vulnerable to over blocking or under 
blocking.
209
 The system is also not fool proof as it can be 
circumvented by users that are technically skilled and it is also 




6.5.3 Application of the Internet Regulatory Regime to 
Blogs 
Since the Internet industry is currently not governed by specific rules 
or regulatory bodies, undoubtedly political blogs would also be 
subjected to none.
211
 The IWF, the self-regulatory body that is 
entrusted to handle online content in the country, does not regulate 
political blogs since its role and remits are designed to tackle child 
pornography and obscene adult materials. Though it could be argued 
that the Internet blocking system, which is being applied by the IWF 
and the UK ISPs in an opaque mode, could be exploited to filter other 
types of content including dissident political views and opinion, the 
likelihood of such incident is very much unlikely. 
Further, the Bloggers’ Code of Ethics
212
 has also been created by 
CyberJournalist.net based on the Society of Professional Journalists 
Code of Ethics in 2003. Nonetheless, its provisions only provide 
advisory guidelines on online journalistic ethics without formal 
                                                 
208
 Frank Fisher, ‘Caught in the Web’, The Guardian, 17 January 2008, 
<www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jan/17/caughtintheweb> [accessed 18 
August 2011]. 
209
 Akdeniz, ‘Who Watches the Watchmen? The Role of Filtering Software in 




 The only legislation applicable to the Internet industry is the E-Commerce 
Regulations which accord immunity to any service providers of an information 
society service from liabilities for mere conduit, caching and hosting information. 
The availability of the defence to blogs is elaborated in details in Part 6.2 of Chapter 
7 below. 
212
 The Bloggers’ Code of Ethics, see <www.cyberjournalist.net/news/000215.php> 
[accessed 18 August 2011]. 
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 There were also reports that stated the European Union 
planned to regulate blogs for ‘polluting cyberspace with 
misinformation and malicious intent’.
214
 Nonetheless, it is submitted 
that so long as blogs do not create any novel issues that could not be 
governed by general laws, there appears to be no concrete reasons for 
them to be regulated by specific rules or regulatory bodies. 
6.6 Conclusion 
The incessant development and prevalent acceptance of numerous 
forms of social media, including blogs, Facebook and Twitter, have 
resulted in the emergence of these platforms as influential means of 
mass communication and self-expression. Consequently, anyone with 
a computer and Internet connection may publish or share his personal 
views or thoughts to an unlimited audience via these online channels. 
Nonetheless, the instantaneous and ubiquitous access as well as the 
ease of use of these new social media websites, in particular Facebook 
and Twitter,
215
 have tempted certain Internet users to misuse these 
channels by publishing comments or remarks with too little regard for 
the consequences for others or themselves. The growing use of these 
new ways of communication, particularly in the past 10 years, 
undoubtedly presents new challenges to legislators and enforcement 
bodies in the UK over how to regulate illegal content in the cyber 
world. 
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A number of criminal prosecutions have been initiated against social 
media users for messages posted on Facebook, Twitter and other 
social media applications. Among the earlier case occurred in October 
2012 when a teenager from Lancashire, Matthew Woods,
216
 was 
sentenced to 12 weeks’ imprisonment (cut to eight weeks on appeal) 
after he pleaded guilty for posting incredibly distasteful jokes and 
sexually explicit comments about the missing of a young girl on his 
Facebook page. The most notable criminal prosecution against social 
media users is the case of Paul Chamber, better known as the ‘Twitter 
joke trial’.
217
 Mr Chamber was initially convicted for tweeting a joke 
about blowing up Robin Hood Airport in Doncaster Sheffield, but 
fortunately his conviction was overturned on appeal. Following public 
criticisms against criminal prosecutions of social media users as well 
as uncertainties surrounding the Twitter joke trial, the Director of 
Public Prosecutions has on 19 December 2012 issued interim 
guidelines on social media prosecutions. And after three month 
consultation period, the final guidelines, which set a high threshold for 
prosecution in cases involving communications that may be 
considered grossly offensive, indecent, obscene or false, were finally 
published in June 2013.
218
 
As for blogs with political expression, detailed analysis of the various 
types of regulatory bodies that are currently being employed to 
regulate the media in the UK shows that certain blogs have already 
been subjected to some forms of existing controls. IPSO and the BBC, 
for instance, are empowered to adjudicate on complaints involving 
blogs that are associated with the press and the BBC. Nonetheless, 
                                                 
216
 DPP v Woods (Matthew) Unreported October 2012 (MC). 
217
 Chambers v DPP [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin), [2013] 1 All ER 149. 
218
 For details on guidelines on prosecuting cases involving communications sent via 
social media, see 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/communications_sent_via_social_media> 
[accessed 14 January 2015]. 
 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 6: Specific Regulatory Regime of the Media in the United 
Kingdom 
230 
they are not permitted to extend their powers beyond their remits and 
therefore political blogs or other UGC administered by individuals 
and ordinary public members will be out of their reach. Likewise for 
ATVOD, it may only regulate any service providers that are 
considered to have offered ODPS under the CA. Since political blogs 
are very much unlikely to fall within ATVOD’s remit, then the co-
regulatory regime for VOD services cannot be applied to political 
blogs. As for the IWF, though it is the only self-regulatory body that 
has been established to regulate online content, its remit does not 
include political blogs as it has been specifically designed to handle 
child pornography and obscene adult materials. Thus, it is submitted 
that the specific regulatory regimes that have been established to 
regulate the traditional media as well as the emerging on-demand and 
the Internet industries cannot be applied to political blogs or other 
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The advent of various forms of web-based communications has 
facilitated the exercise of the right to freedom of expression. 
Nonetheless, the ease of accessibility and publication in the online 
world creates a number of risks, as these digital platforms are prone to 
be exploited by unscrupulous Internet users in the name of freedom of 
speech. By resorting to numerous forms of Web 2.0 applications, in 
particular social media and blogs, all types of online content, 
including hate speech, incitement to racial and religious hatred, and 
defamatory publications can be easily created and disseminated to the 
public. As such, it is important that similar legal safeguards are put in 
place for online and offline speech to protect the interests of the public 
and the state. On the other hand, the complexity of online speech must 
be taken into account and any restrictions on speech must be clearly 
set out in laws, be based on compelling grounds, be proportionate and 
necessary. 
There is a wide range of legal controls that may be applied to control 
online expression on the Internet. These include public order laws, 
specific laws for targeted communications and media law.
1
 Public 
order laws have been controversially used to convict a Facebook user 
for inciting riots simply because he created a web page called ‘The 
Warrington Riots’ during the August 2011 riots in England.
2
 In 
another incident, a student was charged under section 4A of the Public 
Order Act 1986 and was sentenced to imprisonment for 56 days for 
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 Jacob Rowbottom, ‘To Rant, Vent and Converse: Protecting Low Level Digital 
Speech’ (2012) 71(2) CLJ 355, 356 – 365. 
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 In R v Blackshaw [2011] EWCA Crim 2312, [2012] 1 WLR 1126 Mr Sutcliffe 
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posting offensive comments on Twitter about the on-pitch collapse of 
a Premier League footballer.
3
 
Laws designed to govern harmful messages to a specific individual or 
set of individuals have also been extended to communications on the 
Internet. The Malicious Communications Act 1998, which was 
enacted to tackle the problem of poison pen letters, has been used to 
caution a man for making a false allegation about a TV show in his 
blog.
4
 And in the infamous Twitter joke trial, a man was convicted for 
sending a message of a menacing character by a public electronic 
communication network contrary to sections 127(1)(a) and (3) of the 
Communications Act 2003.
5
 The widescale prosecution of social 
media users has led to growing disquiet and public criticism about the 
heavy–handed enforcement of the criminal laws. Subsequently, the 
Director of Public Prosecutions of England and Wales on 19 
December 2012 issued interim guidelines on prosecuting cases 
involving communications sent via social media.
6
 Apart from that, 
actions for defamation and misuse of private information have also 
been brought in relation to online content. 
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5
 Chambers v DPP [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin), [2013] 1 All ER 149. Fortunately, 
the conviction was quashed on his third appeal as the court found that his tweet ‘did 
not constitute or include a message of a menacing character’. 
6
 The interim guidelines set out the approach prosecutors should take when deciding 
whether to prosecute individuals for offences committed on social media. However, 
the guidelines do not have the effect of replacing the Code for Crown Prosecutors as 
they merely supplement the provision of the Code. See 
<www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/social_media_consultation.html> [accessed 12 
January 2013]. 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 7: Blogs and Online Defamation in Malaysia and the 
United Kingdom 
233 
The control of blogs through the general law or specific media rules 
involves a vast area and it is not possible to discuss at any length all of 
the aforesaid laws in this study. For this reason, this part of the thesis 
will focus on the field of defamation. This is because defamation law 
constitutes one of the many permitted restrictions on freedom of 
expression and one, which is open to being deployed in relation to 
political speech. It is therefore imperative to see how online 
defamatory materials are dealt with in the UK and Malaysia. In view 
of this, the chapter provides a brief overview of defamatory 
statements; the status of defamatory posts by bloggers and defamatory 
comments by readers (libel or slander); the application of multiple and 
single publication rules to Internet publication; liability of online 
intermediaries for third party content and linking; and potential 
defences in online defamation proceedings under the Defamation Act 
1996, the Defamation Act 2013 and the Electronic Commerce (EC 
Directive) Regulations 2002 in the UK; as well as under the 
Malaysian Defamation Act 1957 and the Malaysian Communications 
& Multimedia Content Code for the Internet industry in Malaysia. 
7.2 Overview of Defamatory Statement 
The law of defamation in the UK
7
 is principally governed by the 
Defamation Act 1996 though now is also significantly shaped by the 
Defamation Act 2013.
8
 The 1996 statute does not provide explicit 
definition of what defamatory means and nor does the subsequent act. 
In the leading case of Sim v Stretch,
9
 it was proposed by Lord Atkin 
that a defamatory statement is one which injures the reputation of 
                                                 
7
 Defamation may attract civil and criminal liability, but criminal libel in the UK has 
been abolished following the Law Commission Working Paper, Criminal Libel 
(Law Com No 84, 1982). 
8
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another by exposing him to ‘hatred, contempt or ridicule’, or which 
tends to lower him ‘in the estimation of right–thinking members of 
society’.
10
 Since then, it has been generally accepted that defamation 
refers to ‘the publication of a statement which reflects on a person’s 
reputation and tends to lower him in the estimation of right–thinking 




The decision was referred by Tugendhat J in Thornton v Telegraph 
Media Group Ltd
12
 which ruled that ‘whatever definition of 
“defamatory” is adopted, it must include a qualification or threshold 
of seriousness, so as to exclude trivial claims’.
13
 The imposition on the 
existence of a ‘threshold of seriousness’ in what is defamatory appears 
to be in parallel with the judgment in Jameel v Dow Jones & Co
14
 that 
necessitates the commission of real and substantial tort in any 
defamation suit.  
The Defamation Act 2013 has inserted an additional prerequisite, as 
section 1(1) requires the claimant to prove the publication of the 
alleged defamatory statement has caused or is likely to cause serious 
harm to his reputation before a defamation action can be initiated.
15
 
As for bodies trading for profit, the ‘serious harm’ condition requires 
them to demonstrate that the publication of allegedly defamatory 
statement has caused or is likely to cause serious financial loss to 
                                                 
10
 ibid 1240.  
11
 W. V. H. Rogers, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (18th ed, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 
515. 
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 [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB), [2011] 1 WLR 1985. 
13
 ibid [90]. 
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 [2005] EWCA Civ 75, [2005] QB 946. 
15
 Section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013 states ‘A statement is not defamatory 
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of the claimant’. 
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 It is argued that the requirement of serious harm is likely to 
make it more difficult to commence defamation proceedings as it has 
raised the bar for bringing a claim in the UK. 
In Malaysia, the law on defamation is contained in the Malaysian 
Defamation Act 1957.
17
 Unfortunately, the statute provides no single 
definition of what defamation is. As a result, local courts in Malaysia 
have closely followed the law in the UK. Even then, there is no 
comprehensive definition of what constitutes defamatory matter. The 
interpretation of the word has been deliberated in a number of cases. 
In Syed Husin Ali v Syarikat Perchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & 
Anor,
18
 Mohd Azmi J set out the defamatory test as follows: 
[T]he test of defamatory nature of a statement is its tendency to 
excite against the plaintiff the adverse opinion of others, although 
no one believes the statement to be true. Another test is: would the 
words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right thinking 
members of society generally? The typical type of defamation is an 
attack upon the moral character of the plaintiff attributing crimes, 
dishonesty, untruthfulness, ingratitude or cruelty.
19
 
In the subsequent case of Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul-Rahman 
Ya’kub v Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors,
20
 Richard Malanjum concluded that the 
test of defamatory nature of a statement is its tendency to excite 
against the plaintiff the adverse opinion of others, even though nobody 
believes in the truth of the statement. It was highlighted that: 
As to whether the words complained of in this case were capable of 
being, and were, in fact, defamatory of the plaintiff, the test to be 
considered is whether the words complained of were calculated to 
                                                 
16
 Section 1(2) of the Defamation Act 2013 provides ‘For the purpose of this section, 
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Defamation Act 1952, governs civil defamation whilst criminal libel is dealt with 
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19
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expose him to hatred, ridicule or contempt in the mind of a 
reasonable man or would tend to lower the plaintiff in the 
estimation of right – thinking members of society generally.
21
 
The issue has also been discussed in Chok Foo Choo @ Chok Kee 
Lian v The China Press Bhd.
22
 It was observed by Gopal Sri Ram 
JCA: 
[T]he test which is to be applied lies in the question: do the words 
published in their natural and ordinary meaning impute to the 
plaintiff any dishonourable or discreditable conduct or motives or a 
lack of integrity on his part? If the question invites an affirmative 
response, then the words complained of are defamatory.
23
 
In Mark Ignatius Uttley @ Mark Ostyn v Wong Kam Hor & Anor,
24
 
Kamalanathan Ratnam J highlighted that ‘as to whether the said 
meaning is defamatory, the test is to see if such words tend to make 
reasonable people think the worse of the plaintiff or whether such 
words would cause him to be shunned or avoided’.
25
 These judicial 
interpretations have been considered in Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim 
v The New Straits Times Press (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor.
26
 It was ruled 
that: 
In my assessment, therefore, an imputation would be defamatory if 
its effect is to expose the plaintiff, in the eyes of community, to 
hatred, ridicule or contempt or to lower him or her in their 
estimation or to cause him or her to be shunned and avoided by 
them. This is to be judged by ordinary, right-thinking members of 




As to the requirement of ‘threshold of seriousness’ that was 
established in Jameel v Dow Jones & Co
28
 and is now incorporated in 
the Defamation Act 2013, it has yet to be required by the courts in 
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Malaysia. In the absence of any reported decisions and express 
statutory provisions, the publication of any statement will be regarded 
as defamatory under the Malaysian law if such statement conforms to 
the criteria formulated by the courts. As such, if an imputation 
exposes a person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or tends to lower him 
in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally, or 
causes him to be shunned or avoided, such statement will be deemed 
defamatory. For that reason, it is submitted that what constitutes 
defamation in Malaysia is to be distinguished from the current 
position in the UK as the Malaysian law does not require a serious 
harm threshold to be proved before defamation proceedings be 
initiated against the defendant. 
7.3 Libel or Slander   
In the UK and Malaysia, a defamatory statement may constitute a libel 
or slander. The differences between these two types of defamation 
have been highlighted by Kay L.J in South Hetton Coal Company Ltd 
v North-Eastern News Association Ltd: 
[I]n an action for libel, i.e., where the defamatory statement is 
printed or written and published, and not merely communicated 
orally, generally speaking damage is presumed, and that which is 
called special damage, viz., the suffering some definite loss, need 
not be proved or alleged.
29
 
As such, it is generally understood that libel is committed when a 
defamatory statement is made and published in some permanent and 
visible form like writing, printing, pictures, visual images, gestures 
and other methods of signifying meaning even waxworks or effigies.
30
 
On the other hand, slander refers to oral defamation or defamation 
published in transient form. It may also include disparaging gestures 
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 Nonetheless, defamatory words spoken over the air on 
television or radio are treated as libel and not slander
32
 since such 
words are normally read out from written materials. Thus, the central 
distinction between libel and slander lies in the ‘form’ of publication, 
‘permanent’ versus ‘transient’. 
Apart from that, libel is actionable per se as damage is presumed and 
that special damage need not be proved or alleged. This however does 
not mean that a substantial award of damages is to be given to the 
claimant where it is proved that as a result of the publication of the 
defamatory statement, the claimant has suffered limited damage or no 
damage at all. Further, the claimant is now statutorily required to 
prove that the defamation has caused or is likely to cause serious 
harm.
33
 With regard to slander, it requires the claimant to prove that 
some special damage (i.e. pecuniary loss or loss capable of assessment 
in monetary terms) has been suffered as a result of the slanderous 
statement, unless it falls within specified exceptions.
34
  
Further, libel has a greater capacity to cause harm and its damages 
could be normally much higher than slander.
35
 This is perhaps due to 
the permanency of libellous statement and its wide reach in terms of 
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 BHLB Trustee Bhd & Anor v HSBC (M) Trustee Bhd & Ors [2006] 4 MLJ 48. 
32
 Section 166(1) of the Broadcasting Act 1990. 
33
 Section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013. 
34
 Slanderous statements that are actionable per se include words imputing a crime 
for which the claimant can be made to suffer physically by way of punishment, 
words imputing to the claimant a contagious or infectious disease, words calculated 
to disparage the claimant in any office, profession, calling, trade or business held or 
carried on by him at the time of publication, and words imputing adultery or 
unchastity to a woman or girl. Patrick Milmo, WVH Rogers and Clement Gatley 
(eds), Gatley on Libel and Slander (11th ed, Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 
2008) paras 4.3. 4.13, 4.15, 4.20; Shad Saleem Faruqi, Mass Media Laws and 
Regulations in Malaysia (Asian Media Information and Communication Centre 
1998) 53. 
35
 Mohamed Ali Saeh, ‘Online Defamation and Intermediaries’ Liability: 
International’ (Social Science Research Network 2012) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 
2191844 14. <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2191844> 
[accessed 29 January 2013]. 
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dissemination compared to slander.
36
 In addition, libel denotes a more 
deliberate act or contemplated state of mind, whilst slander can 
sometimes arise in the heat of the moment of exchanges.
37
 Therefore, 
it is important to classify defamatory publications as libel or slander as 
there are grave legal consequences between them. 
Nonetheless, the difference between the two becomes more difficult to 
discern with the convergence of telecommunications, broadcasting 
and information technology industries and the development of 
numerous forms of Internet based publications such as social 
networking sites, blogs and many others. Thus, reference must be 
made to the existing provisions and relevant cases in order to 
determine the status of defamatory content published on the Internet-
based platforms, particularly blogs under the law in the UK and 
Malaysia. 
By virtue of section 166(1) of the Broadcasting Act 1990,
38
 
broadcasting by radio and television are treated as libel. The section 
provides: 
For the purposes of the law of libel and slander (including the law 
of criminal libel so far as it relates to the publication of defamatory 
matter) the publication of words
39
 in the course of any programme 
included in a programme service shall be treated as publication in 
permanent form. 
 
                                                 
36




 Section 204(3) of the Broadcasting Act 1990 states the statute is applicable to the 
whole UK. However, there are a few exceptions and one of them relates to the 
distinction between libel and slander in section 166(1). By virtue of subsections (4) 
and (5) of section 166, the difference is only applicable to England, Wales and 
Northern Island but not Scotland as all forms of defamation are actionable in Scots 
law without proof of special damage. 
39
 Section 16(1) of the Defamation Act 1952 provides that any reference to words 
‘shall be construed as including a reference to pictures, visual images, gestures and 
other methods of signifying meaning’. 
Political Blogs and Freedom of Expression:  
A Comparative Study of Malaysia and the United Kingdom 
Chapter 7: Blogs and Online Defamation in Malaysia and the 
United Kingdom 
240 
Nonetheless, the application of this provision to online content is yet 
to be judicially scrutinised by courts in the UK. Materials transmitted 
via the Internet could be rendered as publications in permanent form 
and consequently constitute libel if such publications fall within the 
coverage of the phrase ‘publication of words in the course of any 
programme included in a programme service’. Section 202(1) of the 
Broadcasting Act 1990 defines the word ‘programme’ as including ‘an 
advertisement and, in relation to any service, includes any item 
included in that service’. Further, section 201(1) provides that the term 
‘programme service’ refers to: 
[A]ny of the following services (whether or not it is, or it requires 
to be, licensed under this Act), namely— 
(aa) any service which is a programme service within the meaning 
of the Communications Act 2003;
40
 
(c) any other service which consists in the sending, by means of an 
electronic communications network (within the meaning of the 
Communications Act 2003),
41
 of sounds or visual images or both 
either –  
(i) for reception at two or more places in the United Kingdom 
(whether they   are so sent for simultaneous reception or at 
different times in response to requests made by different users 
of the service); or 
(ii) for reception at a place in the United Kingdom for the 
purpose of being presented there to members of the public or 
to any group of persons. 
 
                                                 
40
 Section 405(1) of the Communications Act 2003 defines ‘programme service’ to 
mean a television programme service, the public teletext service, an additional 
television service, a digital additional television service, a radio programme service, 
or a sound service provided by the BBC.  ‘Television programme’ is defined as any 
programme (with or without sounds), which is produced wholly or partly, to be seen 
on television and consists of moving or still images or of legible text or of a 
combination of those things.  
41
 The phrase ‘electronic communications network’ in section 32(1)(a) of the 
Communications Act 2003 refers to ‘a transmission system for the conveyance, by 
the use of electrical, magnetic or electro-magnetic energy, of signals of any 
description’. 
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Based on these provisions, it is clear that Internet publications such as 
blogs, Wiki, YouTube, and many others are most likely to be included 
within the interpretation of the phrase ‘programme services’ in section 
201(1)(c), and these transmitted materials either in the form of text, 
image, audio or video are to fall within the meaning of ‘programme’ 
in section 202(1) of the Broadcasting Act 1990. Thus, the likelihood is 
that libel, rather than slander, is the dominant tort for Internet-based 
publications.  
On the contrary, it may be argued that online content would fall short 
of the requirement of ‘sending’ in section 201(1)(c) since such content 
is not being ‘sent’ but ‘pulled’ by Internet users. However, this 
argument is difficult to sustain due to the presence of the words in 
parentheses in section 201(1)(c)(i) which states that ‘whether they are 
so sent for simultaneous reception or at different times in response to 
request made by different users of the service’. Therefore, defamation 
published via online publications including blogs will be deemed as 
publications in permanent form and constitute libel under section 
166(1) of the Defamation Act 1996.
42
 
Regardless of the conflicting argument, it has been suggested that 
court should treat online defamation, especially blog postings as 
slander rather than libel.
43
 Blog entries are said to have more in 
common with the spoken words, as they exist in a ‘low-trust culture’ 
and are unlikely to be viewed as authoritative, errors in blogs can be 
corrected within minutes, and those who have been defamed by blogs 
                                                 
42
 Internet publications which are not sent for reception at two or more places in the 
country such as e-mail sent to one person in the UK or to recipients outside the 
country as well as online conversation between two persons in the UK or with 
people outside the country by using instantaneous forms of Internet communication 
like Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and video-conferencing services shall not 
be included within the scope of the provision. 
43
 Glenn Reynolds, ‘Libel in the Blogosphere: Some Preliminary Thoughts’ (Social 
Science Research Network 2007) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1030527 1164 – 1166. 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1030527> [accessed 10 February 2013]. 
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have a greater ability to reply to such accusations.
44
 Nonetheless, the 
assertion has been criticised as wanting to represent the entire 
blogosphere and unfounded.
45
 It failed to consider the role of search 
engines in establishing authority and the devastating impact of 
defamatory blog entries that are linked with traditional websites, 
discussion boards and other blogs.
46
 Further, not all bloggers are 
active in correcting errors and the victims may also not be 




Apart from that, cases involving defamatory posts by bloggers in the 
UK have also been commenced and tried under the law of libel rather 
than slander.
48
 Even though the main issues of these cases centred on 
the seriousness threshold for damage to reputation and the issue of 
abuse of process, there is little doubt that entries by bloggers are not to 
be regarded as libel since postings or articles in blogs usually signify a 
deliberate act or contemplated state of mind of bloggers. It is however 
submitted that these criteria may accord some protection to amateur 
bloggers since they normally do not have huge number of readers or 
followers in the blogosphere.  
Nonetheless, there arises uncertainty with regard to comments by blog 
readers though defamatory words that are written in a permanent form 
are almost certainly libel in technical sense. This is due to the rulings 
                                                 
44
 Ibid 1164 – 1166. 
45
 Anthony Ciolli, ‘Defamatory Internet Speech: A Defense of the Status Quo’ 
(2006) 25 QLR 853, 854. 
46
 ibid 859 – 860. 
47
 ibid 861 – 862. 
48
 This can be illustrated with a number of cases including Carrie v Tolkien [2009] 
EWHC 29 (QB), [2009] EMLR 9; Ali v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2010] EWHC 
100 (QB), 2010 WL 20036; Kaschke v Gray [2010] EWHC 690 (QB), [2011] 1 
WLR 452; Davison v Habeeb [2011] EWHC 3031 (QB), [2012] 3 CMLR 6. 
Nonetheless, the question of whether blog posts constitute libel or slander has not 
been contested in these cases. 
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in Smith v ADVFN Plc
49
 whereby the court ruled that bulletin board 
exchanges on the Internet are more susceptible of being equated with 
slander. It was observed by Eady J that such comments resemble: 
 [C]ontributions to a casual conversation (the analogy sometimes 
being drawn with people chatting in a bar) which people simply 
note before moving on; they are often uninhibited, casual and ill 
thought out; those who participate know this and expect a certain 
amount of repartee or ‘give and take’.
50
 
Further, statements in bulletin boards were not meant to be taken 
seriously as ‘it is often obvious to casual observers that people are just 
saying the first thing that comes into their heads and reacting in the 
heat of the moment’.
51
 The decision appears to be a bold departure 
from the earlier judgment in Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd
52
 which 
ruled that defamatory articles posted on the Usenet as libel. 
The ruling by Eady J has been subsequently quoted with approval by 
Sharp J in Clift v Clarke
53
 when the court refused to grant an order for 
the disclosure of the identity of the persons who made comments on 
the Daily Mail website on the ground that such comments were mere 
‘pub talk’ and it would be ‘fanciful to suggest any reasonable sensible 
reader would construe them in any other way’.
54
 In relation to this, it 
is submitted that comments on blogs could be equally considered as 
‘pub talk’ that are expressed in ‘the heat of the moment’ and should 
therefore be rightly regarded as slander. Nonetheless, certain blog 
comments imputing that a person has committed a criminal offence, or 
is suffering from a disease,
55
 or disparaging remarks on his 
                                                 
49
 [2008] EWHC 1797 (QB), 2008 WL 2872559. 
50
 ibid [14]. 
51
 ibid [17]. 
52
 [2001] QB 201, [2000] 3 WLR 1020. 
53
 [2011] EWHC 1164 (QB), 2011 WL 441883. 
54
 ibid [36]. 
55
 Section 2 of the Defamation Act 1952. 
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professional or business reputation
56
 and statements relating to a 
woman’s chastity
57
 could not be regarded as slander because these 
statements are actionable per se under the law.
58
 To sum up, it is 
submitted that blog comments are more likely to be treated in general 
as slander but comments by third parties on certain issues as 
mentioned above will be treated differently. 
As to the publication of defamatory content in Malaysia, section 3 of 
the Malaysian Defamation Act 1957 provides that ‘For the purpose of 
the law of libel and slander the broadcasting of words by means of 
radio communication shall be treated as publication in a permanent 
form’. It is plainly stated that reports or matters broadcast by radio are 
regarded as equal to publications in newspapers.
59
 These provisions 
have been extended to cover publications on televisions as well since 
legal suits relating to defamatory materials broadcast on television 
stations have been judicially tried and decided under the libel law.
60
 
Therefore, it is an established principle that publications in printed 
materials and broadcasting through radio or television constitute libel 
rather than slander. 
With regard to defamatory statements published on various types of 
Internet–based platforms including blogs, such materials will be 
subjected to libel law if they fall within the scope of ‘the broadcasting 
of words by means of radio communication’. The term ‘word’ is 
                                                 
56
 Section 3 of the Defamation Act 1952. 
57
 Section 1 of the Slander of Women Act 1891. 
58
 Milmo, Rogers, and Gatley, Gatley on Libel and Slander (n 34). 
59
 Section 13(1) of the Defamation Act 1957 provides ‘The provisions of this Act 
shall apply in relation to reports or matters broadcast by means of radio 
communication as part of any programme or service provided by means of a 
broadcasting station within Malaysia, and in relation to any broadcasting by means 
of radio communication of any such report or matter, as they apply in relation to 
reports and matters published in a newspaper and to publication in a newspaper’. 
60
 Among notable cases are Mohamed Azwan bin Haji Ali v Sistem Televisyen (M) 
Bhd & Ors [2000] 4 MLJ 120; and YB Dato’ Dr Hasan bin Mohamed Ali v YB 
Mulia Tengku Putra bin Tengku Awang [2010] 8 MLJ 269. 
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defined in section 2 of the Malaysian Defamation Act 1957 to include 
‘pictures, visual images, gestures and other methods of signifying 
meaning’. Whilst the phrase ‘broadcasting by means of radio 
communication’ is provided in the same section as: 
Publication for general reception by means of a radio 
communication within the meaning of the Telecommunications Act 
1950,
61
 and includes the transmission simultaneously by 
telecommunication line in accordance with a licence granted in that 
behalf under the Telecommunications Act of words broadcast by 
means of radio communication. 
By way of analogy with broadcast publications, since online content is 
transmitted via telecommunication lines and is normally composed of 
a varied combination of written texts, visual images and sounds, it is 
to be expected that defamatory materials published via Internet 
platforms to be regarded as libel. The uncertainty of the issue is 
resolved when cases involving defamation suits against bloggers have 
been tried and decided according to the law of libel.
62
 Hence, it is an 
established principle that publication of defamatory statements in 
blogs and other online communications would be regarded as libel and 
such publication shall not be treated differently from printed materials 
and broadcasting through radio or television under the Malaysian 
Defamation Act 1957. As to the status of defamatory blog comments, 
there appears to have attracted comparatively little attention of the 
judges. In the absence of reported cases and by applying the 
provisions of the Malaysian Defamation Act 1957, it is very much 
unlikely that courts in the country will make a distinction between 
defamatory postings by bloggers and defamatory comments by blog 
                                                 
61
 The Malaysian Telecommunications Act 1950 has been repealed by section 273 of 
the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Act 1998, which has been passed to 
regulate the convergence of communications, broadcasting and information 
technology in Malaysia. 
62
 The New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd & Ors v Ahirudin bin Attan [2008] 1 MLJ 
814; Datuk Seri Utama Dr Rais bin Yatim v Amizudin bin Ahmat [2012] 2 MLJ 807; 
and YB Hj Khalid bin Abdul Samad v Datuk Aziz bin Isham & Anor [2012] 7 MLJ 
301. 
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readers. Thus, any publication of defamatory materials in the 
blogosphere will generally be considered as libel and not slander 
under the Malaysian law. 
7.4 Multiple and Single Publication Rule 
The basis of defamation liability is publication
63
 as no action can be 
maintained unless it can be shown that the alleged defamation have 
been published to a person other than the claimant or their spouse.
64
 
This has been highlighted in Hebditch v MacIlwaine
65
 that ‘The 
material part of the cause of action in libel is not the writing, but the 
publication of the libel’.
66




Unfortunately, publication on the Internet has created a major issue 
for publishers and authors of online defamatory materials. This is 
because most of online content remains accessible for long or an 
indefinite period after it was first published. Further, publication of 
defamatory words on the Internet may occur in more than one place 
and they are potentially accessible anywhere in the world. By virtue of 
the multiple publication rule, which derived its origin in Duke of 
Brunswick v Harma,
68
 each communication of the defamatory 
statement constitutes a separate publication and gives rise to a distinct 
cause of action. Hence, regardless of the limitation rule on 
defamation, the statement is considered to have published at the time 
                                                 
63
 In Pullman v W. Hill & Co Ltd [1891] 1 QB 524 at 527, Lord Esher MR defined 
publication as ‘The making known of defamatory matter after it has been written to 
some person other than the person to whom it is written’. 
64
 In a very old case of Wennhak v Morgan (1880) 20 QBD 637, the court ruled that 
there was no publication where the communication was made to the spouse of the 
defendant. 
65
 [1894] 2 QB 54. 
66
 ibid 61.  
67
 However, publication is not part of the Scots Law because defamation is regarded 
as an injury to a person’s feelings and reputation. 
68
 (1849) 14 QB 185. 
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when, and in the place where, it is received or accessed from the 
Internet and this could result in endless liability for publishers and 
authors of online defamatory statement. 
The multiple publication rule has been criticised for its incongruity 
with online publication and the argument had been invoked in 
Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Ltd (Nos 2 – 5).
69
 The claimant 
brought defamation suit against the defendants for articles that were 
published in a newspaper and online. After more than a year from the 
date of original publication, the plaintiff sued one of the defendants in 
respect of the same articles stored in the online archive. The defendant 
argued that the single publication rule should be adapted to online 
materials and that the publications should be deemed to take place just 
once when they were placed on the website for the first time. The 
court disagreed with the contention and ruled that ‘It is a well 
established principle of the English law of defamation that each 
individual publication of a libel gives rise to a separate cause of 
action, subject to its own limitation period’.
70
 It was held that each 
time the articles were accessed, it constituted a fresh publication and a 
separate cause of action.  
The claimant then brought an action in the ECtHR
71
 arguing that the 
judgment constituted an unjustifiable and disproportionate 
interference with its freedom of expression as it was exposed to 
ceaseless liability for libel. Unfortunately, the Strasbourg court 
rejected the contention as it ruled that in the circumstances of the case, 
it was not necessary to consider the point. Thus, the issue of ‘ceaseless 
liability’ has not been addressed by the ECtHR. In relation to this, it 
has been suggested that in order to avoid being exposed to the risk of 
                                                 
69
 [2001] EWCA Civ 1805, [2002] QB 78. 
70
 ibid [57]. 
71
 Times Newspapers Ltd (Nos 1 and 2) v United Kingdom [2009] EMLR 14. 
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liability in the future, the publishers are obliged to remove or attach 
qualifications to the alleged defamatory materials.
72
 
The enduring concern finally came to an end when the single 
publication rule
73
 was incorporated into the Defamation Act 2013 to 
replace the problematic multiple publication rule. The single 
publication rule is crucial for online content, in particular Internet 
archives, as section 8(1)(3) of the Defamation Act 2013 stipulates that 
the first publication of the defamatory material to the public (including 
a section of the public)
74
 triggers the one year limitation period within 
which the claimant must initiate his claim. The rule has prevented an 
indefinite defamation action against the same person for publishing 
the same defamatory materials on the Internet. The single publication 
rule however does not apply to subsequent publication which is 
‘materially different’ from the manner of the first publication.
75
 In 
deciding the issue, the court may have regard to the level of 




Apart from that, the single publication rule does not apply to second 
persons or third parties who republish the defamatory content, as they 
are not the same person who published the first statement. Each 
republication of such materials is considered a fresh publication and 
                                                 
72
 Matthew Collins, The Law of Defamation and the Internet (3rd ed, Oxford 
University Press 2010) 148. 
73
 The single publication rule was subjected to numerous criticisms as it was claimed 
that the rule was unsatisfactorily drafted. See Molly Grace, ‘The Draft Defamation 
Bill - A Radical Change?’ (2012) I The Manchester Review of Law, Crime and 
Ethics 86, 91; Alistair Mullis and Andrew Scott, ‘Lord Lester’s Defamation Bill 
2010: A Distorted View of the Public Interest?’ (2011) 16 Comms L 6, 13 – 4; 
Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, ‘Worth the Candle? The Government’s Draft 
Defamation Bill’ (2011) 3 JML 1, 13 – 15. 
74
 Section 8(2) of the Defamation Act 2013 states ‘publication to the public’ includes 
‘publication to a section of the public’. 
75
 Section 8(4) of the Defamation Act 2013. 
76
 Section 8(5) of the Defamation Act 2013. 
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will give rises to a distinct cause of action.
77
 The liability of the 
original author or publisher for the repetition of the disputed 
statements will depend on whether the republication is reasonably 
foreseeable.
78
 The potential application of this principle to the Internet 
materials can be best referred to the judgment in Slipper v British 
Broadcasting Corp.
79
 The plaintiff claimed that he was defamed in a 
film by the defendants. A few days after the film was broadcast, it was 
reviewed in national newspapers. The plaintiff alleged that the reviews 
repeated the sting of defamatory references to him in the film. The 
issue was whether the defendants could be held liable for the 
republication of the defamatory words in the subsequent reviews. It 
was held that the jury would be entitled to conclude that the 
defendants anticipated that there would be reviews and that the 
reviews would repeat the sting. 
Republication of defamatory content on the Internet has been 
considered in the Malaysian case of YB Hj Khalid bin Abdul Samad v 
Datuk Aziz bin Isham & Anor.
80
 The plaintiff, an opposition MP, sued 
the defendants (chief editor and a national daily newspaper) for libels 
arising out of their republication of an article defamatory of him 
which originally appeared on the official blog of another MP. The 
issue was whether the defendants could be held liable for an article 
that was posted by another MP. The court found the defendants liable 
for defamation as they made no attempts to verify the veracity of the 
article and they failed to publish disclaimer indicating that the views 
in the article were those of the MP and not of the defendants. 
                                                 
77
 Yaman Akdeniz and Horton Rogers, ‘Defamation on the Internet’ in Yaman 
Akdeniz, Clive Walker and David Wall (eds), The Internet, Law and Society 
(Longman 2000) 311. 
78
 Rogers, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (n 11) 544. 
79
 [1991] 1 QB 283. 
80
 [2012] 7 MLJ 301. 
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7.5 Online Intermediary Liability 
Online intermediaries play an important role in online publication as 
they generally perform one of three functions, mere conduits, caches 




 including Web 2.0 
platforms and blogs, are easier to trace and often operate locally. They 
become an attractive target in legal proceedings since they represent a 
point of control or gatekeeper over materials on the Internet. Further, 
most intermediaries may also have deeper pocket and are more 
capable of paying damages than individuals in defamation actions. 
This has resulted in undesirable consequences as intermediaries are 
likely to be exposed to defamatory postings by third parties. As such, 
this part of the study examines the potential liability of bloggers as 
online intermediaries in relation to third party defamatory content and 
their liability for providing link to defamatory materials in external 
websites. 
7.5.1 Liability for Third Party Content 
The liability of intermediaries for content created by others depends 
on their status under the Defamation Act 2013. Section 10(1) provides 
that: 
 
                                                 
81
 Intermediaries are mere conduits when they facilitate the communications of 
others by carrying the constituent signals and the signals are not stored on their 
networks for any period longer than is necessary for the transmission of the content. 
Intermediaries perform caching function when they store online content temporarily 
on their networks to enable the materials to be retrieved quickly at a later time. 
Intermediaries become content hosts when they store online content on their 
networks and become the primary storage site for that content. 
82
 Online intermediaries have been categorically classified into connectivity 
intermediaries such as ISPs, navigation intermediaries such as Google and 
commercial and social networking providers and other hosts such as Wikipedia, 
Facebook, Twitter, blogs and many others. See Uta Kohl, ‘The Rise and Rise of 
Online Intermediaries in the Governance of the Internet and Beyond - Connectivity 
Intermediaries’ (2012) 26 IRLCT 185, 185. 
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A court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine an action 
for defamation brought against a person who was not the author, 
editor or publisher of the statement complained of unless the court 
is satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable for an action to be 
brought against the author, editor or publisher.  
The provision has limited defamation action against those who are not 
the primary author, editor or publisher of the complained words. 
Section 10(2) states that the terms ‘author’, ‘editor’ and ‘publisher’ 
are to have the same meaning as in section 1 of the Defamation Act 
1996. Accordingly, ‘author’ refers to ‘originator of the statement, but 
does not include a person who did not intend that his statement be 
published at all’; ‘editor’ means ‘a person having editorial or 
equivalent responsibility for the content of the statement or the 
decision to publish it’; and ‘publisher’ denotes ‘a commercial 
publisher, that is, a person whose business is issuing material to the 
public, or a section of the public, who issues material containing the 
statement in the course of that business’.
83
 
Prior to the operation of the Defamation Act 2013, the liability of 
intermediaries has been considered in Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd.
84
 
The plaintiff brought libel proceedings against the defendants (ISPs) 
as they failed to remove third party’s defamatory content from the 
bulletin boards they administered after notification by the plaintiff. 
The defendants argued they should not be held liable because they 
were not the ‘publisher’ of the libellous statement. It was ruled by 
Morland J: 
[W]henever they transmit and whenever there is transmitted from 
the storage of their news server a defamatory posting, publish that 
posting to any subscriber to their ISP who accesses the newsgroup 
containing that posting. Thus every time one of the defendants’ 
                                                 
83
 Section 1(2) of the Defamation Act 1996. 
84
 Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd (n 52). 
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customers accesses soc.culture.thai and sees that posting 
defamatory of the plaintiff there is a publication to that customer.
85
 
The case has laid down an important proposition that online 
intermediaries are to be treated as publishers at common law 
regardless of whether they have actual knowledge of the content or 
not. Their liability will turn on whether they manage to establish a 
defence to the defamation action or not. 
A seemingly contrary view has been established in Totalise Plc v 
Motley Fool Ltd.
86
 The plaintiff filled a Norwich Pharmacal 
application
87
 against the defendants in order to discover the identity of 
an anonymous author who had posted defamatory remarks on their 
sites. The defendants had removed the materials but they refused to 
disclose the identity of the wrongdoer. It was ruled that the defendants 
took no responsibility for what was posted on the bulletin boards 
because they simply provided a facility for discussion and exercised 
no editorial control over the postings. They were absolved from 
liability because they had removed the materials from their servers 
after receiving notification from the plaintiff. 
A bold departure from the orthodox approach that treats all online 
intermediaries as publishers was established in Bunt v Tilley.
88
 The 
ISP defendants applied to strike out the defamation suits alleging that 
they were not publishers of the content at common law. It was ruled 
by Eady J that ‘as a matter of law that an ISP which performs no more 
than a passive role in facilitating postings on the Internet cannot be 
                                                 
85
 ibid 208 – 209. 
86
 [2001] EWCA Civ 1897, [2002] 1 WLR 1233, [2003] 2 All ER 872. 
87
 The proceedings, which were established by the House of Lords in Norwich 
Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133, allow a 
claimant in certain circumstances to file an independent action against a person who 
is believed to have necessary information about the identify of a wrongdoer. 
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against the actual wrongdoer. 
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deemed to be a publisher at common law’.
89
 The judge went further 
by holding that the ISP defendants were not even required to invoke 
any defences to escape liability.
90
 
The principle has been applied in the subsequent case of Metropolitan 
International School Ltd v Designtechnica Corp.
91
 It was ruled by 
Eady J that the third defendant search engine operators (Google Inc.) 
could not be characterised as a publisher at common law as it has not 
authorised or caused the disputed snippets to appear on the user’s 
screen.
92
This is in line with Bunt v Tilley’s
93
 case that requires actual 
knowledge on the part of online intermediaries before they could be 
imposed liability for publishing defamatory materials.  
The rulings have been considered in Davison v Habeeb.
94
 The issue 
was whether the fifth defendant (Google Inc), who offered blogging 
platform (Blogger.com) that had been used by the second and third 
defendants to post defamatory statement about the plaintiff, was a 
publisher at common law as it had been notified by the plaintiff but 
refused to take down the materials. It was ruled that ‘there is in my 
judgment an arguable case that the fifth defendant is the publisher of 
the material complained of, and that at least following notification it is 
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 [2011] EWHC 3031 (QB), [2012] 3 CMLR 6. 
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In Tamiz v Google Inc,
96
 the respondent (Google Inc.) was sued for 
providing Blogger.com, a blogging platform that had been used by 
one blogger to post defamatory comments of the appellant. 
Nonetheless, the comments had been removed by the respondent three 
days after it was notified by the appellant. It was held by Eady J that 
though the comments complained of were arguably defamatory, the 
respondent was not a publisher at common law either before or after it 
was notified of the complaint. The decision was reversed by the Court 
of Appeal as it was observed by Richards LJ that there was an 
arguable case that the respondent was a publisher after notification. 
Since the respondent allowed the defamatory postings to remain, ‘it 
might be inferred to have associated itself with, or to have made itself 
responsible for, the continued presence of the material.’
97
 
Nonetheless, the appeal was dismissed as the court concluded that any 
damage to the appellant’s reputation after notification by the appellant 
but before removal would have only been trivial. Thus, it is a settled 
law that online intermediaries will only be treated as publishers of the 
third party defamatory content at common law if they have actual 
knowledge of the existence of such content. 
As to the liability of blog owners for defamatory comments by third 
parties, the issue should also be determined in accordance with section 
10 of the Defamation Act 2013 which explicitly stipulates that a court 
does not have jurisdiction to determine an action against a person who 
was not the author, editor or publisher of the defamatory publication. 
It is obvious that bloggers are not the author of such statement, but 
they could still be held liable in defamation if it could be shown that 
they are to be regarded as editor or publisher of the disputed words. 
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The application of section 10 to blogs has yet to be seen in any 
reported cases, but reference can be made to Kaschke v Gray.
98
 The 
plaintiff brought libel action against the author of defamatory 
comments on Labourhome blog (the first defendant) and the blogger 
who had set up the blog (the second defendant). The second defendant 
argued that he did not participate in the publication of the postings and 
applied to strike out the suit. The court granted the second defendant’s 
application as an abuse of process. It was ruled that ‘there is no 
realistic prospect of an award of more than very modest damages in 
this action and that for similar reasons to those identified by Eady J it 
would be an abuse of process for this action to proceed to trial’.
99
  
It is important to note that although the plaintiff’s action was rejected, 
the decision does not lay down a definite principle on the liability of 
bloggers for defamatory third party postings. It is far from clear that 
bloggers are not liable for such materials since there is an arguable 
case that bloggers could be held liable for comments posted on their 
websites.
100
 As such, it has been suggested that bloggers must be wary 
of comments and preferably moderate them, and if in doubt remove 
them, especially if they are advised that the comments are 
defamatory.
101
 Alternatively, the easiest way to avoid any liability is 
to turn off the commentary section in blogs.
102
  
With the enactment of the Defamation Act 2013, it is submitted that 
the uncertainty surrounding the liability of bloggers for third party 
comments is now resolved. By virtue of section 10, bloggers could 
avoid liability in defamation by proving that they are not the author, 
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editor or publisher of the defamatory words.
103
 Based on the 
interpretation in section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996, bloggers are 
unlikely to be treated as the author or publisher of the third party 
content. However, they may still be imposed liability in defamation if 
they exercise editorial control over readers’ comments. Thus, it is 
submitted that bloggers could escape liability simply by not 
moderating posting by third parties. Alternatively, they may moderate 
third party statements on their blogs but must immediately remove any 
defamatory content upon notification of its existence. This is in line 
with the common law principles which treat online intermediaries 
including bloggers as publishers only if they have actual knowledge of 
the disputed content. 
As to the position in Malaysia, the liability of bloggers for third party 
content has been raised in Kho Whai Phiaw v Chong Chieng Jen.
104
 
The petitioner presented a petition to the Election Court to have the 
respondent’s victory in the Parliamentary election be declared void for 
undue influence. The respondent was alleged to have exerted undue 
influence by publishing or allowing to be published on his blog, 
Chong Chieng Jen’s Blog, an article written by Mr Smith (Mr Smith’s 
article) which was said to contain threatening statements towards the 
voters. The petitioner contended that the respondent has absolute 
control over his blog and that he could control all entries including 
hiding, editing and deleting postings, or limiting the type of visitors 
who could add postings or comments on his blog as well as moderate 
those comments. For that reason, the petitioner argued that the 
respondent should be regarded as publisher of all information on his 
blog, including Mr Smith’s article, though it was written by third 
                                                 
103
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parties since the act of publication could not have taken place without 
the respondent’s consent or knowledge. The court ruled that since 
there was no sufficient evidence to prove that Mr Smith’s article was 
posted on the respondent’s blog with his knowledge or consent, the 




The case has established that in the absence of knowledge or consent 
on the part of bloggers, no liabilities could be imposed on them as 
they are not to be treated as publishers of the third party content.
106
 A 
crucial question arises as to whose duty is to establish the element of 
knowledge. It was observed by Clement Skinner J:  
The general law is that the burden of proof as to any particular fact 
lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence. 
Accordingly in this election petition, the burden of proving that Mr 
Smith’s article was published with the knowledge or consent of the 
successful candidate i.e. the respondent, is on the petitioner who 
wishes the court to believe in its existence.
107
 
Despite the aforesaid judgment, it is pertinent to highlight the 
implication of a new section 114A in the Malaysian Evidence Act 
1950 which came into force on 31
st
 July 2012. The amendment was 
aimed at tackling the problem of online anonymity, but it has rendered 
all persons who act as owners, hosts, administrators, editors or sub-
editors, or who facilitate to publish or re-publish any publication to be 
presumed as publishers under the law unless otherwise stated.
108
 Thus, 
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the element of knowledge in the aforesaid case could be no longer 
essential as this development appears to make all bloggers or 
operators of Internet communications as publishers and liable for 
online materials posted on their websites, including the third party 
content. Nonetheless, there is yet any reported case on the application 
of this new amendment and it is therefore very premature to hold blog 
owners or editors to be strictly liable for any defamatory entries by 
third party. 
7.5.2 Liability for Linking 
Hyperlinks (hypertext link) are essentially a crucial part of the Internet 
as they create interconnection or cross-reference between a large 
amounts of information on the Internet. The term ‘hyperlink’ can be 
defined as an electronic link providing direct access from one 
distinctively marked place in a hypertext or hypermedia document to 
another in the same or a different document.
109
 Hyperlinks enable 
users to be transported from one website to another when the text or 
image is clicked.
110
 They can be classified into several categories,
111
 
but the most common forms are ordinary linking (shallow or deep 
linking
112
) and framing (framed linking).
113
 Ordinary linking involves 
a simple hyperlink from one webpage to another, whereas framing 
usually involves the inclusion of a hyperlink on a webpage that causes 
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The legal status of online intermediaries for providing a hyperlink to 
another website that contains defamatory or illegal materials has yet to 
be established in the UK. Currently, there is no specific regulation on 
providers of hyperlinks, location tools and content aggregation 
services. This is due to the findings of the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) consultation on the Electronic Commerce Directive in 
2005 that concluded that there are no compelling reasons for the UK 
government to regulate these matters.
115
 Unfortunately, the absence of 
statutory provisions has resulted in uncertainty over the potential 
liability of online intermediaries for hyperlinked materials that are 
defamatory or illegal.  
As a general rule, providers of hyperlinks who deliberately insert 
hyperlinks or frames on websites within their control are to be treated 
as publishers of the external materials. This is because they 
intentionally direct online users to the materials and may have actual 
knowledge or possess a certain degree of awareness of the linked 
content.
116
 However, there is a very limited judicial consideration on 
this issue and consequently, their liability will be entirely dependent 
on the merits of each case. 
The question on hyperlinked materials was first considered in 
Shetland Times Ltd v Wills.
117
 The plaintiffs (Shetland Times) sought 
an interim interdict precluding the defendants (Shetland News) from 
deep linking to the plaintiffs’ internal pages through hyperlinks that 




 DTI Consultation Document on Electronic Commerce Directive: The Liability of 
Hyperlinkers, Location Tool Services and Content Aggregators at 
<www.dti.gov.uk/consultations/page13985.html> [accessed 27 February 2013]. 
116
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bypassed their homepage. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ 
conduct amounted to a copyright infringement under the UK 
Copyright Designs and Patents Act of 1988. In granting the injunction, 
Lord Hamilton ordered all links to the plaintiffs’ websites from the 
defendants’ website should be removed. The defendants appealed but 
before a full trial was about to begin, the parties reached a mutual 
settlement.
118
 As a result, the court had lost the opportunity to 
scrutinise the liability of hyperlink providers in details at trial.
119
 
In Elton John v Countess Joulebine,
120
 the defendant (owner of gossip 
website) was sued for breach of confidence in relation to a stolen draft 
advice of counsel to the claimants. The draft was initially placed on 
her website by an unknown individual, but when she realised that the 
document was of value, she placed a link on the home page of her 
website to the draft. The draft remained accessible on her website and 
it was only removed when the claimants obtained an injunction 
against its publication. The defendant argued that she should not be 
held liable as she did not know the draft was genuine or confidential 
material. It was ruled that the defendant ought to have known that 
there was a risk that the document was being imparted in breach of 
confidence and she should not have continued to have it published on 
her website. Accordingly, the defendant was liable for breach of 
confidence from the moment she became aware of the material and 
yet still allowed the content to be placed on her website and even 
created a link to it from her home page. Hence, the case shows that 
                                                 
118
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intermediaries who knowingly provide hyperlinks to defamatory 
materials in other external websites would be treated as publisher of 
the illegal content. 
The liability of online intermediaries for hyperlinked materials has 
again been raised in Ali v Associated Newspapers Ltd.
121
 The plaintiff 
brought a libel action for articles which had been published by the 
defendants (newspaper publishers) in two daily newspapers and their 
websites. The defendants applied summary judgment for the claim to 
be struck out. One of the issues was whether the existence of a 
hyperlink in the plaintiff’s blog to another website would have the 
effect of incorporating the hyperlinked materials as part of his blog. It 
was ruled by Eady J: 
[I]t is so far undecided in the authorities whether … any material to 
which attention is drawn in a blog by this means should be taken to 
be incorporated as part of the blog itself... Much will depend on the 
circumstances of the particular case… for present purposes I 
proceed on the assumption that the Irish Times interview is not to 
be treated as an integral part of the Claimant's blog.
122
 
Despite the fact that the defendants’ application has been granted by 
the court and the hyperlinked content was not regarded as part of the 
plaintiff’s blog, the ruling in the summary judgment has stated that the 
correct approach in determining the liability for hyperlinked materials 
would depend on the facts of each case. This is to be distinguished 
with the case of McGrath v Dawkins and others.
123
 The plaintiff 
brought libel proceedings against several defendants, including the 
second defendant (operator of UK websites) for its part in publishing 
defamatory remarks by the fourth defendant. All of the defendants 
applied for a summary judgment against the plaintiff’s claim. It was 
alleged by the second defendant that it should not be held responsible 
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for defamation since the entries were posted on forums administered 
by its sister company in the US. Nonetheless, there was a link from 
the home page of the UK site to the forums on the US site. In holding 
that the second defendant should be held liable for the hyperlinked 
content, it was observed by HHJ Moloney QC: 
The law on liability for hyperlinks is in a state of some uncertainty 
at present. Even if the general English rule were … that a mere 
hyperlink does not render the operator of the linking website liable 
for the content of the linked site, the decision may well be a fact–
sensitive one, especially when, as here, the two websites are very 
closely associated, the link is hidden, and the point of contact is the 
‘Home’ button which is normally regarded as taking you to the 
central hub of the same website you are already on. I therefore 
conclude that I am not satisfied at this stage that the 2nd Defendant 
was not answerable for the .net forum at the material time, and that 
it is a question fit for trial.
124
  
The case indicates that pending a full trial on the liability of linked 
content, there is a possibility for website operators to be held liable for 
defamatory words in external sites which are linked to their websites. 
In relation to this, it was argued that should the ruling be later 
affirmed by court at trial, it may have far-reaching legal implications 
on website operators and online intermediaries as they may have to be 




With regard to the position in Malaysia, the liability of blog owner for 
hyperlinked materials has first been raised in The New Straits Times 
Press (M) Bhd & Ors v Ahiruddin bin Attan.
126
 The plaintiffs had 
commenced an action for libel and malicious falsehood against the 
defendant in relation to various postings on his blog called the 
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‘Rocky’s Bru’. As the suit was pending, the parties had agreed not to 
publish comments or posts related to the case. Later, the plaintiffs 
applied for leave to commence committal proceedings against the 
defendant alleging that the blogger had breached his undertakings by 
linking his blog to an external blog called ‘Walk With Us’ which 
contained discussions of the suit and criticisms of the plaintiffs. The 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s act of providing link to the 
impugned blog amounted to a republication of the content of the blog 
on his ‘Rocky’s Bru’ blog. It was ruled by Mohd Hishamudin J that 
the defendant could not be held liable for the content of the ‘Walk 
With Us’ blog as he was ‘neither the author nor the publisher of that 
weblog’.
127
 Further, the link to the disputed blog was only ‘a passive 
link as only the name or title of the link ‘Walk With Us’ appears on the 
right hand column of the defendant’s blog together with the names or 
titles of other 85 hyperlinks’.
128
 
The judgment has then been considered in an unreported case of 
Stemlife Berhad v Bristol-Myers Squibb (M) Sdn Bhd.
129
 Some 
messages were posted on the defendant’s online forum by two users 
operating under the pseudonyms ‘stemlie’ and ‘kakalily’. The 
messages provide a link to an external blog which contains 
defamatory materials of the plaintiff. The plaintiff then filed an 
application for a pre-action discovery against the defendant, 
compelling the disclosure of the true identity of the forum users 
pursuant to the Norwich Pharmacal principles. The question arose as 
to whether the defendant should be liable for the link posted on the 
forum by the two users. It was observed by Azman Abdullah JC that 
there was evidence that the defendant’s forum had a posting inviting 
users to visit the offending blog. Further, there were terms and 
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conditions on editorial rights that conferred absolute discretion on the 
defendant either to edit or remove any postings if the defendant so 
desired without prior notice or explanation. It was ruled that by 
allowing the forum to provide an active deep link to the external blog 
with defamatory materials, the defendant was no longer a ‘mere 
bystander’ as it had performed ‘an active role in facilitating the 
wrongdoing’.
130
 By virtue of the active link, the judgment in The New 
Straits Times Press v Ahiruddin
131
 was distinguished and accordingly, 
the defendant was ordered to disclose the identity of the forum users. 
It is pertinent to highlight that the court simply ordered the defendant 
to comply with the pre-action discovery as the plaintiff intended to file 
defamatory proceedings against the forum users and not the defendant. 
Nonetheless, the judgment appears to suggest that online 
intermediaries, including blog owners or editors, could be held liable 
for hyperlinked content when there is active deep link to another 
website and when they have actual knowledge and control over the 
link on their sites. 
7.6 Defences 
Following the discussion on liability for third party content and 
hyperlink, there are instances where online intermediaries may be 
considered as publishers of defamatory materials created by others but 
published on their services. In such cases, they have to establish a 
defence to escape liability in defamation. The common defences of 
truth (justification) and honest opinion (fair comment) may be used 
for online defamation. Apart from that, the defence of innocent 
dissemination under the Defamation Act 1996 as well as related 
defences for mere conduit, caching, or hosting under the Electronic 
                                                 
130
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Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 are also of particular 
importance to bloggers in the UK. Further, the Defamation Act 2013 
has introduced a specific defence to operators of websites against 
defamation
132
 and the defence of publication on matter of public 
interest,
133
 which has replaced the common law defence of Reynolds 
privilege. As to the position in Malaysia, apart from the principal 
defences of justification and fair comment, there have yet any 
statutory provisions that provide specific defences to Internet 
publications. Nonetheless, the discussion will be turned on the 
Reynolds privilege and the defence of innocent carrier, which is 
introduced, in the Malaysian Communications & Multimedia Content 
Code (Content Code) for the Internet industry. 
7.6.1 Truth & Justification 
Section 2 of the Defamation Act 2013 provides for a new defence of 
truth, which replaces the common law defence of justification.
134
 
Subsection (1) states that the defendant will be able to invoke the 
defence if he can show that the statement complained of is 
substantially true.
135
 He is not required to prove that every single 
aspect of the imputation is true. It has been argued that this is in line 
with the current law
136
 as established in Chase v News Group 
Newspaper Ltd.
137
 It was ruled by Brooke LJ that ‘The defendant does 
not have to prove that every word he/she published was true. He/she 
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The principle has been followed in Turcu v News Group Newspaper
139
 
whereby the newspaper had successfully pleaded the defence of 
justification when the court found that the allegations against the 
claimant were substantially, if not wholly, accurate. It was observed 
that journalists ‘need to be permitted a degree of exaggeration even in 
the context of factual assertions’. It was highlighted by Eady J: 
In deciding whether any given libel is substantially true, the court 
will have well in mind the requirement to allow for exaggeration, at 
the margins, and have regard in that context also to proportionality. 
In other words, one needs to consider whether the sting of a libel 
has been established having regard to its overall gravity and the 




Where the statement complained of bears more than one imputation, 
subsections (2) and (3) provide that the defence will not fail if the 
imputations which are not substantially true do not ‘seriously harm’ 
the reputation of the claimant. Finally, subsection (4) abolishes the 
common law defence of justification and repeals section 5 of the 
Defamation Act 1952. It has been argued that the insertion of the new 
defence of truth is aimed at reflecting the current law while 
simplifying and clarifying uncertainties of the defence of justification 




As to the context in Malaysia, the common law defence of 
justification is available to the defendant in defamation. Once 
justification is pleaded, the burden lies on the defendant to prove that 
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the defamatory imputation is true.
142
  Nonetheless, it is not necessary 




In an action for libel or slander in respect of words containing two 
or more distinct charges against the plaintiff, a defence of 
justification shall not fail by reason only that the truth of every 
charge is not proved if the words not proved to be true do not 
materially injure the plaintiff's reputation having regard to the truth 
of the remaining charges.
144
 
The provision has been highlighted by RK Nathan J in Dato’ Seri 
Anwar bin Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad
145
 that: 
At common law the Defendant was required to prove the truth of 
all the material statements in the libel. However, by virtue of s 8 of 
the Defamation Act 1957 (the Act), the defence of justification 
‘shall not fail by reason only that the truth of every charge is not 
proved if the words not proved to be true do not materially injure 
the plaintiff's reputation having regard to the truth of the remaining 




In Chew Peng Cheng v Anthony Teo Tiao Gin,
147
 it was held that the 
defence of justification in the Defamation Act 1957 does not require 
the truth of every word of the alleged libel to be proved. Further, it 
was elaborated by Zainun Ali JCA in Chong Swee Huat & Anor v Lim 
Shian Ghee (t/a L & G Consultants & Education Services that the 
court will examine ‘the truth of the imputation of the overall 
                                                 
142
 Tjanting Handicraft Sdn Bhd & Anor v Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd & Ors [2001] 2 
MLJ 574 at 597. 
143
 The Malaysian Defamation Act 1957 derived its origin from the UK Defamation 
Act 1952. 
144
 Section 8 of the Malaysian Defamation Act 1957 is in pari materia with the 
repealed section 5 of the UK Defamation Act 1952. 
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 [1999] 4 MLJ 58. 
146
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147
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 for the defence to be successfully pleaded by the 
defendant. 
The defence of justification has been invoked in Dato’ Seri 
Mohammad Nizar bin Jamaluddin v Sistem Televisyen (M) Bhd & 
Anor.
149
 The plaintiff brought libel proceedings against the defendants 
for broadcasting news which accused the plaintiff of sending tweets 
alleging the King of Johor had misused his power for his personal 
needs and that the plaintiff had thereafter made an open apology to the 
King in his Twitter. The issue was the status of the defendants’ plea of 
justification since it was found that the second part of the news that 
stated that the plaintiff had apologised on Twitter was erroneous. By 
virtue of section 8, Yeoh Wee Siam J decided that the defence did not 
fail, as the news report was substantially true. Therefore, it is arguably 
apparent that the decisions of the Malaysian courts in relation to the 
defence of justification mirrored the approach adopted by the UK 
judges prior to the enactment of the Defamation Act 2013. 
Pertaining to the application of the defence of truth or justification in 
the cyberspace, it is obvious that the defence may be invoked by 
bloggers or authors of the online content provided that it can be shown 
the statement is substantially true. As for hosts and moderators of 
online content which may include bloggers, it has been argued that the 
defence will unlikely be relied on by them due to the absence of trust 
between online publishers and content contributors as well as the 
difficulty on the part of the former to ascertain the truth or falsity of 
the third party materials.
150
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150
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7.6.2 Honest Opinion & Fair Comment 
Section 3 of the Defamation Act 2013 replaces the common law 
defence of fair comment with a new defence of honest opinion.
151
 
Subsections (2) to (4) list down three elements for the defence to 
apply, namely the statement was a statement of opinion, the statement 
indicated the basis of the opinion, and that an honest person could 
have held the opinion either on the basis of any fact which existed at 
the time the statement was published or on anything asserted to be a 
fact in a privileged statement published before the statement was 
complained of. 
The first requirement in subsection (2) of section 3 replicates the 
current law as formulated in the Hong Kong case of Tse Wai Chun 
Paul v Albert Cheng.
152
 In this case, Lord Nicholls set out five 
important elements of the common law defence of fair comment 
including the second proposition that stipulates that ‘the comment 
must be recognisable as comment, as distinct from an imputation of 
fact’.
153
 For the statement to be considered as an opinion or comment, 
subsection (3) requires the defendant to specify the basis of the 
opinion. This is in parallel with the Supreme Court decision in Spiller 
v Joseph
154
 which had unanimously ruled that the second part of the 
fourth proposition that readers should be in a position to evaluate the 
comments for themselves should be removed as it could not be 
                                                 
151
 Section 3(8) of the Defamation Act 2013 states that ‘The common law defence of 
fair comment is abolished and, accordingly, section 6 of the Defamation Act 1952 
(fair comment) is repealed’. 
152
 [2001] EMLR 777. 
153
 ibid para 17. The rest of the propositions are that the comment must be on a 
matter of public interest; be based on facts which are true or protected by privilege; 
explicitly or implicitly indicate, at least in general terms, the facts on which the 
comment is being made and the reader or hearer should be in a position to judge for 
himself the extent to which the comment was well-founded; and be one which could 
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reconciled with the authorities and would rob of the efficacy of the 
defence in the online world.
155
 Accordingly, it was highlighted by 
Lord Phillips that the fourth proposition should be rewritten as ‘Next, 
the comment must explicitly or implicitly indicate, at least in general 
terms the facts on which it is based’.
156
 
As to the third condition of the defence, which is stipulated in 
subsection (4), it is an objective test that consists of two elements. The 
third condition will be fulfilled if one of the elements is satisfied. The 
elements are whether an honest person could have held the opinion 
either on the basis of any fact that existed at the time the statement 
was published, or on anything which asserted to be a fact in a 
‘privileged statement’ that was published before the statement 
complained of. A statement is a ‘privileged statement’ if the person 
responsible for its publication would have one of the defences listed in 
subsection (7) of section 3.
157
  
Subsection (5) provides that the defence will fail if the claimant can 
prove that the statement was actuated by malice.  Where the defendant 
was not the author of the statement, subsection (6) stipulates that the 
defence will be defeated if the claimant can show that the defendant 
knew or ought to have known that the author was actuated by malice. 
As to the position in Malaysia, the defence of fair comment may also 
absolve the defendant in defamation. Section 9 of the Malaysian 
Defamation Act 1957, which is in pari materia with section 6 of the 
UK Defamation Act 1952, provides: 
                                                 
155
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157
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In an action for libel or slander in respect of words consisting partly 
of allegations of fact and partly of expression of opinion, a defence 
of fair comment shall not fail by reason only that the truth of every 
allegation of fact is not proved if the expression of opinion is fair 
comment having regard to such of the facts alleged or referred to in 
the words complained of as are proved. 
In order to rely on this defence, the defendant is required to prove that 
the statements complained of are comments and not facts; there is a 
basis for the comments; the comments are of public interest; and the 
comments are made honestly without malice. This has been 
highlighted by Azmel J in Hussin Mohd Ali v Ho Kay Tat & Anor
158
 
who quoted with approval the decision of the Privy Council in JB 
Jeyaratnam v Goh Chok Tong.
159
 
The first condition requires the defendant to prove that the disputed 
words are in the form of comment since the defence does not apply to 
statements of fact. In both cases of SB Palmer v Rajah & Ors
160
 and 
JB Jeyaratnam v Goh Chok Tong
161
 the plaintiff was alleged to have 
incited all those who were attending a meeting to leave the meeting. In 
the first case, the statement was construed as an allegation of fact and 
therefore, the defence of fair comment failed. Whilst in the second 
case, relevant facts were stated before the alleged defamatory 
statement was made. Consequently, the defence was successfully 
pleaded as the court found that the statement was a comment and not 
an allegation of fact. 
The defence of fair comment has again been invoked in Harry Isaac 
& Ors v Berita Harian.
162
 The Court of Appeal ruled that the defence 
ought to have been rejected because the articles included allegations 
                                                 
158
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159
 [1989] 1 WLR 1109. 
160
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161
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of facts without disclosure of the sources for such facts and which 
facts the appellants never sought to justify. It was highlighted by 
Anantham Kasinather JCA that ‘it is trite law that the defence of fair 
comment is concerned with the protection of comment and not 
facts’.
163
 In deciding whether the disputed words are fact or comment, 
the test is whether the ordinary and reasonable man, upon hearing or 
reading the words, would regard them as a statement of fact or as 
comment.
164
 However, where the facts and comments are so mixed up 
that one cannot be distinguished from the other, the defence of fair 
comment will not be available to the defendant.
165
 
The second condition for the defence of fair comment is that the 
comment must be based on true facts. In Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi v 
Bulat bin Mohamed & Anor
166
 the defence was rejected because the 
defendants failed to prove that the facts on which the comment was 
founded were true. In Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok 
Thong,
167
 it was ruled by the Privy Council that: 
It is of course well established that a writer may not suggest or 
invent facts and then comment upon them, on the assumption that 
they are true. If the facts upon which the comment purports to be 
made do not exist, the defence of fair comment must fail. The 
commentator must get his basic facts right.
168
 
Therefore, the defendant must prove the truth of the facts on which the 
comment is based. In Datuk Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Utusan Melayu 
(M) Bhd & Anor,
169
 the defendants invoked a number of statutory 
defences including fair comment. Unfortunately, the defence was 
rejected as the court found that the defamatory articles published by 
                                                 
163
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164
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the defendants were not founded on true facts. Thus, it is essential that 
a true statement of fact that forms the basis of the comment must exist 
for the defence of fair comment to succeed. Nonetheless, it is not 
essential that all of the facts to be proved since it would be sufficient 
that the facts, which form the basis of the comment, are proven. This 
is in pursuant with section 9 that does not mandate the defendant to 
prove the truth of every fact before he can plead fair comment.
170
  
The third element of the defence is that the comment must be fair and 
is not malicious. In order to be fair, the comment must be an honest 
expression of the writer and is not made maliciously. Malice is ill will 
or spite or some previous quarrel or bad relationship or any indirect or 
improper motive in the mind of the defendant at the time of 
publication.
171
  Where it is shown that the defendant did not believe 
that what he published was true, or that he knew the statement to be 
false; that is generally conclusive evidence of express malice.
172
 
The existence of malice will have a significant impact on the 
defendant and this can be seen in Datuk Harris  Mohd Salleh v Datuk 
Yong Teck Lee & Anor.
173
 The case involved a clash between two ex-
Chief Ministers of Sabah over press statements by the defendant 
insinuating the plaintiff to have conspired in the air-crash tragedy that 
had killed his predecessor and more than half of the cabinet ministers. 
The statements defamatory of the plaintiff were made pursuant to a 
public speech by a veteran ex-Minister about the air-crash incident. 
The issue was whether the defendant was actuated by malice, spite or 
improper motive when he uttered the statements. The court discovered 
that the defendant did not make any attempts to verify the accuracy of 
                                                 
170
 Mohd Jali bin Haji Ngah v The New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd & Anor [1998] 
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the speech and did not even bother whether it was true or not. Further, 
there was evidence of bad blood between the plaintiff and the 
defendant when the latter lost his seat in the state assembly as a result 
of the election petition filed by the plaintiff. Accordingly, the court 
ruled that the defendant was actuated by malice and this disposed of 
the defence of fair comment.  
Referring to the last requirement of the defence, the comment must be 
on an issue of public interest, otherwise the defence will not be 
available to the defendant. There is no exact definition as to what 
constitutes public interest, but the court is bound to distinguish 
between ‘that which the public is interested in’ with ‘which is in the 
public interest’ i.e. for the benefit of the public which the courts will 
protect.
174
 Matters that are regarded as issues of public interest may 
encompass the administration of justice and thus the defence of fair 
comment in relation to court proceedings is applicable.
175
 Comments 
concerning the acts and activities of politicians and people who are 
influential in the community, such as the conduct and acts of ministers 
or opposition leaders are also regarded as matters of public interest.
176
 
Other matters accepted as being in the public interest are comments in 
newspaper with regard to the quality and content of secondary school 
textbooks,
177
 comments in newspaper that consultant architect in a 
project to build additional car-park floors of a hospital did not comply 
with building plans,
178
 comments about an invitation to the public to 
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invest in ostrich farming,
179
 and comments that certain international 
higher institutions offered unaccredited degrees.
180
 
Based on the discussion, it is obvious that the defence of fair comment 
in Malaysia is not parallel in its operation to the new statutory defence 
of honest opinion that has replaced the defence of fair comment in the 
UK. Interestingly, in the recent unreported case of Liu Thian Leong v 
Jee Nyen Chong,
181
 counsel for the defendant had invited the court’s 
attention to the Lord Phillips’s proposal in Spiller v Joseph
182
 and 
suggested that the defence of fair comment in Malaysia should be 
renamed ‘honest comment’ and for the proof of public interest in the 
defence be dropped. Unfortunately, the argument was ignored by the 
court and accordingly, the legal position of fair comment in Malaysia 
still remains unchanged.  
With regard to the application of the defence of honest opinion and 
fair comment to defamatory statements in blogs or other online media, 
it is submitted that both defences are most likely available to bloggers 
or authors of the online content provided that they could fulfil all of 
the required elements. The availability of the defence of fair comment 
to the defendants in online defamation cases in Malaysia has been 
indirectly observed by the Court of Appeal in Dato’ Seri Mohammad 
Nizar.
183
 Nonetheless, since there was malice that could be readily 
inferred from the surrounding circumstances of the published 
defamatory statements against the plaintiff, it was ruled that 
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The defence of fair comment has again been raised in Datuk Seri 
Anwar bin Ibrahim v Wan Muhammad Azri bin Wan Deris.
185
 The 
plaintiff, the leader of opposition party, had filed defamation suit 
against the defendant, a political blogger, for his blog posts and 
articles that were understood to have alleged the plaintiff as ‘an 
immoral person; a person with no dignity; a person unfit to hold 
public office; not qualified as a political leader; not fit to be Prime 
Minister of Malaysia; and a leader who is not responsible and cannot 
be trusted’.
186
 The defendant raised four defences including the 
defence of fair comment, but it was rejected by the court as he was 
unable to prove that the defamatory statements were ‘true or a fair 
comment on a matter of public interest’.
187
 Thus, the judgment has 
impliedly indicated that although the defence of fair comment under 
the Malaysian Defamation Act 1957 predated the advent of online 
platforms including blogs, the defence could be successfully pleaded 
by bloggers or other Internet publishers in defamation cases provided 
that all of the requirements are met by them. 
As for content hosts and online moderators, it is submitted that in a 
practical sense that the defence of honest opinion and fair comment is 
likely to be difficult for them to rely on since they have no view as to 
the honesty or otherwise of the original authors or contributors in 
uttering the alleged defamatory words. Further, the defence will be 
defeated if it is proved that the hosts or moderators know or ought to 
have known that the authors or contributors were actuated by malice. 
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7.6.3 Publication on Matter of Public Interest & the 
Reynolds Defence 
The Defamation Act 2013 has also incorporated a new defence of 
publication on a matter of public interest. Explanatory notes to the 
Defamation Act 2013 state that the new statutory defence reflects the 
existing common law Reynolds defence
188
 which had established 
protection for publication on matters of public interest provided that 
the criteria of ‘responsible journalism’ are satisfied.
189
 The defence is 
contained in section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013 that stipulates: 
(1) It is a defence to an action for defamation for the defendant to 
show that – 
(a) the statement complained of was, or formed part of, a 
statement on a matter of public interest; and 
(b) the defendant reasonably believed that publishing the 
statement complained of was in the public interest. 
It is claimed that the provisions have been formulated to reflect the 
Reynolds defence as most recently set out in Flood v Times 
Newspapers Ltd
190
 in which the Supreme Court had adopted a liberal 
interpretation of the defence in order to offer a robust protection for 
publications on matters of public interest.
191
 It is also obvious from the 
wordings that there is no express requirement for the defendant to 
prove that he has met a standard of responsible journalism, satisfied 
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 The Reynolds defence has been established by the House of Lords in Reynolds v 
Times Newspaper Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127. 
189
 In Reynolds’ case, Lord Nicholls laid down ten non-exhaustive criteria of 
responsible journalism which include the seriousness of the allegation, the type of 
information, the source, verification attempts, status of the information, urgency, 
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both sides of the story were included in the publication, the tone of the published 
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any or all of the prescribed conditions for Reynolds defence or acted 
both fairly and responsibly in gathering and publishing information.
192
 
The defence will be available if the defamatory statement was on a 
matter of public interest and the defendant had reasonably believed 
that its publication was in the public interest. In determining the 
defendant’s reasonable belief, the court is required to take into 
account ‘all the circumstances of the case’
193
 and must ‘make such 
allowance for editorial judgment as it consider appropriate’.
194
 
Subsection (3) of section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013 codifies the 
common law doctrine of reportage.
195
 It provides that in circumstances 
where the doctrine applies, the defendant is not required to verify the 
information reported before publication. In determining whether it 
was reasonable for the defendant to believe that the publication was in 
the public interest, the court should disregard any failure on the part of 
the defendant to take necessary steps in verifying the truth of the 
statement. Apart from that, the new defence may be relied on 
irrespective of whether the publication is one of fact or opinion.
196
 
Ultimately, the defence of publication on matter of public interest has 
effectively abolished the Reynolds defence.
197
 
                                                 
192
 Timothy Pinto, ‘Defamation Act 2013 – A Boost for Free Speech’, 2 May 2013, 
<http://www.taylorwessing.com/news-insights/details/defamation-act-2013-a-boost-
for-free-speech-2013-05-02.html> [accessed 21 May 2013]. 
193
 Section 4(2) of the Defamation Act 2013. 
194
 Section 4(4) of the Defamation Act 2013. 
195
 The doctrine was first surfaced in Al-Fagih v HH Saudi Research & Marketing 
(UK) Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1634, [2001] EMLR 13  and it was described by Simon 
Brown LJ as ‘a convenient word to describe the neutral reporting attributed 
allegations rather than their adoption by the newspaper’. In Roberts & Anor v Gable 
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By analysing the aforesaid provisions, it seems easier for the 
defendant to rely on the defence if the defamatory publication is really 
on a matter of public interest as he is only required to prove that he 
has a reasonable belief that the words complained of is in the public 
interest. Thus, it appears that the new defence is more flexible and 
more in favour of freedom of expression than the Reynolds defence. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that courts may consider relevant 
principles on the Reynolds defence that have been established in 
Reynolds,
198





 although there is no requirement for judges to do so.
201
  
As to the position in Malaysia, there is no statutory defence of 
publication on matter of public interest. Nonetheless, the Reynolds 
defence has been accepted and applied by the local courts. The 
defence was considered in Mark Ignatius
202
 whereby the defendants 
relied on the defence of qualified privilege when they were sued by 
the plaintiff for publishing defamatory articles in their newspaper. 
Nonetheless, the court rejected the defence since the publication was 
not of concern to the general public. Further, Kamalanathan Ratnam J 
referred to the rulings in Reynolds
203
 and held that the defence also 
failed because the disputed statement was published without 
canvassing the plaintiff’s point of view that had been issued earlier to 
the public via a press conference. The judgment is crucial because it 
indicates the court’s application of the Reynolds defence as formulated 
by the House of Lords in the UK. 
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Regardless of the decision, it is important to highlight that in the 
earlier case of Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Dato’ Seri Dr 
Mahathir bin Mohamad
204
 the Malaysian High Court referred to the 
Reynolds’ rulings in the Court of Appeal
205
 and applied the three-step 
test established therein. A couple of other cases followed and adopted 
the Reynolds’ rulings by the Court of Appeal including Halim Arsyat v 
Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Bhd
206
 and Dato’ Seri S Samy Vellu v 
Penerbitan Sahabat (M) Sdn Bhd (No 3).
207
 Nonetheless, it should be 
noted that these judgments were made prior to the House of Lords’ 
rulings that had effectively established the common law Reynolds 
defence. 
Subsequent to the decision in Mark Ignatius,
208
 the ten indicative 
factors in Reynolds
209
 and the Jameel’s
210
 decision was referred in 
Irene Fernandez v Utusan Melayu (M) Sdn Bhd.
211
 Tee Ah Sing J 
said: 
The impugned article read in its entirety clearly put the blame 
entirely on the plaintiff, taking sides with the police. The plaintiff 
was never interviewed prior to the impugned article being 
published. There was never any attempt to verify the truth of the 
defamatory imputations with the plaintiff.  There was no urgency to 
have published the impugned article. The defendant also did not 
give the plaintiff any opportunity to comment before the 
publication of the impugned article. The defendant clearly ignored 
to seek the plaintiff’s comments as the plaintiff would be in the best 
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In relation thereof, the court viewed the defamatory article was not a 
piece of responsible journalism and as a result, the plea of Reynolds 
privilege was rejected. In Sivabalan a/l P Asapathy v The New 
StraitsTimes Press (M) Bhd,
213
 the court has expounded two 
requirements that must be shown for the defence to apply – ‘the 
publication concerned a matter of public interest’ and ‘the steps taken 
to gather, verify and publish the information were responsible and 
fair’.
214
 It was underlined by Zawawi Salleh J that these guidelines 
were merely ‘pointers and not to be treated as hurdles’.
215
 In this case, 
the court ruled that since the defendants managed to satisfy both of the 
prescribed conditions, they were entitled to rely on the Reynolds 
privilege. On a similar note, the defence was considered and applied 




The prerequisites of the defence were reiterated in Mahadi bin 
Mohameddiah v Ibrahim Isa & Ors.
217
 It was expressed by Gunalan 
a/l Muniandy JC: 
[T]he Reynolds defence … is predicated on two primary elements: 
public interest and responsible journalism. For the defence to be 
invoked, the defendant has first to establish that the publication was 
on a matter of public interest. Having done so, the defendant 
(media) has to satisfy the court that it had acted reasonably.
218
 
Thus, the decisions have shown that the Reynolds privilege would 
only be allowed if all conditions are satisfied by the defendant. In 
Chong Siew Chiang v Ng Kim Ho & Anor,
219
 the defendants took no 
steps to verify the allegations made against the plaintiff. As a 
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consequence, the court rejected the defendants’ plea of the Reynolds 
privilege. Similarly, in Dato’ Seri Mohammad Nizar,
220
 the court ruled 
that the defendant could not seek protection under the Reynolds 
defence as it was apparent that the defendants did not practise 
responsible journalism in verifying the defamatory statements with the 
plaintiff and in getting the latter’s comment on the issues. Further, the 
court viewed the defendants’ publication was unbalanced and was 
deliberately aimed at giving a negative impression towards the 
plaintiff. 
Apart from the Reynolds privilege, the doctrine of reportage has also 
been adopted and applied by judges in Malaysia. It was considered in 
Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v The New Straits Times Press (M) Sdn 
Bhd & Anor.
221
 The plaintiff, the leader of the opposition party, 
brought libel action against the defendants for publishing an article 
defamatory of him in their daily newspaper. The defendants resisted 
the claim and relied on the defence of reportage as they alleged that 
the impugned article was a mere reproduction of another report and it 
did not carry their own comments or views towards the plaintiff. The 
availability and application of the defence was then thoroughly 
scrutinised by Harmindar Singh JC that: 
[I]t can be safely asserted that reportage would normally apply … 
in cases where there is an ongoing dispute where allegations of 
both sides are being reported. The report, taken as a whole, must 
have the effect that the defamatory material is attributed to the 
parties in the dispute. The report must not be seen as being put 
forward to establish the truth of any of the defamatory assertions. 
This means that the allegations must be reported in a fair, 
disinterested and neutral way. The important consideration here is 
that the allegations are attributed and not adopted. Therefore 
                                                 
220
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reportage will not apply where the journalist had embraced, 
garnished and embellished the allegations.
222
 
Accordingly, the court ruled that the defence of reportage was not 
available to the defendants as the publication did not involve a 
continuing dispute between parties. Further, it was found that there 
was only one version of the view about the plaintiff and it was 
certainly not reported in a fair, disinterested and neutral way. 
The doctrine of reportage has then been invoked in a number of 
subsequent cases. In Chong Siew Chiang v Ng Kim Ho & Anor,
223
 the 
defendants pleaded the defence of reportage as they were merely 
reporting news and were unable to determine the falsity or truth of the 
allegations against the plaintiff.  In rejecting the defence of reportage, 
it was observed by Ravinthran Paramaguru JC: 
The reportage as a defence is subject to limitations. Otherwise, the 
defence of accurate reporting or neutral reporting would give an 
unconditional licence to media organisations to destroy reputations 
of innocent men and women under the pretext of merely reporting 




In YB Hj Khalid,
225
 the disputed article was a republication of the 
views of another politician taken from his personal blog. The article 
was published in toto without any verification of the truth of its 
content. It was decided that though the concept of reportage has been 
accepted by the courts in Malaysia, this was not a case to which the 
defence would apply because the article was reported with emotional 
undertones that would arouse anger and suspicion against the plaintiff. 
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Pertaining to the availability of the statutory defence of publication on 
matter of public interest in the online environment, it is argued that the 
new defence is capable to be used in defamatory proceedings. This is 
based on the express provisions in the Defamation Act 2013 that 
requires the defendant to prove the defamatory statement was on a 
matter of public interest and the defendant had reasonably believed 
that its publication was in the public interest. Further, in Seage v 
Harper
226
 it was decided by the Privy Council that the Reynolds 
defence, which was repealed and now replaced by the defence of 
publication on matter of public interest, was not exclusively conferred 
on the printing press and broadcasting media. Such defence was held 
to be applicable to ‘publications made by any person who publishes 
material of public interest in any medium, so long as the conditions 
framed by Lord Nicholls as being applicable to “responsible 
journalism” are satisfied’.
227
 The judgment was affirmed by the 
Supreme Court in Flood
228
 and it was underlined that ‘Reynolds 
privilege is not reserved for the media, but it is the media who are 
most likely to take advantage of it, for it is usually the media that 
publish to the world at large’.
229
 
With regard to the application of the Reynolds privilege to non-media 
practitioners including amateur bloggers in Malaysia, the High Court 
in Chong Siew Chiang v Ng Kim Ho & Anor
230
 had referred to the 
judgment in Reynolds
231
 and refused to extend the defence to the first 
defendant who was not a news publisher. The defence was regarded as 
a special defence in defamation to the traditional media only. In 
relation to this, it is argued that the court seems to have misunderstood 
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the concept of the Reynolds privilege as it has been judicially accepted 
in the UK that the defence should not be confined to the media only. 
Further, Varghese George J in Lim Guan Eng v Utusan Melayu (M) 
Bhd
232
 had referred to the position in the UK which provides that the 
defence is available to all publications on public interest.
233
 Apart 
from that, it was alleged that though the defence refers to journalism, 
the label of ‘responsible journalism’ is merely a shorthand means of 
identifying the defence and is no way limited to journalistic 
publications. In addition, it was acknowledged by VT Singham J in 
Datuk Seri Anwar
234
 that the expression ‘press’ is no longer confined 
to the traditional media alone as it now encompasses the electronic 
media. In line with this ruling, it is submitted that the Reynolds 
defence should not be exclusively confined to journalists from the 
traditional media only. Amateur bloggers or other online users who 
could satisfy all of the prescribed criteria of the common law defence 
should also be permitted to plead such defence in defamation cases. 
7.6.4 Defence to Operators of Websites 
The Defamation Act 2013 provides a new defence to operators of 
websites in respect of defamatory words posted on their websites. 
Section 5 stipulates: 
(1) This section applies where an action for defamation is brought 
against the operators of a website in respect of a statement 
posted on the website. 
(2) It is a defence for the operator to show that it was not the 
operator who posted the statement on the website. 
(3) The defence is defeated if the claimant shows that –  
(a) it was not possible for the claimant to identify the 
person who posted the statement, 
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(b) the claimant gave the operator a notice of complaint in 
relation to the statement, and 
(c) the operator failed to respond to the notice of complaint 
in accordance with any provision contained in 
regulations. 
The section has conferred an increased protection on website 
operators in relation to third party defamatory postings. The operators 
may invoke the defence if the claimant can identify the actual poster 
of the statement,
235
 the operators have not received a notice of 
complaint
236
 from the claimant, and if they receive such notice, they 
comply with the regulations
237
 such as by taking down the disputed 
posts or provide the claimant with the identity or contact details of the 
poster. The defence is defeated if the claimant can prove that the 
website operators has acted with malice in relation to the posting of 
the statement.
238
 The defence is however not defeated if the operators 
moderate the statements posted on their websites by others.
239
 Thus, 
the defence is still available even if the website operators exercise 
editorials over third party postings on their websites. 
By analysing the statutory provision in section 5 of the Defamation 
Act 2013, it is obvious that the new defence is certainly applicable to 
bloggers. They may invoke such defence to escape liability for 
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defamatory comments posted on their blogs by blog readers provided 
that could satisfy all of the prerequisites in that section. 
7.6.5 Innocent Dissemination 
The Defamation Act 1996 provides a statutory defence of innocent 
dissemination to any persons who are not directly involved in the 
making of the defamatory statements. The defence seems to be a 
modern equivalent of the common law defence of innocent 
dissemination and is of particular significance to Internet 
intermediaries, which act as mere conduit, cache or host of such 
content on their services. Section 1, which is headed ‘Responsibility 
for publication’, states that: 
(1) In defamation proceedings a person has a defence if he shows 
that – 
(a) he was not the author, editor or publisher of the statement 
complained of, 
(b) he took reasonable care in relation to its publication, and 
(c) he did not know, and had no reason to believe, that what he 
did caused or contributed to the publication of a defamatory 
statement. 
These requirements are cumulative in the sense that all of them must 
be fulfilled for the defence to succeed. Firstly, the intermediaries must 
prove they are not the author, editor or publisher
240
 of the content they 
host, cache or carry on their services. To fulfil this condition, they will 
have to demonstrate that their conduct is confined to ‘operating or 
providing any equipment, system or service by means of which the 
statement is retrieved, copied, distributed or made available in 
                                                 
240
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 or operating or providing access to ‘a 
communications system by means of which the statement is 
transmitted, or made available, by a person over whom he has no 
effective control’.
242
 Where their conduct has not exceeded the limits 
in section 1(3), they are not to be regarded as author, editor or 
publisher of the materials under section 1(1)(a) and thus, they could 
invoke the defence of innocent dissemination. 
Subsequently, the application of the defence will turn on the 
successful fulfilment of the remaining elements. Section 1(1)(b) 
contemplates any intermediaries seeking the section 1 defence to show 
that they have exercised reasonable care in relation to the publication 
of the defamatory words. In determining whether they have exercised 
‘reasonable care’, courts must have regard to the matters set out in 
section 1(5) of the Defamation Act 1996 such as the extent of 
responsibility for the content of the statement or the decision to 
publish it, the nature of the publication, and the previous conduct or 
character of the author, editor or publisher.  
Finally, the intermediaries are required by section 1(1)(c) to prove that 
they ‘did not know, and had no reason to believe’, that their conduct 
caused or contributed to the publication of a defamatory statement. 
The requirement would be satisfied if the intermediaries could prove 
that either they had no reason to believe that the information was 
defamatory or they had no reason to believe that their actions caused 
or contributed to the publication. In assessing whether the 
intermediaries have the required knowledge of the defamatory 
materials complained of, courts must take into account the facts that 
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are actually known by the intermediaries and not facts that they might 
or ought to have known.
243
 
The requirements of the section 1 defence had been considered in 
Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd.
244
 The court found that the ISP 
defendants were not the publisher of the defamatory postings pursuant 
to section 1(1)(a) and they had thus successfully satisfied the first 
requirement of the defence. Nonetheless, the ISP defendants could not 
invoke the section 1 defence because they felt foul of the remaining 
conditions by continuously storing the defamatory remarks on their 
servers even after they had been notified and were requested to delete 
the postings. It was ruled by Morland J that ‘as from 17 January 1997 
they knew of the defamatory content of the posting, they cannot avail 
themselves of the protection provided by section 1 of the Defamation 
Act 1996 and their defence under section 1 is, in law, hopeless.
245
 
The judgment has established an important principle that upon gaining 
actual knowledge of the existence of the defamatory materials, the 
intermediaries will lose the protection of the section 1 defence if they 
failed to expeditiously take down such content. The decision was 
followed in Bunt v Tilley
246
 whereby the court ruled that section 1 
would provide the ISP defendants with a defence to the libel claim 
because the e-mail notifications by the claimant had not effectively 
put the ISPs on notice or fixed them with actual knowledge of the 
defamatory postings. Thus, the availability of the defence will depend 
on the non-existence of actual knowledge of the defamatory words 
and the exercise of reasonable care by expeditiously removing the 
disputed materials upon notification by the defamed persons.  
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In Davison v Habeeb,
247
 the issue was whether the fifth defendant 
(Google Inc.), who operated the blogging platform of Blogger.com, 
could rely on the section 1 defence from the date of receipt of 
notification from the plaintiff to the day the defamatory articles were 
removed. The court ruled that though the fifth defendant was not a 
publisher under the Defamation Act 1996, it would still have to satisfy 
the necessary conditions in section 1(1)(b) and (c). Since the fifth 
defendant allowed the defamatory content to stay on its servers for a 
certain period of time after obtaining actual knowledge of its 
existence, the defence should fail and it should become liable for 
continued publication of the materials.
248
 
In McGrath v Dawkins and others,
249
 the issue arose as to whether the 
third defendant (Amazon UK) was a commercial publisher or editor of 
the comments published on its website and, if so, whether it could 
seek protection under the section 1 defence. The court ruled that the 
third defendant’s role was merely limited to provider of the service 
and by virtue of sections 1(2) and 1(3)(c), it was neither commercial 
publisher nor editor under the Defamation Act 1996. It was observed 
that due to the vast size and diverse nature of the website, it was not 
possible for the defendant to have actual knowledge of any unlawful 
information prior to the plaintiff’s complaint. Nonetheless, the court 
was not satisfied that the third defendant had exercised reasonable 
care in relation to the publication of the defamatory statement. As a 
result, the application to strike out the defamation claim was rejected. 
                                                 
247
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The section 1 defence has again been considered in Tamiz v Google 
Inc.
250
 The Court of Appeal expressed disagreement with the earlier 
decision of Eady J, which ruled that section 1 would provide a defence 
to the respondent (Google Inc.) since all of the conditions were 
satisfied. Richards LJ partially concurred with the High Court rulings 
that the respondent had complied with the requirements in section 1(a) 
and (b) of the Defamation Act 1996. Nonetheless, it was ruled that the 
respondent failed to satisfy the condition in section 1(c) after 
notification as the respondent knew or had reason to believe that what 
it did caused or contributed to continued publication of the defamatory 
content. In view of that, the respondent could not rely on the defence 
of innocent dissemination in libel actions. 
To sum up, it is an established principle that upon notification of the 
existence of defamatory publication, online intermediaries should 
swiftly delete such content from their services. Failure to do so may 
have a grave implication as they may not be able to take advantage of 
the defence of innocent dissemination under the Defamation Act 1996. 
This seems to imply that the intermediaries are now placed in the 
position of a judge or jury over the queried remarks, but it has been 
contended that it is far better for them to err on the side of caution
251
 
as immediate removal of the materials could potentially absolve them 
from liability in defamation suit.
252
 
As to the availability of the defence to blogs, the question appears to 
have attracted comparatively little attention of the courts. By referring 
to relevant cases involving hosting intermediaries such as Godfrey v 
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 Notwithstanding the prospect of losing the defence of innocent dissemination for 
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 Davison v Habeeb,
254
 McGrath v Dawkins and 
others
 255
 and Tamiz v Google Inc,
256
 bloggers may have no problem 
to satisfy the first requirement in section 1(1)(a) as they are very much 
unlikely to be regarded as author, editor or publisher, but difficulties 
may arise in fulfilling other requirements in section 1(1)(b) and (c).  
Apart from that, there is an established defence of innocent 
dissemination under common law.
257
 The defence had been exploited 
by ‘subordinate distributors’
258
 in cases where they can prove they did 
not know the publication complained of contained a libel; they did not 
know the disputed statement was of such a character that it was likely 
to contain libel; and the absence of knowledge was not due to their 
negligence. The common law defence continues to apply in certain 
circumstances
259
 though it has been superseded by the Defamation Act 
1996. This is based on the ruling of Eady J in Metropolitan 
International School Ltd 
260
 which stated that the common law 
defence has not been actually abolished with the coming into 
operation of the defence in the Defamation Act 1996. Nonetheless, it 
was argued that the common law defence has failed to keep pace with 
the rapid development of the information communication 
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of the Defamation Act 1996 on 4 August 1996. 
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LJ’s judgment in Vizetelly v Mudie’s Select Library, Ltd [1990] 2 QB 170, 180.  
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260
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 and consequently, it is almost no longer relied upon 
after the operation of the section 1 defence.  
7.6.6 Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 
The UK Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 (E-
Commerce Regulations)
262
 have incorporated the Directive on 
Electronic Commerce (EU E-Commerce Directive)
263
 into the 
country. The provisions have dealt with many aspects of electronic 
commerce, including the establishment of immunity regime that 
exempts online intermediaries from liabilities for carrying (mere 
conduit), caching (automatic and temporary storage of information for 
faster transmission) or hosting (storage) illegal content on their 
services.
264
 The immunities will be available to service providers
265
 
that are considered to have offered ‘information society service’.  
The phrase ‘information society service’ is defined as covering ‘any 
service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by means of 
electronic equipment for the processing (including digital 
compression) and storage of data, and at the individual request of a 
recipient of a service’.
266
 Based on this interpretation, many 
commercial Internet intermediaries such as ISPs, bulletin board 
operators, and web hosting services may be covered by the scope of 
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264
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incorporated almost in verbatim the provisions of Article 12, 13 and 14 of the EU E-
Commerce Directive. 
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 The status is less clear-cut for bloggers as they are 
not directly remunerated by the ‘recipients of their services’.
268
 
Nonetheless, some bloggers may derive modest income from 
advertising banners and affiliate sales and for that reason, it is 
arguable that they may be included within ‘information society 
service’ under the E-Commerce Regulations. 
The question of non-payment to service providers by online users has 
been raised in Davison v Habeeb.
269
 The second defendant (a blogger 
called ‘Peter Eyre’s Pace) did not make payment to the fifth 
defendant (Google Inc.) that provided the blogging services 
(Blogger.com). By referring to the decisions in Bunt v Tilley
270
 which 
ruled that services offered by the ISPs defendants were within the 
scope of Regulation 19 and the ruling in Metropolitan International 
School Ltd
271
 that ‘information society services’ should be given an 
‘extended definition’ so as to embrace search engines which were not 
remunerated by their service users, Parkes J concluded that the 
Blogger.com service constituted an information society service and 
accordingly, the fifth defendant should be entitled to take advantage of 
the intermediary immunities.
272
 Thus, it is submitted that bloggers 
who make available their blogs to Internet users could satisfy the 
interpretation of ‘information society services’ despite the fact that 
they normally do not receive any payment from blog readers. 
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Following the potential inclusion of blogs within the ambit of the 
‘information society services’, a related question arises as to which 
type of immunities may be invoked by bloggers for publishing third 
party defamatory materials. Since online intermediaries are 
categorically recognised for the purpose of the E-Commerce 
Regulations by their role or involvement either as mere conduit, cache 
or host of content, bloggers are most likely to apply the hosting 
defence as they are principally involved in the storage of the online 
information. Regulation 19 of the E-Commerce Regulations provides: 
Where an information society service is provided which consists of 
the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, 
the service provider (if he otherwise would) shall not be liable for 
damages or for any other pecuniary remedy or for any criminal 
sanction as a result of that storage where – 
(a) the service provider – 
(i) does not have actual knowledge of unlawful activity or 
information and, where a claim for damages is made, is not 
aware of facts or circumstances from which it would have been 
apparent to the service provider that the activity or information 
was unlawful; or 
(ii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the 
information, and 
(b) the recipient of the service was not acting under the authority 
or the control of the service provider. 
The host immunity is only available to online providers that confine 
their services to a mere storage of Internet content. Thus, the defence 
will be definitely not available when the conduct of bloggers goes 
beyond mere storage of the third party materials. Such incidents may 
occur when bloggers exercise editorial control over comments by blog 
readers, move blog entries to more prominent positions, or even apply 
spelling and grammar checks on the third party postings. 
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Apart from the storage requirement, the exemption requires the 
service providers to show that they do not have ‘actual knowledge’ or 
/ and ‘awareness’ of the unlawful content on their services. However, 
there is uncertainty as to whether both ‘actual knowledge’ and 
‘awareness’ must not exist before the defence could be pleaded. It was 
contended that in defamation or civil cases which involve claims for 
damages, the hosting immunity will be lost even if the service 
providers do not have actual knowledge of the illegal materials they 
hosted.
273
 This is due to the reason that such cases require a lower 
standard of awareness of facts or circumstances from which the 
unlawful nature of the content would have been apparent to the 
service provider.
274
 On the contrary, it was argued that in a defamation 
case, a host will only be aware of the facts or circumstances if the host 
has actual knowledge of the existence of the disputed materials, and 
actual knowledge of facts or circumstances from which it would have 
been apparent the materials were unlawful.
275
 Thus, mere general 
awareness will not deny the host of the hosting immunity under 
Regulation 19.  
This issue has been considered in Kaschke v Gray.
276
 In relation to the 
requirement of ‘actual knowledge’ or / and ‘awareness’ of the 
unlawful content, it was observed by the court that: 
Initially Mr Harris appeared to submit that it was not necessary for 
Mr Hilton to establish both these things. However by the end of the 
oral hearing he accepted that both had to be proved. That 
concession was in my view not only rightly made but, given the 
language in Regulation 19(a)(i) inevitable.
277
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The judgment appears to have suggested that mere general awareness 
on the host of the services is insufficient as it requires the presence of 
actual knowledge before the availability of the hosting exemption 
could be denied. Pertaining to the issue of actual knowledge, 
Regulation 22 of the E-Commerce Regulations states: 
In determining whether a service provider has actual knowledge for 
the purposes of regulations 18(b)(v) and 19(a)(i), a court shall take 
into account all matters that appear to it in the particular 
circumstances to be relevant and, among other things, shall have 
regard to — 
(a) whether a service provider has received a notice through a 
means of contact made available in accordance with regulation 
6(1)(c), and 
(b) the extent to which any notice includes –  
(i) the full name and address of the sender of the notice; 
(ii) details of the location of the information in question; and 
(iii) details of the unlawful nature of the activity or information 
in question. 
 
The importance of the requirement has been considered in Bunt v 
Tilley
278
 as the facts showed that the notice issued by the claimant did 
not include details of the location and the unlawful nature of the 
information. It was ruled by Eady J. that the ISP defendant could not 
be held liable for hosting the online content on its services by virtue of 
Regulation 19 of the E-Commerce Regulations.
279
 It was observed that 
in order to be able to characterise any information as ‘unlawful’, a 
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In Davison v Habeeb,
281
 the issue was whether upon notification of 
the defamatory posts by the claimant fixed the fifth defendant (Google 
Inc.) with actual knowledge of unlawful information, and made it 
aware of circumstances from which it would have been apparent to it 
that the information was unlawful. It was held by Parkes J: 
[T]he service provider who is simply notified of a defamatory 
allegation, in circumstances where it is not clear whether a defence 
is available, will have received a notification which is inadequately 
substantiated. In those circumstances, the service provider will not 
have actual knowledge of unlawful information or awareness of 
facts or circumstances from which it would have been apparent to 
the service provider that the information was unlawful.
282
 
Thus, mere notification of the content will not fix online 
intermediaries with actual knowledge under Regulation 19. Further, 
publication of the defamatory material of and concerning a person 
would only become unlawful when there is no defence available to 
them. It was contended that the decision was praiseworthy as it would 
be a comfort to website owners, upon receiving complaints that 
certain postings on their websites are defamatory, to request from the 




In McGrath v Dawkins and others,
284
 the issue was whether the third 
defendant (Amazon) had actual knowledge of unlawful activity or 
information, and / or was made aware of facts or circumstances from 
which it would have been apparent that the activity or information was 
unlawful. It was held by Moloney QC: 
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A corporation can have actual knowledge only through a human 
representative, and given the vast size and diverse nature of 
Amazon's website there is no reason to suppose that anyone in 
Amazon was actually aware of these postings, let alone of their 
possible unlawfulness, prior to C's complaints.
285
 
The court also found out that the claimant’s notice had failed to 
clearly specify the location of neither the postings nor the facts that 
would show them to be unlawful. Further, the claimant had failed to 
comply with Regulation 19 that had been held to import the further 
requirement that the third defendant should know something of the 
strength or weaknesses of available defences. Accordingly, the third 
defendant had succeeded with its Regulation 19 defence but not with 
the section 1 defence under the Defamation Act 1996. For this reason, 
the hosting exemption under Regulation 19 appears to be broader in 
scope than the section 1 defence as the latter will be defeated when the 
intermediaries merely know, or have reason to believe, that their 




Apart from that, the hosting defence requires online intermediaries to 
expeditiously remove or disable access to the unlawful content upon 
gaining actual knowledge of it, or awareness of facts and 
circumstances from which the existence of the unlawful material 
would have been apparent.
287
 The requirement has been considered in 
Kaschke v Gray
288
 whereby it was observed by Standlen J that ‘the 
need to prove expeditious removal arises only where the defendant has 
actual knowledge of unlawful activity or information or awareness of 
facts from which the illegality would have been apparent’.
289
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Unfortunately, there is no clear explanation as to what constitutes 
‘expeditious’ and whether the Internet intermediaries are required to 
check the alleged illegality before removing or disabling access to it. 
It is suggested that instead of simply removing unlawful content upon 
receiving any notice of its existence, the online intermediaries should 
‘do what is reasonable to prevent further communication of that 
notified content’.
290
 Nonetheless, it is argued that the lack of formal 
guidance has resulted in the removal of the content by the ISPs as they 
seek to avoid any legal liability for hosting third party content.
291
 
Finally, the hosting defence would not be available where the author 
of the unlawful statements acted as an agent or employee of the online 
intermediaries because in such cases the author is regarded to be 
‘under the authority or the control’ of the intermediaries pursuant to 
the express provision in Regulation 19(b). In an unreported case of 
Imran Karim v Newsquest Media Group Ltd,
292
 the claimant brought a 
libel action against the defendant in respect of an article and user 
comments posted to the bulletin boards on websites hosted by the 
defendant. With regard to the user comments, the defendant sought to 
rely upon the host immunity in Regulation 19. Based on the evidence 
in the case, Eady J found that the defendant did not have actual 
knowledge of unlawful information nor was aware of it until it was 
pointed out by the claimant. The unlawful material was also taken 
down as soon as the nature of the complaint reached the defendant. It 
was also clear that the recipient of the service was not acting under the 
authority or control of the service provider within the meaning of 
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regulation 19. As a result, it was ruled that the defendant is entitled to 
rely upon that defence. 
7.6.7 Innocent Carrier 
There are no specific provisions that afford the defence of innocent 
dissemination or exempt online intermediaries from carrying, caching 
or hosting unlawful Internet content in Malaysia. Nonetheless, the 
Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (CMA) provides for the 
adoption of self-regulatory system for the communications and 
multimedia industry in the country, and in view of that, the CMA has 
entrusted the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia 
Commission (Commission) to establish relevant industry forums to 
regulate online content and related issues. Accordingly, the 
Communications and Multimedia Content Forum of Malaysia 
(Content Forum) was established as a self-regulatory body that will be 




The Content Forum has prepared a non-binding content code,
294
 the 
Malaysian Communications & Multimedia Content Code (Content 
Code), which sets out guidelines on approved and prohibited content 
in Malaysia.
295
 The Content Code has established a defence of 
innocent carrier in Item 2.0 of Part 5 that states: 
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 providing access to any Content but have neither 
control over the composition of such Content nor any knowledge of 
such Content is deemed an innocent carrier for the purposes of this 
Code. An innocent carrier is not responsible for the Content 
provided. Nonetheless, this does not exempt such access providers 
from adhering to the General measures as outlined in Part 6.0 of 
this Part where it expressly applies to them. 
It is apparent that providers of online content or those who provide 
access to prohibited content
297
 under the Content Code are entitled to 
rely on the innocent carrier defence provided that they have neither 
control over the creation of such content nor any knowledge of it. 
Apart from that, they are expected to comply with the general and 
special measures prescribed in the Content Code. Nonetheless, it is not 
immediately apparent the standard of knowledge (actual or 
constructive) required from the content and access providers in order 
to take advantage of the defence.
298
  
As to the availability of the innocent carrier defence to blog authors or 
editors, their position is still unclear as it has yet to be tested in any 
cases. Nonetheless, it is submitted that they could be rightly included 
within the interpretation of ‘code subjects’ as they are clearly 
‘providers of online content or those who provide access to online 
content’ within Part 5 of the Content Code. Thus, blog authors or 
editors may rely on the innocent carrier defence in order to avoid 
liability for publishing third party prohibited content on their services. 
                                                 
296
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Nonetheless, it is very much unlikely for the defence to be 
successfully pleaded in defamation proceedings as the scope of the 
Content Code has been limited to certain categories only.
299
 In relation 
thereof, it was claimed that the situation would be better addressed if 
the Malaysian Defamation Act 1957 could provide for a defence of 
innocent dissemination similar to the UK Defamation Act 1996.
300
 In 
the absence of specific provisions, the usual defences may be relied 
upon by blog authors or editors in cases involving publication of 




To sum up, defamatory materials published on blogs or other Internet 
publications shall be subjected to defamation laws if they fulfil all of 
the prescribed criteria. Defamatory blog posting by bloggers in the 
UK and Malaysia are considered as publication in permanent form and 
thus shall be governed by libel law. On the other hand, defamatory 
comments by blog readers in the UK are treated as communication in 
transient form and thus a slander, whilst the Malaysian law does not 
distinguish between blog comments and blog postings. Regardless of 
the difference, defamatory content on blogs is normally accessible for 
an indefinite period of time and can be easily repeated or republished 
in the cyber world.  
Nonetheless, bloggers in the UK are no longer exposed to 
indeterminate liability as the Defamation Act 2013 has introduced 
single publication rule that renders bloggers’ liability to expire after 
one year the statement was first published. On the contrary, the 
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multiple publication rule is still in force in Malaysia and as such, 
online defamatory content in blogs or other online publications is 
exposed to unlimited liability. 
Bloggers are also prone to be held liable for publishing defamatory 
statements created by third parties as well as for unlawful content in 
external websites due to the existence of hyperlinks to such materials 
from their blogs. Fortunately, bloggers in the UK could invoke the 
section 1 defence of innocent dissemination under the Defamation Act 
1996 and the immunity from hosting under the E-Commerce 
Regulations in order to escape liability. Further, bloggers may also 
rely on the principal defences of truth and honest opinion, as well as 
the new statutory defence of publication on matter of public interest 
which has been introduced by the Defamation Act 2013.  
As for Malaysian bloggers, there are no comparable statutory defences 
available to them and the innocent carrier defence contained in the 
Malaysian Content Code is most unlikely to be applicable in 
defamation proceedings. In the absence of any specific defences for 
online defamatory content, blog authors or other online publishers 
have to rely on the usual defences of justification and fair comment as 
well as the common law defence of Reynolds privilege and reportage. 
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8.1 Conclusion 
This thesis has considered the interplay between political blogs and 
the right to freedom of speech and expression in Malaysia, comparing 
this with the position in the UK. I use the term ‘blog’ to refer to 
frequently updated websites, which are usually displayed in reverse-
chronological order, with entries comprising personal observations, 
comments on other stories and often hyperlinks to external websites. 
‘Political blogs’ are a form of blogs that focuses on politics and 
related issues.  
In chapter 2, I analysed the distinctive nature and importance of 
political blogs. In a country such as Malaysia, where the traditional 
media have been strictly controlled by the government, political blogs 
have been hailed as an influential channel for independent news and 
information, enabling the people to acquire a reasonable 
understanding of political issues and ultimately to make informed 
judgment in elections. Apart from that, political blogs have also been 
resorted to as a novel platform for the electorate, members of 
opposition parties and civil right groups to freely discuss and debate 
matters of public interests. Therefore, it has been concluded that 
political blogs have, and will continue to play, a crucial role in 
augmenting public participation in politics and ultimately democratic 
process in Malaysia. 
The right to freedom of speech and expression is guaranteed to all of 
the Malaysian citizens ever since the country gained her independence 
in 1957 by Article 10(1) of the Malaysian Federal Constitution. The 
right embraces freedom of the press and the right to receive 
information, but unfortunately the right of access to information is not 
included within its ambit. Apart from that, the article does not provide 
statutory distinction between political speech and other non-political 
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expression such as commercial and artistic speech. Further, no judicial 
decisions have ruled that political speech should be accorded special 
status under the Malaysian law. In the absence of express statutory 
provisions and decided cases, political speech in Malaysia will not be 
given a privileged legal status like the position in the UK. Therefore, 
political speech will be governed by the same rules and regulations 
that are applicable to other types of expression.  
Unfortunately, the position of political speech is further exacerbated 
with the enactment of the Sedition Act 1948, which has on numerous 
occasions been resorted to deter and prevent opposition politicians and 
civic groups from making critical comments on matters of public 
interest. Thus, it is submitted that since open public dialogue and 
criticisms towards the government is hardly permissible, it is very 
much unlikely that political speech will be freely exercised by the 
people in the country.  
Pertaining to the legality of restrictive laws on freedom of expression, 
in general any restrictive laws passed by Parliament that fall within 
the ambit of the fourteen permitted exceptions would be regarded as 
constitutional though harsh and unjust, due to the omission of the 
word ‘reasonable’ in Article 10(1). However, this thesis has 
established that pursuant to the landmark ruling in Sivarasa Rasiah v 
Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor,
1
 any laws that have the effect of 
limiting freedom of expression have to be reasonable, as the word 
‘reasonable’ should be now read before restrictions in Article 10. The 
legality of the Sedition Act 1948 has been challenged in the recent 
case of Mat Shuhaimi bin Shafiei v Public Prosecutor
2
 on the ground 
that it offended the ‘reasonableness test’. The Court of Appeal 
however rejected the appellant’s contention as it ruled that it is 
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reasonable to maintain the impugned provisions of the statute since 
the government has a good right to preserve public peace and order in 
the country. The judgment appears to demonstrate the positivist 
attitude of the local judges, as they were still reluctant to take a liberal 
interpretation of the word ‘reasonable’ so as to give greater protection 
to freedom of expression, particularly political speech. 
There is also uncertainty as to whether the constitutional guarantee to 
freedom of expression in Article 10 and related restrictive laws passed 
by Parliament are applicable to political blogs, in that the 
constitutional provisions were drafted long before the development of 
the Internet and without the technological advancement in mind. 
Nonetheless, since the right can be exercised via any platform or 
channel, it is argued that the same principles should equally be 
applicable to political blogs.  
In addition, political blogs are comparable to the mainstream media in 
the sense that the former provides an avenue for disseminating 
information and news. As such, it is concluded in chapter 3 that 
political blogs should be granted, at minimum, a similar right to 
freedom of the press that is impliedly contained in Article 10. Political 
blogs are not conferred any special status although their postings are 
largely related with discussion on matters of public concern. This is 
mainly because political speech itself is not statutorily or judicially 
privileged over other types of speech in the country. The position of 
political blogs is now resolved with the recent decision in Mat 
Shuhaimi bin Shafiei
3
 whereby the appellant blogger was found guilty 
of posting seditious remarks in his personal blog under the Sedition 
Act 1948. Thus, it is submitted that in general, the right to freedom of 
expression in Malaysia is also exercisable through political blogs, but 
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the exercise of such a right is not without limit as it is made subject to 
restrictive laws that have been Parliament. 
A comparative study of freedom of expression in the UK is contained 
in chapter 4. Prior to the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA), the UK had neither a codified written constitution, nor a 
specific bill of rights that protected fundamental rights. Consequently, 
freedom of expression was merely residual in nature and could only 
be exercised when there were no express restrictions in statutes or the 
common law. Some domestic judges were influenced by Article 10 of 
the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).
4
 However, it was held that the 
provision could only be applied when there was ambiguity in statutes 
or the common law.
5
 Further, the ECHR had yet to be incorporated 
into the domestic law and thus they remained unenforceable in the 
UK. This scenario has changed when freedom of expression and other 
fundamental rights in the ECHR were incorporated as a schedule in 
the HRA. As a result, freedom of expression is now statutorily 
available to all persons in the UK.  
The right to freedom of expression embraces freedom to hold opinion, 
freedom to receive and freedom to impart information and ideas. 
Apart from that, freedom of the press is also included within the scope 
of this fundamental right. With regard to the position of political 
speech in the UK, it has been observed that although such a right is 
applicable to all forms of expression, local courts have judicially 
recognised its preferred legal status over other types of speech such as 
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commercial or artistic expression.
6
 This is evidently in stark contrast 
with the position in Malaysia that does not statutorily or judicially 
distinguish between all categories of expression and therefore, does 
not accord special preferred position to political speech. 
Freedom of expression in the UK is not absolute and its exercise is 
subject to a number of limitations. The state is allowed to impose 
restrictions on such a right provided that they are prescribed by law, 
made in pursuance of legitimate aims and be necessary in democratic 
society. In determining the validity of such derogation, domestic 
judges are granted a margin of appreciation but the final decision still 
rests with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). With regard 
to the application of the right in political blogs, Article 10 has clearly 
stipulated that freedom of expression is exercisable ‘regardless of 
frontiers’. As such, it is submitted that the general rules and principles 
governing freedom of expression in the UK should be equally 
applicable to the blogosphere. Alternatively, it is has been claimed 
that since majority of the digital communications in blogs and other 
web based platforms are regarded as low level speech,
7
 this kind of 
online expression merits some protections and any restrictions on such 
speech must be proportionate to its level.
8
 
Chapter 5 of the study has analysed the specific regulatory regime of 
the media in Malaysia. In general, the traditional print and broadcast 
media have been subjected to strict regulatory control by the state. The 
Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 (PPA), the main 
legislation for the print industry, imposes prior constraints in the form 
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of a printing licence and publication permit on newspaper publishers 
and operators of printing presses. Unfortunately, the grant, refusal, 
suspension or revocation of licence or permit is placed under the 
discretionary power of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Apart from that, 
the press is also bound by the content regulation under the PPA that 
prohibits the publication of materials which are obscene or against 
public decency, or which incite to violence against persons or 
property, or which promote feelings of ill-will, hostility, enmity, 
hatred, disharmony or disunity.
9
 Further, not only publication of 
materials that are deemed undesirable or malicious content is 
prohibited under the PPA, such publication is also regarded as a 
criminal offence that is punishable with imprisonment or fine.
10
 
As to the application of the regulatory regime of the press to political 
blogs, an uncertainty arises since political blogs may comprise of 
audio materials that could have then resulted such blogs to be 
considered as ‘audio recording’ within the broad definition of the term 
‘publication’ in the PPA. Therefore, there is a slight possibility that 
the provisions of the PPA might be extended to political blogs that 
incorporate audio postings even though such blogs are largely text-
based publication. Nonetheless, it is argued that it is very much 
unlikely for political blogs or other online publications be mandated to 
procure licence or permit under the PPA as these prior constraints may 
contravene the government’s guarantee of no censorship of the 
Internet in the country. 
With regard to the broadcast media, the Communications and 
Multimedia Act 1998 (CMA), the primary statute for the converged 
industries, has categorised such media as content applications service 
providers that must procure and hold valid individual licence before 
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offering their services to the public. And in contrast with the licensing 
system of the press, the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia 
Commission (MCMC) has been entrusted as an independent 
regulatory body that will administer applications for licences and 
make recommendations to the Minister whether to approve or reject 
any applications. Therefore, it is submitted that with this setup, the 
licensing system of the broadcast media appears to offer greater 
transparency and less governmental control over the broadcast media 
in the country compared to the print industry. 
Pertaining to the application of the broadcast regulatory system to 
political blogs, it is submitted that since the phrase ‘content 
application service’ has been given a very broad interpretation so as to 
encompass online publications, political blogs may be subjected to the 
licensing system of the broadcast media. Nonetheless, regulation 5 of 
the Communications and Multimedia (Licensing) Regulations 2000 
states that an individual licence shall only be granted to local 
corporate entities and not individuals or unincorporated bodies or 
groups. In addition, order 6 of the Communications and Multimedia 
(Licensing) (Exemption) Order 2000 expressly stipulates that 
providers of Internet content application services are exempted from 
having individual or class license. Thus, it is apparent that the 
regulatory regime of the broadcast media will not be applicable to 
political blogs. 
As for the Internet industry in Malaysia, it is evidently clear that the 
Internet is less regulated compared to the traditional media as only the 
Internet service providers (ISPs) are required to be licensed as 
applications service provider class licensees,
11
 whilst political blogs or 
other web-based communications are exempted from the licensing 
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regime under the CMA. This is perhaps due to the ‘no censorship’ 





 that puts into effect the government’s pledge that the 
online environment is generally protected from prior interferences by 
the state. Therefore, political blogs and other online publications are 
basically free to publish content without the need to procure any 
licence or permit from the authority. Regardless of the no censorship 
promise, provision of illegal content
14
 and improper use of the 
Internet
15
 are regarded as criminal offences punishable with fine and 
imprisonment under the CMA. Further, the players of the Internet 
industry are also encouraged to voluntarily subscribe to the Malaysian 
Communications & Multimedia Content Code (Content Code), which 
sets out guidelines and procedures on the publication of ‘indecent 
content, obscene content, violence, menacing content, bad language, 




In short, chapter 5 of the study has established that political blogs and 
other online publications are currently not bound by any specific 
regulatory controls that govern the traditional media as well as the 
Internet industry in Malaysia. Even though there is a slight possibility 
of extending the licensing system of the press to the blogosphere, it is 
submitted that such application would definitely amount to a violation 
of the no censorship guarantee of the Internet. For that reason, it has 
been alleged that the existing legal regime of the traditional and new 
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16
 Part 2 of the Content Code. 
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media is still lacking in regulating the blogosphere or other online 
publications.
17
 Nonetheless, it is submitted that post publication rules 
and regulations are more than sufficient to handle content-related 
issues in political blogs and therefore, it is concluded that at present 
they should not be mandated to comply with any licensing 
requirements such as those applicable to the traditional print and 
broadcast media. 
An analysis of specific regulatory regime applicable to the media in 
the UK is elaborated in chapter 6 of the thesis. The print industry is 
currently subject to a new self-regulatory system administered by the 
Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO). Its remit covers 
editorial content included in a printed newspaper and magazine and 
editorial content on electronic services operated by member publishers 
that voluntarily subscribe to the Editor’s Code of Practice (Code).
18
 
This includes blogs belonging to newspapers and magazines that 
subscribe to the Code and pre-moderated before publication. It is 
further clarified that IPSO will not be accountable for online materials 
that is not on sites owned by or under the control of its members.
19
 As 
such, it is concluded that the self-regulatory system of the press is not 
applicable to political blogs that are generally operated by individual 
bloggers or even personal blogs of professional journalists since such 
blogs are not owned by or under the control of IPSO’s member 
publishers.  
As for the broadcast media in the UK, they have been made subject to 
extensive statutory regulations and are governed by two separate 
regulatory bodies; Office of Communications (Ofcom) for commercial 
televisions and radio stations, and the British Broadcasting 
                                                 
17
 Aishath Muneeza, ‘The Milestone of Blogs and Bloggers in Malaysia’ (2010) 3 
MLJ cvii. 
18
 IPSO AOA 7.3.6; IPSO Regulation 3.6. 
19
 IPSO AOA 7.3.7; IPSO Regulation 3.7. 
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Corporation (BBC) for all BBC content whether transmitted over the 
television, radio or online. Any would be broadcasters are required to 
abide by the licensing requirements under the Communications Act 
2003 (CA). Apart from that, the broadcast media are also bound by 
strict content regulations that are not applicable to other media, in 
particular the requirement of due accuracy and impartiality though the 
IPSO’s Code calls for accuracy. 
The regulatory system of the broadcast media administered by Ofcom 
is not applicable to political blogs because Internet communications, 
apart from Internet live TV and VOD services, are generally excluded 
from Ofcom’s remit by the CA. Nonetheless, blogs or other user-
generated content (UGC) that are associated with the BBC are to be 
subjected to regulatory control by the BBC as the BBC’s Editorial 
Guidelines have clearly stated that the standards expected of BBC 
content are not confined to television and radio stations only but also 
to other forms of communication channels, including the Internet. 
Therefore, it is concluded that apart from blogs that are related to the 
BBC, political blogs and other online publications that are largely 
published by individuals or ordinary public members are not bound by 
the specific regulatory regime of the broadcast media in the UK. 
Regarding the video on demand (VOD) industry, this new medium is 
currently co-regulated by Ofcom and the Association for Television 
on Demand (ATVOD). VOD providers that principally offer 
‘television-like’ programmes, empower viewers to freely select and 
watch the programmes at their own preferred time, control selection 
and organisation of the programmes, and offer the programmes to the 
public at large are considered as providing on-demand programme 
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services (ODPS) under the CA.
20
 These requirements are cumulative 
in nature and non-fulfilment of any criterion will exclude a provider 
from statutory duties and obligations that are imposed on VOD 
providers by the CA. In relation to this, since most audio visual 
materials in political blogs are not television-like, normally incidental 
to their largely text-based entries, and are not normally provided for 
remuneration, it is concluded that the co-regulatory regime of VOD 
services will not be applicable to political blogs. 
As for the Internet industry in the UK, the government has generally 
excluded Internet communications, including political blogs from the 
licensed sectors that are governed by Ofcom. The Internet Watch 
Foundation (IWF), the only self-regulatory body that has been 
established by the industry to govern online content in the UK, does 
not regulate political blogs since the IWF’s role and remits are solely 
designed to handle issues of online child pornography and obscene 
adult materials. To sum up, it is concluded in chapter 6 of the thesis 
that the specific regulatory systems and bodies that have been 
formulated to govern the traditional print and broadcast media, the 
VOD services and the Internet industries in the UK would be unlikely 
to be applied to political blogs. 
Chapter 7 of the study has examined blogs and online defamation in 
Malaysia and the UK. It is clear that defamatory blog entries by 
bloggers will be governed by libel law in both countries. Nonetheless, 
there is dissimilarity with regard to comments by blog readers as in 
the UK they are considered to be slander, whilst in Malaysia such 
comments are treated in the same manner as blog posts. Blog owners 
may also be liable for defamatory content posted by third parties as 
well as defamatory materials in external websites due to the existence 
                                                 
20
 Section 368A(1) of the CA provides statutory interpretation of the phrase ‘on-
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of hyperlinks from their blogs. As a consequent, they have to establish 
a defence to escape liability in defamation proceedings. Bloggers in 
Malaysia have to rely on the usual defence of justification and fair 
comment in the Malaysian Defamation Act 1957, and the common 
law defence of Reynolds privilege and reportage. In the UK, on the 
other hand, bloggers may invoke specific defences for online content 
in the section 1 defence of innocent dissemination under the 
Defamation Act 1996 and the immunity from hosting under the 
Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002. Furthermore, 
they may rely on the principal defences of truth and honest opinion, as 
well as the new defence of publication on matter of public interest in 
the Defamation Act 2013. The study therefore shows that political 
blogs in both Malaysia and the UK may be open to challenge on the 
basis of private suits in defamation and, in resolving such cases courts 
need to be aware of the special importance that this form of 
communication now plays in furthering democratic debate and a 
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